MASTERARBEIT

EUROPE'S COLONIAL LEGACY – THE MISSING LINK TO UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN INTEGRATION?

The Rome Treaty negotiations and Britain's accession to the EEC in the light of colonial legacies in Sub-Sahara Africa and quantified by data extracted from the COMTRADE database

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Meinen Eltern gewidmet.

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Preface

The impact of Europe's colonial legacy on the formative years of the European Economic Community is today's most widely overlooked facet in the study of European Integration. With the present master thesis in European Union Studies prepared at the *Salzburg Centre of European Union Studies* I would like to address this important, yet largely ignored aspect of European history. I am confident that what I discovered in the course of my research and what I have compiled into this 80 pages of Eurafrican relations and its impact on the Rome Treaty negotiations as well as the accession round of 1973 will shed some new light on these landmark events of European Integration, showing how they are interrelated. The instances of the Rome Treaty negotiations and the UK's entry bids into the EEC become much more tangible when reviewing them in the light of colonial links and their impact on the former mother countries' domestic economies. I would even like to conjecture that colonial history is the missing link to fully understand the process of European Integration up to the mid-70s.

I would like to make some very general remarks on the methodology at this early point: In my paper I naturally have to be very specific in remit to account for both time and space restraints associated with the preparation of a master thesis at my faculty. So, drawing from the rationalist framework provided by Moravcsik in his book *The Choice for Europe*, in which he distinguishes three phases to study European Integration – national preference formation, interstate bargaining, and institutional choice – I want to gravitate my work towards the second phase. Neither do I feel familiar enough with the political and societal landscape of member countries in the surveyed time period to accurately describe the formation of their domestic preferences, nor do I think the question of institutional choice is a most indispensable determinant in explaining the issue at hand – with the Yaoundé Convention the Eurafrican relations were very soon dealt with in an institutional framework largely outside that of the EEC. However, at some points references in both directions will be necessary.

Also, I have tried to use as many primary sources as possible. Most prominently, I have used the United Nations COMTRADE database to quantify the exchange of goods between selected countries. By doing this I hope to be able to contribute something novel to the discussion of European Integration. I think that the pursuit of this approach might be especially worthwhile – even in other areas – because of the undisputable nature of the material, its easy accessibility, and trouble-free quantifiability. Also, I think it is fair to assume that it was exactly this kind of information that was available to stakeholders and invoked a good deal of their preferences to be reflected in their bargaining positions. Additionally, I have found primary documents giving me tremendous insight freely available on the Internet at the European Navigator, compiled by the *Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe* (CVCE). The *General Report on the Activities of the Community*, consistently assembled by the Commission starting from 1958, was another welcome primary wealth of information. When using secondary sources I was trying to favor those that have themselves extensively used primary sources to reach at their conclusions. Quotations were made in The Chicago Manual of Style using *Zotero*.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Helmut Kramer and Andreas Maurer of *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* in Berlin, who both helped me in the very early stages of this paper and gave me a better idea of where the journey could take me. Also, I would like to thank the *Institut für Europäische Politik* in Berlin, who let me browse through their material on their premises. In addition, I need to thank Thomas Spielbüchler of the University of Innsbruck, who helped me understand the African perspective better, and Bernard Barthalay, who assisted me with French original sources. At the European Commission I am thankful to Gino Debo at the Directorate-General for Development, who readily helped me with all my inquiries, and the very forthcoming ladies at the Historical Archives of the Commission as well as the European Parliament. Last but not least, at the University of Salzburg I am most indebted to Sonja Puntscher-Riekmann, regarding the political sciences' aspects of my paper, and Christian Dirninger, not only regarding his area of research as a professor of economic history but also – as the main attendant of my paper – with regard to all other major and minor problems that arise at the fringes of such a work and that he all handled with utmost care and empathy.

Salzburg, July 2009

Abbreviations

AASM	Associated African and Malagasy States
ACP	African, Caribbean, Pacific
CAF	Central African Federation
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CAR	Central African Republic
CET	Common External Tariff
CCC	Common Commercial Policy
CSA	Commonwealth Sugar Agreement
CVCE	*Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe*
DG	Directorate-General
DOM	*Départements d'outre-mer*
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EEC	European Economic Community
EC	European Community
ECC	Early Commonwealth Countries
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
ECU	European Currency Unit
EDF	European Development Fund
EIB	European Investment Bank
EMA	European Monetary Agreement
EP	European Parliament
EPU	European Payments Union
EUA	European Units of Account
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FLN	*Front de libération nationale*
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GSP	Generalized System of Preferences
HCC	Historic Commonwealth Countries
HDI	Human Development Index
IC	Implementing Convention
LCC	Late Commonwealth Countries
MEP	Member of European Parliament
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OCTs	Overseas Countries and Territories
OEEC	Organization for European Economic Cooperation
QMV	Qualified Majority Votings
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
TOMs	*Territoires d'outre-mer*
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
u/a	units of account
WW I	World War I
WW II	World War II

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Introduction

The history of early European Integration is also a history of late European colonialism. At the time of the Rome Treaty[1] negotiations, four of the six partners that should form the EEC still had to deal with colonial repercussions: **France** had the biggest colonial empire to run, stretching from Senegal in the West to Djibouti in the East. **Belgium**, too, had considerable dependencies in Africa in 1957. In fact, with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Belgium inherited a country from Leopold II in 1908 that was nearly eight times her own size. In 1949 the UN declared Somalia a trusteeship of **Italy** with the proviso to prepare her for independence within 10 years.[2] Finally, outside Africa the **Netherlands** retained administration over Dutch New Guinea with plans to prepare her for independence, too. Only **Germany**, who lost her colonial possessions after WWI, and **Luxembourg** had no dependencies in the 50s. Similarly, in the ensuing accession rounds of 1973 and 1986 colonial legacies were issues to be broached in the course of entry negotiations.

Still, colonization was not the project of single European nations. In fact, the nature of colonization was **pan-European**: The pioneers that settled in overseas territories were in their spirit pan-European.[3] This reflected in the migration patterns;[4] although Germany was largely cut off from European overseas expansion due to political fragmentation, "*[…] many Germans participated in the pan-European wave of overseas expansion […]*"[5] as early as in the 16th century.[6] The pan-European nature was for a long time also owing to the then prevalent economic system of mercantilism, which promoted territorial expansion to acquire additional resources among all European countries alike.[7]

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[1] 'Rome Treaty' is used somewhat lightly in this paper to refer to the 'Treaty establishing the European Economic Community'.

[2] In 1960 Italian Somaliland merged with British Somaliland in the North of present day Somalia; see David Birmingham, *The decolonization of Africa* (London: UCL Press, 1995), 42.

[3] Osterhammel does not expand on this point in his book (see footnote 8). My personal guess would be that the connecting element was their self-perception of cultivating the pagans, so defining them as a relatively homogenous group of cultivated people in the face of autochthones in overseas territories; compare Loomba who explains: "*Despite the enormous differences between the colonial enterprises of various European nations, they seem to generate fairly similar stereotypes of 'outsiders' […].*" Ania Loomba, *Colonialism/Postcolonialism*, 2. ed., The new critical idiom (London [et al.]: Routledge, 2005), 93.

[4] "*Partly because national identities and national boundaries were so uncertain in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries[,] European explorers and scholars, as well as traders, soldiers and seamen were able to move from the service of one country to another with relative freedom.*" David Arnold, *The age of discovery: 1400 - 1600*, Reprinted. (London [et al.]: Routledge, 1994), 11.

[5] George Steinmetz, *The devil's handwriting: precoloniality and the German colonial state in Qingdao, Samoa, and Southwest Africa* (Chicago [et al.]: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 376.

[6] The pan-European nature of colonialism can also be illustrated by one of its earliest episodes of overseas expansion: In the late fifteenth-century Christopher Columbus – an **Italian** married to a **Portuguese** woman – embarked on his journey to find a west-route to Asia for **Spain**, after being rejected support from the Portuguese, **British**, and **French** courts, all of which he asked for assistance in turn before finding a royal patron in Queen Isabella of Castile; see Arnold, *The age of discovery*, 12.

[7] See Roy H. Ginsberg, *Demystifying the European Union: the enduring logic of regional integration* (Lanham, Md. [et al.]: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 22.

Accordingly, the colonial financing structure knew no political or ideological boundaries. For example, in the 19th century a lot of German capital was invested in the British Empire, while French capital financed Russia in her plans for territorial expansion.[8] In the inter-war period, Coudenhove-Kalergi strongly advocated a pan-European effort to make hay of Africa.[9]

In any case, Africa was the most recent chapter in European colonial history: After the great European powers divided much of the rest of the world among themselves at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, starting with the Berlin Conference of 1884 the **Scramble for Africa** put the entire dark continent under direct European control in just about two decades.[10] The discovery of diamond and gold resources in 1867 and 1886, respectively, served as forceful pull factors for European states to grab as much of Africa as quickly as they could. The period of decolonization then started with independence of Libya from Italy in 1951 and was spurred by Britain's and France's unsuccessful attempt to solve the Suez Crisis of 1956 with military force. Independence of African countries in the early 60s came as a great surprise to the former 'mother countries', but by the early 60s most of the former colonies preferred independence in the hope of boosting their economic and social welfare as a result.[11] *„The retreat of the tide of European imperialism seemed to be almost as rapid as its rise had been 75 years earlier."*[12]

It is a well-known fact that many challenges today lie in Africa. One might take statistical figures to buttress this point: In the first quarter of 2009 nine of nineteen UN peacekeeping operations were situated in Africa; about 70 percent of UN peacekeepers and 73 percent of the UN peacekeeping budget went to Africa.[13] Another approach to illustrate Africa's special position is by looking at the Human Development Index (HDI) assembled by the World Bank, which has increasingly become the global gold standard when comparing countries' economic, social and environmental levels of development. When reading the HDI table backwards, among the 30 least developed countries 28 (!) were situated in Sub-Sahara Africa in 2005.[14] A final approach to grasp the magnitude of Sub-Saharan African problems is to look at statistics offered by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations.[15] In the 2003 to 2005 period 30 percent of the total population living in Sub-Sahara

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[8] See Jürgen Osterhammel, K*olonialismus: Geschichte - Formen - Folgen,* 5. ed. (München: Beck, 2006), 29-30.

[9] See Dirk Van Laak, "Afrika vor den Toren: deutsche Raum- und Ordnungsvorstellungen nach der erzwungenen "Dekolonisation"," in *Ordnungen in der Krise: zur politischen Kulturgeschichte Deutschlands 1900 - 1933*, ed. Wolfgang Hardtwig, Ordnungssysteme 22 (München: Oldenbourg, 2007), 106.

[10] See Kenneth J. Twitchett, "The Colonial Powers and the United Nations," *Journal of Contemporary History* 4, no. 1 (1969): 168.

[11] See Osterhammel, *Kolonialismus*, 39-46.

[12] Birmingham, *The decolonization of Africa*, 1.

[13] See Martin Palouš, "EU Presidency Statement: Open debate on Peace and Security in Africa" (presented at the United Nations Security Council, New York, March 18, 2009), http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_8578_en.htm (29 July 2009).

[14] See UNDP, "Human development index 2005," *Human Development Report 2007/2008*, 2009, http://hdrstats.undp.org/indicators/1.html (29 July 2009).

[15] See FAO, "Prevalence of undernourishment in total population," *Food Security Statistics*, 2008, http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/ess/documents/food_security_statistics/PrevalenceUndernourishment_en.xls (29 July 2009).

Africa faced undernourishment. So, Sub-Sahara Africa also infamously led this table from reverse. Europe today is the world's largest donor of foreign aid to developing countries and the special needs of Sub-Sahara Africa make special attention of this area both necessary and legitimate. Accordingly, a myriad of scientific and popular contributions have dealt with Eurafrica[16], both pre- and post-colonialism and on a bilateral as well as multilateral level. Evidence of economic interests reflected in trade statistics has then often been presented in an unsystematic and random fashion, frequently taken from a great number of different sources. The Internet opens a whole new world of possibilities in this respect, unimaginable only a few years ago.

Therefore, in my work I would like to close this lacuna of transparency and capitalize on a database available on the Internet to consistently review the European economic interest towards Africa from the founding of the EEC in 1957 to the accession of Britain in 1973, drawing from one single source. By using the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database COMTRADE, assembled by the United Nations Statistics Division, I would like to sketch a wide-ranging picture of Europe's economic entanglement with Africa on a primary source level starting from the early 60s.[17] This economic picture shall then be complemented by the political manifestations of these vested national interests. Milestones of European Integration, such as the tensely-negotiated Rome Treaty or the French-blocked UK entry bids, become better discernible when holding them against the light of European colonial history. My **overarching-hypothesis**[18] henceforth is that the presentation of this data – and a system of categorization on the level of the nation state devised by capitalization thereof – to illustrate the different *foci* of colonial legacies, provides additional value in the understanding of the political process of European Integration, with concrete manifestations in the countries' behavior in the respective interstate bargaining processes.[19] To that end, each chapter will start with a historic synopsis to portray the economic background. This will then be followed by a narrative of the political process in question to contextualize the inferences made. The work so gets an **interdisciplinary feature** in economic history and political sciences.

To analyze the economic relations between Europe and Africa, this paper will deal primarily with **imports** into the EEC. Exports originating from the EEC towards Africa will not be surveyed. The

[16] 'Eurafrica' is a neologism merging the two words 'Europe' and 'Africa'. It has its origins in nineteenth-century Germany but acquired enduring resonance as ideology only in France in the concept of *France Afrique* based on assimilation; see Obadiah Mailafia, *Europe and economic reform in Africa: Structural adjustment and economic diplomacy*, Routledge studies in development economics 9 (London [et al.]: Routledge, 1997), 35-36.

[17] The data itself is extracted in the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), revision 1. Commodity codes as well as commodity descriptions are indicated in tables and figures where useful. The COMTRADE database is available at http://comtrade.un.org (29 July 2009).

[18] This overarching-hypothesis shall be supplemented by sub-hypotheses formulated at the beginning of each chapter.

[19] It must be noted at this point that another major variable in explaining the EEC member states' position towards Africa was that of **expectations**, i.e. their perception as to what potential future gains were to be reaped from an Association of African territories (e.g. oil or gas reserves in the Sahara, other natural resources, potential future outlet markets for European companies). However, since these expectations are ambiguous to assess and virtually impossibly to quantify they will be ignored in this analysis.

reason for this is twofold: Firstly, the role of African countries, or developing countries more generally, lay primarily in supplying primary resources, such as petroleum, wood or copper. Also, tropical agricultural products like bananas or cocoa, which do not grow in the temperate climate of Europe, are important import flows to present the situation accurately. Secondly, Europe was not dependent on Africa when it came to exports. While some of the imports were almost exclusively derived from African countries – e.g. France receiving 63 percent of her aluminium imports from Cameroon or the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) receiving 60 percent of her groundnut imports from Nigeria – this is not true for exports, i.e. there was no single line of exports were the African countries would constitute a group of significant size.[20] Generally speaking, exports to Africa were manufactured goods, chemicals, and machinery and transport equipment. The share of African countries in these product categories was a minor fraction of the total export figure. Their significance to the European export market was therefore marginal, at best.

To identify the scope of analysis, **Sub-Sahara Africa** shall be defined as follows: Sub-Sahara Africa comprises of all independent countries in Africa that have no access to the Mediterranean Sea.[21] Also, for the purpose of this study independent states in the Atlantic and Indian ocean with no direct connection to the African mainland (Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, Union of the Comoros, Republic of Seychelles, Mauritius) are excluded from the scope, since they have had a quite different colonial experience from the mainland countries due to their easy accessibility from the sea. However, Madagascar is explicitly included in the analysis.



Figure 1: Sub-Saharan African countries as defined in this paper are highlighted in green. Island countries – with the exception of Madagascar – are not included. Source: Wikimedia Commons and own illustration.

The remainder of this work shall be structured as follows: Chapter one will deal with the **Rome Treaty** and the Yaoundé Convention. Chapter two will encompass the **Northern Enlargement** with a focus on the UK joining the EEC and resulting ramifications for Eurafrican relations, reflected in the Lomé Convention. The last section concludes.

[20] Algeria and France being the exception to this rule. For example, in 1962 France exported almost a fifth of her food and live animals to Algeria. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.

[21] The Western Sahara and with it the partially recognized Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic are excluded from the scope as well.

1. Foundation of the EEC and the Yaoundé Convention

This chapter deals with the early period of Eurafrican relations on a pan-European level. While in the past African colonial history was always one of bilateral relations between a European motherland and an African dependency, with the Rome Treaty this relationship was fundamentally altered: France, having a great interest in including her African territories in some form in the EEC, pressed hard to associate her *Territoires d'outre-mer* (TOMs) with the European Common Market. In the end, she succeeded in her demands and a number of Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) were associated with the EEC under Part IV of the Rome Treaty. The list of African OCTs associated with the EEC and included in the scope of this paper is visualized in figure two and stated below: [22]

- **French West Africa:** Senegal, Mali (French Sudan), Guinea (French Guinea), Ivory Coast, Benin (Dahomey), Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso (Upper Volta)
- **French Equatorial Africa:** Republic of the Congo (Middle Congo), Central African Republic (Ubangi-Shari), Chad, Gabon
- **Other French dependencies:** Togo, Cameroon, Djibouti (French Somaliland), Madagascar
- **Belgian dependencies:** Democratic Republic of the Congo (Belgian Congo), Rwanda (Ruanda-Urundi), Burundi (Ruanda-Urundi)
- **Italian Trust Territory:** Somalia (Italian Somaliland)



Figure 2: African OCTs associated with the EEC pursuant to Annex IV of the Rome Treaty. Source: Wikimedia Commons and own illustration.

[22] Historic names as used at the time of the Rome Treaty are indicated in brackets. Cameroon and Somalia in particular have experienced substantial territorial shifts after independence. However, in figure 2 only the present day frontiers are presented as a matter of simplification. The full list of OCTs that were associated with the EEC under Part IV is available at http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Treaty_establishing_the_EEC_-_Annex_IV:_Overseas_countries_and_territories_to_which_the_provisions_of_Part_IV_of_the_Treaty_apply (29 July 2009).

Since none of the African countries associated under the Rome Treaty took part in the actual Rome Treaty negotiations, they were naturally not bound by its provisions once they acquired sovereignty. Still, since Association brought with it some largely unconditional perquisites in the form of investment facilities, most African countries wanted to uphold good relations with the EEC. So, it came as little surprise that all African OCTs but Guinea came together as the Associated African and Malagasy States (AASM) to sign the Yaoundé Convention in 1963 in order to continue economic special relations with the EEC.

This chapter will first discuss the economic background between the EEC6 and selected African countries using early data from the COMTRADE database. A categorization of the Six on the basis of the extracted data shall be tried in the conclusion. The second section will then review the negotiation process of the Rome Treaty in the light of **sub-hypothesis one**, which states that the process of European Integration, if failing in 1957, would most probably have failed over the question of associating OCTs and so over France's colonial legacy. Finally, the negotiations and outcome of the Yaoundé Convention shall be presented shortly, again using data from the COMTRADE database to make some inferences about the state of dependency in Eurafrican relations at the time.

1.1. The economic situation between the EEC6 and the African18 in the early 60s

The data presented in this first section on the economic situation between Europe and Africa is from 1962, which is the earliest possible date when extracting data from the COMTRADE database available on the Internet. Since this chapter shall highlight the situation in the second half of the 50s as well, which is when the EEC6 came together to negotiate the Rome Treaty and the Association of African OCTs, one important assumption has to be made: Changes between 1957 and 1962 were not significant. If they were, no conclusions could be drawn from the data presented in this chapter with respect to the Rome Treaty negotiations. It seems implausible, however, that the 1962 data is skewed to the point where it does lose all explanatory power to elucidate the situation of 1957.

Three other factors come into mind that should make the critical reader cautious: First, the already started integration towards a Common Market will most like have had some upward impact on the numbers, especially with respect to intra-EEC imports. The exchange of commodities between the Six might have been considerably smaller in 1957 due to this factor. However, it seems sensible to assume that the magnitude and order of numbers is about right. Second, and working in the opposite direction, Guinea started disintegrating from the West as early as 1958. So, the numbers for Guinea should be taken with special care and might have been higher in 1957 than in 1962. Third, and also working as a downward bias, in 1960 the Congo crisis erupted in the DRC. Having in mind that, even with this crises in full swing in 1962, the DRC is one of the major countries represented in the data, her share might have also been considerably higher in 1957. Still, for the lack of alternatives available, the 1962 data will have to suffice for this analysis.

The scope of analysis comprises the EEC6 and the AASM[23] less Rwanda plus Guinea, henceforth termed the '**African18**'. The African18 so comprises of French and Belgian colonies as well as Somalia under Italian administration. Also, the data for Algeria will be presented in this section as it was a crucial jigsaw piece and ultimately tied to the EEC in Article 227 of the Rome Treaty.

Each EEC country is being dealt with in three ways:

- First, the situation regarding the African18 and Algeria is presented more broadly.
- Second, **four tropical commodities** typical of the AASM exporting structure – bananas, coffee, cocoa and groundnuts – are presented in a more detailed manner to highlight the different geographic centers of gravity in the early 60s. By applying a color code (shades of green – African18; shades of orange – British-Africa; shades of blue – Latin America[24]) the different geographic focal points shall be visualized.
- Third, the **intra-EEC** import figures are presented as an indicator of how much interest the single countries had in a European Common Market: The higher the share of intra-EEC imports, the greater the interest in a Common Market and open European borders.

Tables and figures are cumulated on separate sheets labeled **Info Boxes** for each respective country. After dealing with all EEC6 partners individually, a short section at the end shall systematically review their interests relative to one another and draw conclusions.

1.1.1. France

France had imports totaling $7.5 billion in 1962. This number was less than 10 percent of her GDP, a share lower than her EEC partners. However, almost 9 percent of the total import figure came from Algeria, which is clear indication of the special position Algeria held for France at the time.[25] In some fields Algeria's position as France's prime source of supply was even more heavily pronounced: In 1962 almost 80 percent of alcoholic beverages imported by France originated from Algeria, mostly wine. Also, in terms of petroleum imports – in the 60s not significantly less important to the functioning of an industrialized economy than today – France drew heavily from Algerian resources. Over one third of French petroleum imports came from Algeria in 1962. Algeria was of importance to the French economy unrivaled by any other country in the region, maybe the world, which should help explain some of the fierceness invested in trying to keep it as a colony.

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[23] Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Dem. Rep.), Congo (Rep.), Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Togo. *N.B.*: Data for Rwanda is not available in the COMTRADE database.

[24] For the purpose of this study 'Latin America' shall refer to all countries and territories of the Americas south of the USA, including such countries as Belize, Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Antigua and Barbuda, St. Lucia, Dominica, Grenada, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and the Bahamas, in all of which English prevails. Similarly, the former Dutch colonies Suriname, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba shall be included.

[25] It is important to point out that I foresee no mechanism to control for the size of economic actors in my methodology to assess import shares, i.e. the importance of larger states will tend to be overstated in the rankings presented throughout this work, while smaller states might be underestimated prima facie.

INFO BOX 1

1962 French intra-EEC Imports	in US$	% of World
FRG	1 323 643 392	17.61%
Belg-Lux	496 909 056	6.61%
Italy	414 478 240	5.51%
Netherlands	288 210 432	3.83%
World	7 516 678 144	Σ33.57%

Table 2: French intra-EEC Imports by Country in 1962. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.

1962 French Imports	in US$	% of World
Algeria	657 574 400	8.75%
Senegal	126 838 920	1.69%
Ivory Coast	111 910 944	1.49%
Cameroon	70 224 584	0.93%
Madagascar	54 196 268	0.72%
Gabon	45 428 580	0.60%
Congo, Dem.Rep.	33 771 168	0.45%
Niger	15 032 507	0.20%
Guinea	11 494 911	0.15%
Chad	11 296 563	0.15%
Togo	10 481 301	0.14%
Benin	9 952 513	0.13%
Central African Rep.	9 422 915	0.13%
Congo, Rep.	8 334 133	0.11%
Mali	3 714 456	0.05%
Mauritania	889 614	0.01%
Burkina Faso	681 136	0.01%
Somalia	358 597	0.00%
Burundi	46 798	0.00%
World	7 516 678 144	Σ15,72%

Table 1 (right): French Imports by Country in 1962. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.



Figure 3: France's Top 5 Importers of Bananas, Coffee, Cocoa and Groundnuts in 1962. African18 countries are depicted in shades of green. *N.B.:* Only the 5 top importers are depicted. The share of African18 countries therefore can be higher, since they also form part of the 'other' category. Source: COMTRADE and own computation. Own illustration.

To understand why Algeria became this exception among French overseas possessions it is important to sketch the historical background. Algeria has been an integral part of France since the 1830s. This was a unique feature of the France-Algerian colonial relation, in that France came to define Algeria as basically an extension of herself. Algeria's fight for independence, then, triggered a whole row of societal and political questions. The French-Algerian War, which was raging from 1954 to 1962, is considered one of the most callous wars over independence ever. It became widely known as the first modern led war for independence of an African state against a European state and so became the archetype of the mid-twentieth century fight to end Western colonialism.[26]

More to it, the Algerian War challenged France's self-perception of what she was today and what she would be in the future. On 18 March 1962 with the signing of the Évian Accords by Charles de Gaulle and representatives of the *Front de libération nationale* (FLN), the secessionist movement in Algeria, the war would be ended. France, interested in ongoing political and commercial relations with her former colony, would get the right to use certain military bases and the French colonial population in Algeria would be granted religious freedom. In return, Algeria received technical and financial bilateral aid from the French government of considerable proportions. More importantly for France, however, politically the Évian Accords conceded that, after years of broad popular and political conviction that *l'Algérie, c'est la France* and armed struggle, "*[t]he French recognized that the Algerians were so different, as a group, from other French citizens that they could not be accommodated within the French Republic.*"[27]

Most important commodities imported from the African18 (in thousand US$)

Commodity Code and Description	Country	Import	World	% of World
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels	Ivory Coast + Gabon	51 960	1 381 873	4%
24 Wood, lumber and cork	Ivory Coast + Gabon	42 937	123 453	35%
28 Metalliferous ores and metal scrap	Gabon	7 289	134 472	5%
286 Ores and concentrates of uranium & thorium	Gabon	7 167	8 744	82%
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material	Cameroon + Congo, Dem. Rep.	43 562	1 228 036	4%
68 Non ferrous metals	Cameroon + Congo, Dem. Rep.	43 472	298 901	15%
682 Copper	Congo, Dem. Rep.	21 947	161 981	14%
684 Aluminium	Cameroon	20 779	33 190	63%

Table 3: Most important commodities imported by France from the African18 in 1962. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.

Imports of the other 18 African states combined yielded about the same share as Algeria alone (see table 1). From the African18 states Senegal, the Ivory Coast and Cameroon held the top three positions. When adding Madagascar, Gabon and the DRC, these six countries accounted for almost 85 percent of all imports from the African18. However, in total these 18 countries accounted for only under 7 percent of all French imports. One might therefore conclude that the African18 were not so important to the French economy. However, any such conclusion would be premature.

[26] See Todd Shepard, *The invention of decolonization: the Algerian War and the remaking of France* (Ithaca, NY [et al.]: Cornell Univ. Press, 2006), 8.
[27] Ibid., 6.

In fact, when looking at single commodity lines the African18's economic importance for France becomes clearly visible. As highlighted in table 3, in individual fields the position of some of the states was not less dominant than that of Algeria. The Ivory Coast and Gabon together provided 35 percent of all wood, lumber and cork imported by France in 1962. Gabon also contributed the lion's share of France's uranium and thorium supplies, both of which are usable as fuel in nuclear reactors, which was of prime importance to France as reflected in the weight accorded to the Euratom component of the Rome Treaty negotiations. Cameroon and the DRC supplied 15 percent of France's imports of non-ferrous metals, the latter supplying almost 15 percent of all copper imports. Cameroon even provided 63 percent of all aluminium imports.

Furthermore, **four tropical commodities** imported from the African18 were in the prime echelons of importance for France – bananas, coffee, cocoa and groundnuts; to be analyzed for every single EEC country alike. As can be seen in figure 3, in all instances but **bananas** the African18 contributed the bulk of imports.[28] Over two thirds of French **coffee** imports originated from the African18, with the only sizeable exception outside Africa being Brazil, which accounted for about a fifth. The French dependence on the African18 in the field of **cocoa** was even more pronounced, with over 80 percent stemming from the three most important Africa18 exporters. Finally, **groundnuts** offer a similar picture, with Senegal alone contributing over two thirds of all imports in 1962. Another thing can be seen from the groundnut figures: Nigeria is a factor, even for France. This is already indication of the fierce debate that should arise between France and her European partners over the possible impact of the UK and with it British-Africa joining the Common Market in the early 60s.

Finally, in an attempt to strike a balance between the importance of the African market as opposed to the European market, it might prove useful to look at the **intra-EEC** imports in comparison. As can be seen in table 2, the FRG had a dominant position in France's intra-EEC import statistics, with about 18 percent of total imports originating from Germany.[29] In fact, Germany was France's most important single import partner over all, with the USA far behind in second place with slightly above 10 percent of total imports. Interestingly, all other EEC partners individually had a share in total French imports of even less that of Algeria! It is therefore fair to state that France's economy was absolutely geared towards her own dependencies.

1.1.1.1. The Franc Zone

France's economic entanglement with her OCTs was going further than trade. In the realm of monetary policy France created what became known as the 'Franc Zone', i.e. her West and Central African colonies bound together by the use of the same currency which was pegged to the French Franc and whose issuing was largely controlled by the French central bank. The history of the Franc Zone dates back to the economic crisis in the inter-war period, in which a closed system between metropolitan France and French colonies was beneficial to all parties, thereby circumventing the uncertainty present in the then gloomy world economic sentiment. While in the beginning the

[28] Bananas were imported mainly by Martinique and Guadeloupe, both also French territories associated under Title IV of the Rome Treaty but not encapsulated in this analysis for they are not located in Sub-Sahara Africa.
[29] The shorter 'Germany' is henceforth used to refer to West-Germany only.

currency used in metropolitan France and overseas territories was identical, the post-WWII time brought about changes. In 1945 two currencies instead of one were issued, one being the *Franc métropolitain*, the other the *Franc colonial*, with the latter being pegged to the former. African partners were required to hold 65 percent of their foreign exchange reserves with the French Treasury on their operating account.[30] This margin requirement has frequently been a source of controversy between France and her monetary partners in Africa.

For France the foreign reserves requirement was a big advantage in the inter-war and post-WWII period, in which she could use this system to shore up her own meager foreign reserves positions. Also, France systematically offered and consistently paid above world market prices for a range of tropical products – a system called *surprix* – which led to considerable expansion of cash crops in just about any French-African territory. This system of preferential prices engendered a *de facto* closed economic organism. But with a certain and uncontested sales market in Africa the French industry became less competitive on a global scale, not being forced to increase efficiency at the same pace as her international competitors. By the same token, producers of primary products in the African colonies had little incentive to increase efficiency or look for alternative trading channels, blocked by punitive tariffs, thereby fostering interdependency between France and Africa.[31] This explains the massive French interest in attaching her African colonies to the European Common Market.

French colonies had a negative foreign trade balance with France, and a positive balance of trade with most other countries.[32] The **free movement of capital** embedded in the Franc Zone facilitated repatriation of profits incurred by French businessmen in African colonies. Additionally, the French side had from the inception assumed practically all operative powers within the respective African Central Banks in the Franc Zone, letting the rhetoric of equal participation and the right to self-determination for African partners appear shallow in this respect. The participating African countries were deprived of the possibility to engage in a sovereign monetary policy, depriving African elites of the opportunity to learn how to use monetary tools to their countries' advantage.[33] These potentially disadvantageous effects have to be balanced against the financial, economic and cultural commitment by metropolitan France, partly reflected in the gigantic bilateral aid flows to her West and Central African territories.[34]

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[30] See Christian Uhlig, *Monetäre Integration bei wirtschaftlicher Abhängigkeit: Probleme einer währungspolitischen Strategie dargestellt am Beispiel der Franc-Zone*, Weltwirtschaft und internationale Beziehungen: Diskussionsbeiträge 6 (München: Weltforum Verl., 1976), 12-13.

[31] See Bernd Friedrich, Sung-Jo Park, and Rudolf Wiegelmann, *Entwicklungspolitik der EG: Für eine neue Weltwirtschaftsordnung oder neue Regionalisierung der Weltwirtschaft?*, Campus-Forschung (Frankfurt [et al.]: Campus, 1980), 20.

[32] This negative balance of trade with France was largely due to the immense level of French services imported by African countries, illustrating France's dominant position in areas like financial services, tourism, transportation and patent license revenues; see Uhlig, *Monetäre Integration bei wirtschaftlicher Abhängigkeit*, 56.

[33] See Ibid., 25-30.

[34] See Ibid., 36-38.

1.1.2. Belgium-Luxembourg

Belgium and Luxembourg will have to be dealt with in one swing, since both were economically tied together in the Belgian-Luxembourgian Economic Union and numbers in the COMTRADE database are available only in the aggregated form.[35] Together these two countries had total imports of about $4.5 billion in 1962, which represents a share of about 30 percent of their combined GDP. If one would expect one country – apart from France – to be economically entangled with the African18, it would be Belgium. Belgium had a long colonial history with the DRC, which after Nigeria is the second most populous country of Sub-Sahara Africa. Unsurprisingly so, the DRC is the dominating actor in Belgian-Luxembourgian import statistics, contributing almost 4 percent of the total 4.58 percent share yielded by all African18. Algeria was not a decisive economic factor for Belgium-Luxembourg.

Table 4 reveals the same phenomenon as in the French case, i.e. although the overall share of the African18 appears small, in certain individual lines the number can be much higher. Belgium-Luxembourg received about 80 percent of their tin imports from the DRC. Similarly, almost 60 percent of copper imports originated from the DRC in 1962. So, the dominant position of the DRC becomes even more palpable from this data.

Most important commodities imported from the African18 (in thousand US$)				
Commodity Code and Description	Country	Import	World	% of World
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels	Congo, Dem. Rep.	28 092	810 718	3%
28 Metalliferous ores and metal scrap	Congo, Dem. Rep.	20 255	201 648	10%
283 Ores and concentrates of non ferrous base metals	Congo, Dem. Rep.	20 150	57 950	35%
2836 Ores and concentrates of tin	Congo, Dem. Rep.	14 768	18 186	81%
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material	Congo, Dem. Rep.	140 003	1 073 983	13%
68 Non ferrous metals	Congo, Dem. Rep.	139 783	294 301	47%
682 Copper	Congo, Dem. Rep.	110 845	191 759	58%

Table 4: Most important commodities imported by Belgium-Luxembourg from the African18 in 1962. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.

The situation regarding the **four tropical commodities** is not as clear-cut as in the French case. To highlight the different geographic centers of interest, countries in Latin America are depicted in shades of blue. It can be seen from figure 4 that in the case of **bananas** – where the DRC had a substantial share of 13 percent of total imports – Latin American countries dominated the field. Also, with regard to **coffee** imports Latin America was the single most important region for Belgium-Luxembourg, contributing about half of all imports. Only in **cocoa** did the African18 have a somewhat relevant position with a combined share of 11 percent of total imports. In importing **groundnuts** British-African territories, depicted in shades of orange, had a staggering position, contributing close to 100 percent. In effect, Belgium-Luxembourg's imports in these four commodities were spread across many different regions. That might be one crucial factor in explaining why Belgium was at first hesitant to join France in her bid to associate French- and Belgian-African territories to the European Common Market. Still, with the DRC alone yielding almost 4 percent of her total imports, Belgium

[35] However, due to the very dissimilar size of the two countries the numbers mostly reflect the Belgian reality.

INFO BOX 2

1962 BEL-LUX intra-EEC Imports	in US$	% of World
FRG	851 293 760	18.69%
Netherlands	673 289 792	14.78%
France	664 899 584	14.60%
Italy	134 354 304	2.95%
World	7 516 678 144	Σ51.01%

Table 6: Belgian-Luxembourgian intra-EEC Imports by Country in 1962. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.

1962 Belgian-Luxembourgian Imports	in US$	% of World
Congo, Dem.Rep.	179 352 912	3.94%
Congo, Rep.	4 907 009	0.11%
Burundi	3 959 212	0.09%
Ivory Coast	3 236 455	0.07%
Cameroon	2 685 255	0.06%
Algeria	2 474 012	0.05%
Chad	2 393 678	0.05%
Togo	1 245 778	0.03%
Gabon	1 092 716	0.02%
Senegal	497 456	0.01%
Guinea	459 738	0.01%
Madagascar	389 330	0.01%
World	4 555 408 896	Σ4.63%

Table 5: Belgian-Luxembourgian Imports by Country in 1962. All African18 countries not listed have a share of less than 0.01 percent. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.



Figure 4: Belgian-Luxembourgian Top 5 Importers of Bananas, Coffee, Cocoa and Groundnuts in 1962. Latin American countries are depicted in shades of blue. SACU = Southern African Customs Union. Source: COMTRADE and own computation. Own illustration.

had herself immense vested interests in Africa and was susceptible to arguments promising massive capital inflows into these territories.

The different geographic emphasis can also be seen when comparing French and Belgian-Luxembourgian **intra EEC** imports. While France imported just a third of the total from her EEC partners, Belgium-Luxembourg imported over half of the total from within Europe. As can be seen from table 6, the FRG also held the dominant position in the Belgian-Luxembourgian case, with almost a fifth of all EEC imports originating from Germany. The BENELUX partner Netherlands naturally had a strong position, as did France as another big neighboring country. Only Italy, skirted geographically, had a share less than that of the DRC alone. Overall Belgium, although having interest of her dependencies in Africa receiving aid flows from which she could benefit at least indirectly, could probably expect to benefit more from a European Common Market than France.

1.1.3. Federal Republic of Germany

Germany presents a whole different picture. She had by far the biggest number of total imports, reaching over $13 billion, and the biggest absolute number of potential suppliers, too. Accordingly, the African18 plus Algeria together only yield a share of considerably less than 2 percent. Only Algeria comes close to the 1 percent mark. All the African18 countries together fail to yield 1 percent. But to draw the conclusion that the African continent was not important to the German economy, would be a misconception. In fact, table 7 just displays the wrong African countries.

Figure 5 surveys the top 5 importers regarding the **four tropical commodities**. Similarly to the Belgian-Luxembourgian case, **bananas** and **coffee** are mainly imported from Latin America, with Germany being by far the biggest importer of coffee into the EEC. More importantly, the importance of British-Africa becomes visible from figure 5. In fact, **cocoa** is the only of all four commodities surveyed, in which one of the African18 countries even represents a sizeable share for Germany at all. In 1962 Germany imported 8 percent of her total cocoa imports from Cameroon, 46 percent are imported from Ghana, another 18 percent from Nigeria. The dependence on British-Africa is even more visible when it comes to importing **groundnuts**. Nigeria pronouncedly leads the field in this case with 60 percent of all German groundnut imports being grown in the most-populous Sub-Saharan African state and still British colony in 1957. Another 9 percent are imported by the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), which economically entangled the present-day states of South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia[36] and Swaziland. The British-Sudan contributed 7 percent of groundnuts imports. Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which comprises the present-day states of Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi, also had a 4 percent share in groundnut imports.

On the whole, the FRG was dependent rather on the British part of Africa. Her hesitation to agree to the Association of French-African states – out of fear of disgruntling her other African partners – is therefore fully comprehensible.

[36] Namibia as a former German colony is a somewhat special case, but was *de facto* administered by South Africa since WWI.

INFO BOX 3

1962 German intra-EEC Imports	in US$	% of World
France	1 306 761 984	9.98%
Netherlands	1 072 633 984	8.19%
Italy	924 644 992	7.06%
Belg-Lux	685 654 976	5.24%
World	13 096 053 760	Σ30.46%

Table 8: German intra-EEC Imports by Country in 1962. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.

1962 German Imports	in US$	% of World
Algeria	115 757 000	0.88%
Congo, Dem.Rep.	31 319 000	0.24%
Ivory Coast	19 445 000	0.15%
Cameroon	11 783 000	0.09%
Gabon	11 518 000	0.09%
Congo, Rep.	11 483 000	0.09%
Guinea	3 439 000	0.03%
Madagascar	3 437 000	0.03%
Senegal	2 229 000	0.02%
Togo	782 000	0.01%
World	13 096 053 760	Σ1.62%

Table 7: German Imports by Country in 1962. All African18 countries not listed have a share of less than 0.01 percent. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.



Figure 5: German Top 5 Importers of Bananas, Coffee, Cocoa and Groundnuts in 1962. African countries formerly under British influence are depicted in shades of orange. Source: COMTRADE and own computation. Own illustration.

Also, unlike Belgium, Germany had no existing colonial relationship with any African territory that she could be wooed with. Even more pronounced, still, might have been Germany's fear of displeasing her Latin American partners. It might not be fully visible in the four commodities represented in this survey, but in general Latin America was the more vibrant region for the Germany economy. This may be illustrated by the **total import figures by country** ranked in descending order: Venezuela – being the first country outside Europe and North America to appear in this ranking – was the 14th biggest importer to the FRG in 1962. The 16th biggest importer was Argentina, and the 19th biggest Brazil. Those three countries were more important to the German economy than nearby Algeria ranking 23rd. The SACU is the first Sub-Saharan African region displayed on the list, on 28th place. The first African18 country to appear is the DRC, on position 56. With her economic interests all across the world it comes as little surprise that Germany became the leader of the 'globalist' camp within the EEC, advocating equally good economic relations with everybody.

Still, Germany's economy was heavily geared towards Europe. While **intra-EEC** imports may appear low, with a share of just over 30 percent (see table 8), this again gives rise to the wrong conclusions: Germany in 1962 might have received most imports from the US, leading the overall top-importers list already alluded to in the previous paragraph, but places two to five were held by her EEC partners. Outside the EEC but within Europe the UK was in 6th position, Sweden was the 7th biggest importer. Furthermore Switzerland, Austria and Denmark ranked 10 to 12. Together these ten European countries contributed over 45 percent of German imports. So the seemingly little intra-EEC share is less a sign indicating little importance of the European market, but Germany's strength in being diversified over a whole myriad of countries all over the world – contributing as suppliers to the German economic miracle.

1.1.4. Netherlands

If the African18 and Algeria were of little importance to Germany, their importance to the Netherlands was marginal. Cameroon tops the list with only 0.27 percent. The DRC ranks second with 0.16 percent. Algeria, only fourth in the list, reaches a share of only 0.10 percent of total Dutch imports. At first glance, the Dutch economy was least dependent on the African18. Let us turn to the four surveyed commodities to check this assertion for its validity.

The first thing to point out with respect to the **four tropical commodities** is the sheer magnitude of imports flows: The Netherlands were the biggest importer of bananas and by far the biggest importer of cocoa in 1962. While **bananas** and **coffee** were largely imported from Latin America and the Portuguese colony of Angola, Dutch merchants were very dependent on African states in cocoa and groundnut imports. In the case of **cocoa** imports, which by virtue of its absolute size is a noteworthy commodity flow for the Dutch economy, over 30 percent were contributed by the African18, a substantial share, but another 40 percent from British-Africa. Similarly to Belgium-Luxembourg and Germany, in importing **groundnuts** British-African countries were leading by a wide margin.

So, as in the German case, the picture becomes more ambiguous when looking at the concrete commodity figures. Still, a similar observation as in the German case can be drawn: Although in individual commodity lines the African18 might have been a relevant contributor to national imports,

INFO BOX 4

1962 Dutch intra-EEC Imports	in US$	% of World
FRG	1 234 548 507	23.09%
Belg-Lux	1 050 846 044	19.65%
France	250 855 155	4.69%
Italy	146 803 103	2.75%
World	5 347 534 830	Σ50.17%

Table 10: Dutch intra-EEC Imports by Country in 1962. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.

1962 Dutch Imports	in US$	% of World
Cameroon	14 603 189	0.27%
Congo, Dem.Rep.	8 633 284	0.16%
Ivory Coast	7 198 386	0.13%
Algeria	5 219 593	0.10%
Gabon	3 208 922	0.06%
Congo, Rep.	921 302	0.02%
Senegal	879 189	0.02%
Madagascar	856 731	0.02%
Benin	722 230	0.01%
Togo	579 754	0.01%
Guinea	343 322	0.01%
World	5 347 534 830	0.81%

Table 9: Dutch Imports by Country in 1962. All African18 countries not listed have a share of less than 0.01 percent. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.



Figure 6: Dutch Top 5 Importers of Bananas, Coffee, Cocoa and Groundnuts in 1962. Source: COMTRADE and own computation. Own illustration.

in general the possibility of displeasing her Latin American and British-African partners might have easily outweighed the potential benefits arising from associating the French-African territories. Also, just as Germany and unlike Belgium, no Dutch-African territories were there to be used as a bargaining stick by French negotiators. In addition, the case of Dutch New Guinea was distinctly different from French colonies in 1957. While France had a long term perspective on its African possessions and wanted to keep them in their sphere of influence, the Netherlands prepared New Guinea actively for independence. Similarly, the Belgian and Italian governments had no long term visions for keeping their African territories.

Similar to Belgium-Luxembourg, Dutch interest in the European market was much more pronounced than in the case of France. **Intra-EEC** imports yielded above 50 percent of total imports in 1962, with the FRG being the biggest partner, followed by her BENELUX partners. France and Italy had a marginal share. The low share in French imports make it comprehensible that the Netherlands, unlike any other EEC country, tentatively contemplated to pursue European Economic Integration without French participation.[37]

1.1.5. Italy

While the line so far can be drawn quite distinctly, with France and Belgium on the one, the FRG and the Netherlands on the other side, the case of Italy is more ambiguous. Italy's economy was relatively weak, with a GDP of only about 70 percent of that of France although having a higher population. Her dependence from the African18 plus Algeria, as measured in table 11, was highest after France and Belgium-Luxembourg. Italy received a substantial share of imports from the DRC – with about 16 percent of her total copper imports originating there – Algeria, Somalia, and the Ivory Coast. In total, the African18 plus Algeria contributed just under 2 percent to overall imports.

This higher dependence on the African18 in the Italian case is also reflected in the **four tropical commodities**. Together with France she is the only of two countries that is heavily dependent on African18 countries when importing **bananas**, with 62 percent originating from Somalia, which was under Italian administration in 1957, and another 12 percent received from the Ivory Coast. Also, apart from France her dependence on the African18 in importing **coffee** was highest. A combined share of almost 20 percent of the total coffee imports was received from the African18 in 1962. The last commodity where the African18 contributed a relevant share is **cocoa**, where they yielded a fifth of total imports. In the **groundnut** import figure British-African dependencies lead the field by a wide margin. British-African territories were so essential to all EEC6 partners but France when importing groundnuts! Still, in groundnut imports France herself was leading the field of overall imports into the European Common Market. France imported more groundnuts in 1962 than all of her five EEC partners together.

[37] Haas reports that as early as 1956, on the occasion of the *relance européenne*, the Dutch made suggestions to perhaps study the feasibility of ECSC members continuing European Integration without France for fear of getting involved with Algeria and other colonial issues; see Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, social and economic forces, 1950-1957* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958), 426.

INFO BOX 5

1962 Italian intra-EEC Imports	in US$	% of World
FRG	1 023 807 744	16.90%
France	534 771 776	8.83%
Belg-Lux	166 027 248	2.74%
Netherlands	162 759 424	2.69%
World	6 056 367 616	Σ31.16%

Table 12: Italian intra-EEC Imports by Country in 1962. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.

1962 Italian Imports	in US$	% of World
Congo, Dem.Rep.	40 058 636	0.66%
Algeria	27 142 872	0.45%
Somalia	17 399 104	0.29%
Ivory Coast	17 110 790	0.28%
Cameroon	6 971 669	0.12%
Madagascar	1 301 424	0.02%
Uganda	1 144 271	0.02%
Togo	981 992	0.02%
Gabon	560 357	0.01%
Senegal	481 235	0.01%
Central African Rep.	339 131	0.01%
Burundi	335 855	0.01%
World	6 056 367 616	Σ1.90%

Table 11: Italian Imports by Country in 1962. All African18 countries not listed have a share of less than 0.01 percent. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.



Figure 7: Italian Top 5 Importers of Bananas, Coffee, Cocoa and Groundnuts in 1962. Fmr Ethiopia = present-day states of Ethiopia and Eritrea. Source: COMTRADE and own computation. Own illustration.

A look at Italian **intra-EEC** imports reveals that for Italy a European Common Market, purely economically based on the import data, was least beneficial. Apart from Germany, which had a very low intra-EEC import share for the explained reasons, Italy had the second smallest share of intra-EEC imports. The reasons for Italy's low share might be twofold: First, although she had a considerable share of imports from the FRG and France, the exchange of goods with Belgium-Luxembourg and the Netherlands was limited, which might be partly due simply to her geographical position off the European center. Second, Italy as Germany had considerable economic ties with other European countries, such as the UK and nearby Austria and Switzerland. Her import flows from the US were also very significant. Based on this, one might make the assertion that Italy's motives for joining the EEC were inspired to a large part by other factors than by considerations based on beneficial effects of free European trade. To explore in greater detail what these other factors might have been, will be part of the next section.

1.1.6. Conclusion

One main purpose of this section was to identify the economic centers of gravity for each respective EEC6 member state. The methodology used to achieve this goal was by capitalizing on the COMTRADE database freely available on the Internet and selecting four of the most important commodities imported by Europe. Conclusions were highlighted according to a color code, illustrating three different poles – the African18 with French, Belgian, and Italian influenced territories all associated under the Rome Treaty, British Africa, and Latin America. Table 13 summarizes the findings:

Top 5 Importers grouped in Geographic Centers (in US$ and %)				
	Total	African18	British Africa	Latin America
France	299 751 686	224 768 682	15 371 464	27 676 780
Belgium-Luxembourg	77 780 780	2 937 299	13 918 336	5 640 297
FRG	366 794 008	5 573 000	81 802 000	150 547 000
Netherlands	214 702 600	31 868 796	50 052 612	66 076 606
Italy	123 886 295	34 915 269	23 961 722	31 438 789
		in percent		
France	100%	**75%**	5%	9%
Belgium-Luxembourg	100%	4%	**18%**	7%
FRG	100%	2%	22%	**41%**
Netherlands	100%	15%	23%	**31%**
Italy	100%	**28%**	19%	25%

Table 13: Top 5 Importers of Bananas, Coffee, Cocoa and Groundnuts to the EEC6 in 1962 grouped according to geographic centers of gravity. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.

While France's, Belgian-Luxembourg's and Italy's main import routes of the selected tropical commodities were originating from Africa, the FRG and Netherlands imported most of these goods from the Latin American area, which explains their great hesitation to concede to French demands to associate her African dependencies on the expense of third countries in the course of the Rome

Treaty negotiations. Also, for any country but France and Italy, British African colonies – probably the ones most directly adversely affected by the Association of OCTs – were of a bigger economic importance than the African18. Germany's share received from the African18 in the selected goods was lowest, her stern opposition to associate the African18 with the EEC therefore understandable. Interestingly, even Belgium-Luxembourg imported a higher share of the selected commodities from British Africa than from the African18, which by definition includes her own colonies, although from a quite low absolute figure. In any case, it becomes very clear from table 13 that France's economy was extremely skewed towards her own territories in Africa.[38]

Another main purpose of the previous section was to illustrate each EEC member states' interest for European Economic Integration. The variable selected to indicate any such inclination was the share of intra-EEC imports of total imports – the higher the share, the greater the incentive to join a European Common Market. Concerning this variable the Six can be split into two groups: members with a share above and below 50 percent.[39] When combining this indicator of propensity towards European Economic Integration with the share of imports from the African18 as a measure of proclivity for African Economic Association, one can make a subset of six categories to group the EEC6 according to national economic interests (see figure 8).

The categorization into three broader groups appears fruitful:

- **The European Integrationists:** The BENELUX countries all had intra-EEC import shares of over 50 percent, a lot of this being a direct result of the economic integration process already started between these three states in form of the Benelux Customs Union. Still, their impulse to enlarge their potential scope of outlet markets in the nearby was substantial. Belgium probably had a somewhat special position in this group – next to France the only country within the EEC6 to have had African colonies of a considerable size for decades. The French-African colonies (excluding Algeria) in 1955 counted about 40 million inhabitants, Belgium had about 20 million people living in its colonies, the bulk of which (about 14 million) lived in Belgian-Congo.[40] Hence, the Belgian colonial empire was, applying that measure, only about half the size of the French one, making it a big stakeholder with vested interests in Euro-African relations. Still, it is hard to imagine that Belgium would have risked European Economic Integration for African Association. Belgium was probably the country with the highest stakes in bringing both issues to a successful conclusion. Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgian national, was so probably very wisely chosen to negotiate the Rome Treaty and reconcile the different views present within the EEC6.

[38] The dependency becomes even more pronounced when accounting for Martinique and Guadeloupe – including these two Caribbean overseas territories, which were also associated under title IV of the Rome treaty, France's dependency on her own territories in the four selected commodities rises to close to 80 percent.

[39] All countries having a share of less than 50 percent (i.e. FRG, Italy, France) had a very similar share of intra-EEC imports of slightly above 30 percent.

[40] See United Nations Population Division, "The 2008 Revision Population Database," *World Population Prospects*, 2009, http://esa.un.org/unpp (29 July 2009).



Figure 8: The EEC6 grouped according to propensity for European Economic Integration and African Economic Association based on data from the COMTRADE database. Source: Own illustration.

- **The European Hesitator:** France had economic interests in the African18 unrivaled by any other country. When adding Algeria the dependency on her overseas territories was even more pronounced. On the other hand, her interest in European Economic Integration was limited. Concerns were voiced in France that warned of inundation with German products due to a lack of competitiveness of the French industry. Not surprisingly so, France took a much greater interest in the Euratom negotiations and might have sacrificed the EEC for her African ties, would there have been the possibility to untangle the two treaties.

- **The Ambiguous:** The situation of Italy and Germany is not so easy to retrace from the numbers. Both had the lowest shares of intra-EEC imports with just over 30 percent. So, their drive for European Economic Integration might have been fueled at least partly by other factors. Germany might have been intrigued by starting a new process of multilateral institutionalization with a view towards political integration, where she could play a dominant role (as she had no permanent Security Council seat in the UN, for example). Also cooling German-American relations, encumbered by the Radford Plan of July 1956 which foresaw a reduction in American conventional forces, a move fiercely opposed by Adenauer, reassured Germany that she would have to push Western European integration as a distinct bulwark against the Communist East.[41] Italy, on the other hand, might have been attracted

[41] See Hans Ehlert, *Die NATO-Option*, ed. Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, vol. 3, Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945-1956 (München: Oldenbourg, 1993), 216.

by the creation of the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Social Fund that would provide her weak economy with additional investment facilities.[42] As regards the association of African states Italy was certainly more inclined to concede to French demands than Germany: Firstly, Italy would probably be able to argue only a small contribution to the EDF; and secondly, she could hope to benefit indirectly from European investments in Somalia.

It might prove illuminating to keep this categorization in mind for the next section, when the negotiation process of the Rome Treaty is portrayed. I would argue that the economic background as presented in this section is clearly reflected in the countries' position. Above all, France's reluctance to agree to the EEC without associating her African territories becomes very clear.

1.2. The Rome Treaty – Shaping Eurafrica

This section will review the negotiations leading to the signing of the Rome Treaty and its outcome regarding the Association of OCTs. The negotiation process will be portrayed starting from the Venice Conference until the signing of the Rome Treaty. Usually, the Rome Treaty negotiations are portrayed starting from the Messina Conference. However, this does not appear to be the right starting point for this analysis, since the question of associating OCTs was first raised by France at the Venice Conference. Similarly, one could expect the analysis to encapsulate the process of ratification in the six member states after the actual signing of the Rome Treaty. However, since this would promise little additional insight into the question of Association as an intergovernmental issue between the Six, it shall be skipped from the remit.

1.2.1. Negotiations

The French position[43] in the Rome Treaty negotiations and her firm determination to associate her overseas territories with the EEC is highlighted by a letter of Gaston Defferre, Minister of Overseas France, to the French Prime Minister Guy Mollet on 17 May 1956: In the letter he addresses some of the issues resulting from the Spaak Report, which carried no trace of any plans of associating OCTs with the common market. Defferre in his letter stressed the importance of associating the territories of the *Union française* with the envisioned European Common Market. He argues that the TOMs and

[42] See, for example, the 'Protocol on Italy' annexed to the Rome Treaty, in which Italy is given the prospect of funds from the EIB and the European Social Fund to create jobs in Southern Italy and on the Italian islands.

[43] At this point I would like to once state the obvious and be very explicit on the readily used formulation 'France's position', 'Italy's position' etc. in the political sciences, which I feel gives rise to stereotypes when encountered unreflected. This simplifying expression is used solely to refer to the position of the elected official(s) in power at the time of any given interstate-bargaining process or even the position of non-elected official(s) deputed to act upon their own discretion on any certain task. It does not and cannot imply any assertion on what opinion the majority of the populace held at any given point in time towards a specific topic.

France have already established a common market with one another in the Franc Zone similar to the one proposed for the six European ECSC countries. To abandon the TOM in the process of European integration would lead to waning economic, social and political influence in Africa which was not acceptable to the French side: *"[…]France [...]ne peut sacrifier sa vocation africaine à sa vocation européenne."*[44] Defferre received a lot of sympathy for this position and on a French inter-ministerial meeting as early as 28 May 1956 the French government widely accepted to make Association of OCTs a precondition for signing the Treaty.[45]

After the Spaak Report was formally adopted by the Council of Ministers of the ECSC at the Venice Conference at the end of May 1956, it was decided to continue the drafting of a final treaty in the framework of an 'Intergovernmental Conference on the Common Market and Euratom' that was again headed by Spaak. The series of negotiations that would ultimately lead to the signing of both treaties in Rome in March the following year, would begin with initial gatherings in Brussels between June 26 and July 21;

> *" […]it was here that the French formally presented a series of basic demands to the other five. From this point on, what France primarily desired was evident: the inclusion of its overseas territories, the harmonization of social and welfare costs in the six economies, and a number of special safeguards for French industry and agriculture to cushion the initial blow of tariff reductions."*[46]

Association of OCTs did not feature prominently at the ministerial meeting in Brussels on 26 June 1956 and France did not make this issue one of her top priorities, which led Adenauer to think that questions concerning the common market and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) were much more likely to precipitate a breakdown in negotiations.[47] So, when the talks resumed after the summer break in the fall of 1956, the other 5 EEC partners confronted France with a joint response. To their view, the complete exclusion of the agrarian sector was unacceptable and, while the phasing of stages towards tariff elimination could be debated, the way forward had to be determined

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[44] Gérard Bossuat, ed., "Lettre de Gaston Defferre à Guy Mollet (17 mai 1956)," in D'*Alger à Rome (1943 - 1957): choix des documents,* Histoire de la construction Européenne (Bruxelles: CIACO Ed., 1989), 167-177. Quoted from and available at http://www.ena.lu?lang=1&doc=23952 (29 July 2009).

[45] See Pierre Guillen, "Europe as a cure for French impotence? The Guy Mollet government and the negotiation of the Treaties of Rome," in *Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy and the origins of the EEC, 1952-1957*, ed. Ennio di Nolfo, vol. 2, Power in Europe? (Berlin [et al.]: Walter de Gruyter, 1992), 508.

[46] Pierre-Henri Laurent, "The Diplomacy of the Rome Treaty, 1956-57," *Journal of Contemporary History* 7, no. 3 (1972): 210.

[47] The reasons for France's delay in making known her demands concerning Association of OCTs to her European partners more prominently were threefold: Firstly, she wanted to giver her partners time to adjust to this highly provocative issue; secondly, France wanted the negotiations to proceed to the point where her partners would not want to risk everything else for what was essentially an extraneous issue; and thirdly, the situation in France itself might have necessitated a delay, in the sense that the government needed time to convince public opinion and her political partners to 'share' French OCTs, which at the time was a step vociferously opposed by large parts of the French society; see Carol Cosgrove Twitchett, *Europe and Africa: from association to partnership* (Farnborough: Saxon House, 1978), 8-10.

irreversibly. It became clear that none of the claims brought forward by the French representatives were insurmountable – a fact that they themselves were eager to stress – and that a final solution would be a question of give and take.

> "*As the talks proceeded, it became clear that for Paris the two most important goals were the linking of the overseas possessions to the general market (with an investment fund to assist development and modernization), and the progressive adjustment and equalization of social policies of the six states in step with tariff reductions.*"[48]

The question of OCTs grew more important in the course of 1956. The negotiations were needed to be brought to an end in a timely manner, since neither the pro-European Guy Mollet French administration, caught up in domestic inflation and the Algerian war, nor the pro-European Konrad Adenauer as German *Bundeskanzler* were perceived as standing on firm domestic ground in their political plans. So, in October 1956 France and Germany agreed on the territorial question of the Saarland, which was to be returned to Germany. In return, Adenauer conceded to some of the French claims in the area of social policies, such as equal wages for men and women and the number of paid statutory holidays.[49]

This was when the horse-trading got into full-swing. After a number of other issues was resolved in the second half of 1956, one major point remaining on the plate and standing in the way of French participation was the question of how to associate French and Belgian African overseas territories and how to finance the European Development Fund (EDF).[50] France – already isolated over agriculture and other issues – was then able to convince Belgium, who was initially reluctant to associate herself with French demands and took time to be persuaded, to become allies with her in demanding Association of OCTs in the six-party talks.[51]

In October 1956 the French and Belgian authorities drew up a joint report in which they reviewed the financial arrangements for the association of OCTs. The report was to be discussed on 15 November 1956 by the Committee of Heads of Delegation. It made clear that due to the differences in economic development the association of OCTs with the EEC cannot be without special provisions favoring OCTs. One important such provision would be the progressive abolition of tariffs and quantitative restriction for products from OCTs to all EEC countries, while OCTs should be allowed to uphold certain tariffs to protect their nascent industries. In return, France and Belgium would grant each EEC member the right of access to their overseas markets. Concerning the establishment of a European Development Fund the Franco-Belgian Report proposed a fund totaling about $1 billion. OCTs should be able to claim these funds in accordance with their needs. In time, these investments should flow

[48] Laurent, "The Diplomacy of the Rome Treaty," 210.
[49] See Ibid., 211-212.
[50] To speak of the 'European Development Fund' at this point is actually not fully correct. The actual term used at the time of the Rome Treaty was 'Development Fund'. Only in the First Yaoundé Convention did this investment facility add European to its front.
[51] See Cosgrove Twitchett, *Europe and Africa*, 9.

back to the EEC in the form of African fledgling industries demanding products from the EEC market.[52]

The association of French colonies with the European common market by then had strong political support in the French Parliament and was largely grounded in areas outside economic interests, "*[…] but basically this almost pathological preoccupation reflected the crucial place the colonies still held in the Fourth Republic's projections for the future.*"[53] France was determined to put the burden of financing the development of OCTs on European shoulders to avoid any extra weight on her own economy in the wake of European competition: Buying primary commodities at prices well above the world market or supplementing African budgets with French aid and investments, accruing unilaterally to France, while at the same time exposing French industry to European competition, would not be viable.[54]

Belgian's decision to align with France was prompted by a general sympathy with French interest rather than outright identification. Belgium had not found it necessary to devise any special arrangements for her African dependencies within the Benelux treaty and there were no pressing reasons to associate the DRC and Ruanda-Urundi with the EEC. All Belgian colonies operated under an open door trading regime, were liberalized and well established on the world market. Consequently, association of Belgian OCTs was not among the top priorities and Brussels did not want to risk the EEC over the question of Association. The positions of Italy and Luxembourg were very similar to that of Belgium: Both showed a benevolent attitude towards French demands, but were hesitant to articulate their positions out of fear for risking European Integration.[55]

When France and Belgium (and to some extent Luxemburg and Italy) were on the one side of the dividing line, Germany and the Netherlands were by then clearly on the other. After WW II and the adoption of the UN Charter, which clearly condemned all forms of colonial relationship and reinforced the right of all peoples to self-determination, it seemed inappropriate for France to push the merits of colonialism. In addition, France not only wanted its EEC partners' moral assistance but also demanded substantial financial contributions.

> "*For The Hague and Bonn to become identified with 'vestiges of imperialism' was asking a great deal; to compound this request by demanding over $250 million from the one and possibly $1oo million from the other presented a diplomatic obstacle of formidable proportion.*"[56]

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[52] See Ginette Kurgan-Van Hentenryk, ed., "Projet de rapport franco-belge sur la participation éventuelle des pays et territoires d'outre-mer au Marché commun européen," in *Documents diplomatiques belges (1941-1960): De l'indépendance à l'interdépendance*, Europe: aspects économiques 4 (Bruxelles: Académie Royale de Belgique, 2001), 383-386. Quoted from and available at http://www.ena.lu?lang=1&doc=25214 (29 July 2009).
[53] Laurent, "The Diplomacy of the Rome Treaty," 213.
[54] See Bossuat, "Lettre de Gaston Defferre à Guy Mollet (17 mai 1956)," 167-177.
[55] See Cosgrove Twitchett, *Europe and Africa*, 12-13.
[56] Laurent, "The Diplomacy of the Rome Treaty," 214.

Rather than outright rejection, however, Germany and the Netherlands proposed a limited association. The emotional debate was calmed by the hint that the Germans and the Dutch would not veto *any* association arrangement but debated the concrete means of how any such arrangement was best achieved. Neither Germany nor the Netherlands wanted to risk European Economic Integration with France as a full-fledged member; and so France new herself in a very strong bargaining position.[57] However, by the end of the year the stern opposition of these two countries made clear that an unlimited and long-range alliance the way France proposed was unlikely. Negotiations henceforth started to center around the size of the financial contribution of each member towards the EDF and the period of time involved.

> "*Authoritative press reports indicated that the French were thinking of $500 million excluding their own contribution, which would be discussed only after the initial total was accepted, whereas the Germans used the same figure as a total, of which forty per cent would come from France.*"[58]

Although it might be wrong to view the question of OCTs as the exclusive topic of the ensuing marathon negotiations in the beginning of 1957, it was probably the one with the biggest potential to bring the idea of a Common European Market to an end. The debate on OCTs was still emotional and an agreement was not in sight. By February of 1957 the question of how to associate the OCTs and how to finance the EDF was still unresolved.[59] A French delegation's note on the question of OCTs of 15 February 1957 highlights the precarious situation:

> "*At no time did they press us to provide access for their markets, capital and men to the African countries with which we have ties. […] They believe that they have already met a number of substantial demands put forward by France in a wide range of areas […] and this could turn out to be the negotiations' snapping point. […] A political gesture is the only possible basis for an agreement.*"[60]

Especially the Dutch were deeply affected by continuous French efforts to undermine the whole economic treaty and this has made them uncompromising to any further French claims. In fact, in early February Spaak had to travel to The Hague in order to dissuade the Dutch from leaving the EEC talks and join the British in their efforts to create an Economic Free Trade Agreement (EFTA). Unimpressed the French clung to their demands to associate OCTs fully for a five year trial period accompanied by a massive European investment fund. Germany and the Netherlands still preferred associating OCTs loosely, without any removal of tariffs and integration of OCTs economies, and a

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[57] See Seiro Kawasaki, "Origins of the Concept of the "Eurafrican Community"," *Tôkyô Kasei Gakuin Tsukuba Joshi Daigaku Kiyô* 4 (2000): 26.

[58] Laurent, "The Diplomacy of the Rome Treaty," 214.

[59] See Ibid., 214-215.

[60] CVCE, "Note from the French Delegation on the issue of the association of the overseas countries and territories (15 February 1957)," *European Navigator*, 2006, http://www.ena.lu?lang=2&doc=6589 (29 July 2009).

simple aid program without any political strings.[61] "*As the heads of government and their principal advisers met at the Hotel Matignon on 17 February it was apparent that the entire economic design hung on the issue of the overseas territories.*"[62]

The issue was resolved at the highest level, with Mollet and Adenauer meeting halfway. Especially France's foreign minister, Christian Pineau, was eager to placate Germany not to jeopardize all the benefits that France has already successfully negotiated in the course of the EEC and Euratom talks. Spaak from the beginning wisely tied the Common Market to Euratom.[63] While France indicated it wanted the Euratom deal badly, her interest for the EEC was lukewarm.[64] By linking these two issues together, Spaak reconciled the different views present in Europe and gave each member state enough incentive to accept the package deal.[65] The next day, after a large unreserved commitment of funds by France, agreement was achieved on largely associating OCTs and including them in the tariff reduction scheme in return for full access to OCTs markets by all EEC partners alike. In the end, the Franco-Belgian plan was accepted with few modifications; but it was less accepted for the sake of the African peoples than for the sake of the EEC itself.[66]

> "*As the sun rose in Paris on 20 February after two days and nights of debate, the Germans and Dutch reluctantly agreed to the French demand for a five-year association and their proposals for financial contributions.*"[67]

Without Spaak's astute junctim of Euratom with the EEC the negotiations would probably have not come to a successful conclusion. In any case, the **question of OCTs** was the last point to be resolved before a final agreement could be reached; and was made a *sine qua non* by France for joining the EEC. This highlights its superior position in the sense that is was the matter with the highest potential to spark failure of the overall negotiations. If that is the case then France, clearly, carried the highest stakes in the round. She was economically profoundly connected to her colonies over the Franc Zone and the system of *surprix*, which reflected in the trade statistics in the previous section, and the

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[61] See Laurent, "The Diplomacy of the Rome Treaty," 215-216.

[62] Ibid., 215.

[63] Interestingly, this was one of the main bones of contention between Spaak and Jean Monet. While the former viewed economic integration as the cornerstone of European future prosperity, Monnet was much more enticed by the question of Euratom as a means to secure future European energy needs and supranational supervision. Monnet used his 'Action Committee for the United States of Europe' as a vehicle to heavily lobby Euratom; see Richard Vaughan, *Twentieth-century Europe: paths to unity* (London [et al.]: Helm, 1979), 135-136.

[64] Germany, on the other hand, had little interest to cooperate more closely with France in matters of Atomic energy. Germany preferred closer cooperation with the USA and the UK in this field, since they had more advanced technology to offer; see Wilfried Loth, "Guy Mollet und die Entstehung der Römischen Verträge 1956/1957," In*tegration 3*0, no. 3 (2007): 314.

[65] See Pierre-Henri Laurent, "Paul-Henri Spaak and the Diplomatic Origins of the Common Market, 1955-1956," *Political Science Quarterly* 85, no. 3 (1970): 386-387.

[66] See Véronique Dimier, "Legitimizing the DG8: a small family business (1958-1975)," in *European Consortium for Political Research*, ed. ECPR (presented at the Workshop: the political logics within the European Commission, Grenoble: ECPR, 2001), 5.

[67] Laurent, "The Diplomacy of the Rome Treaty," 216.

question of OCTs had a high visibility within France. If Guy Mollet would have been more uncompromising or Adenauer less pragmatic, my conjecture would be that the EEC negotiations would most likely have failed not over the CAP or provisions relating to the internal market, but over the emotional debate on neo-colonialism and Association of OCTs – and so would have failed over an extraneous question only loosely related to inner-European matters.[68]

1.2.2. Outcome

Association of OCTs was a remarkable step in the history of European integration: Not only was it the beginning of a European development cooperation strategy, granting the European Commission as a supranational institution and honest broker without national interests extensive powers in the handling of concrete projects, but it was also the first time that the EEC conferred remarkable powers of something remotely comparable to a common foreign policy (even though only with third world countries) on a supranational institution.[69] Additionally, while in the past the colonial relationship was characterized by special provisions between colonized territories and the motherland, the Rome Treaty broke up this pattern and transformed it into a new multilateral relationship, where EEC member states would be empowered to trade, invest and uphold commercial relations with former French or Belgian territories in Africa on a basis which would increasingly approach that of the mother country.[70]

While the principles on which Association rested were stipulated in the Rome Treaty – and so remained valid for an unspecified duration – the actual Implementing Convention (IC), which *inter alia* regulated the EDF, would on the insistence of Germany remain valid for an initial trial period of just 5 years.[71] From the beginning it was clear that the Association of OCTs would be defined along geographic and political rather than functional lines. A reality reflected in the choice of the Commissioner for Development, who between 1958 and 1985 constantly was a French national. In general, many of the civil servants at the Commission responsible for Association of OCTs were French nationals, since they naturally were the ones with the most practical knowledge of the mostly French OCTs.[72]

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[68] To be sure, the available literature fails to substantiate such an extreme interpretation of the *reality*. Neither the French nor the German side had reason to believe that the respective other party would risk the whole EEC over the question of OCTs. In that light, both parties were very prudent in their logic that the other party would finally – at least partially – give in to its demands. Still, since the question of Association was the last issue to be resolved, it was arguably the issue with the biggest potential to spark failure of cross-sectoral European Economic Integration, in 1957 hardly more than a gentle bud.

[69] See Hanns Jürgen Küsters, "Die integrationspolitischen Wirkungen der Römischen Verträge - eine Bilanz nach 50 Jahren," Inte*gration 30,* no. 3 (2007): 329.

[70] See Arnold Rivkin, *Africa and the European Common Market: a perspective*, vol. 3, 2. ed., Monograph series in World Affairs 4 (Denver, Colorado: University of Denver, 1966), 7.

[71] See Cosgrove Twitchett, *Europe and Africa*, 17.

[72] See Véronique Dimier, "Administrative reform as political control: lessons from DG VIII, 1958-75," in *The Changing European Commission*, ed. Dionyssis Dimitrakopoulos, Europe in Change (Manchester [et al.]: Manchester University Press, 2004), 76-78.

Concerning **trade cooperation**, within twelve years all restrictions on trade between the EEC and OCTs would be removed, just as if associated OCTs were members of the evolving customs union itself, but OCTs could continue to levy duties for development or revenue purposes.[73] At the same time the EEC was to establish a Common External Tariff (CET), which would be levied on imports from third countries not associated under Part IV of the Rome Treaty.[74] Additionally, the **Right of Establishment** was to be gradually opened until all EEC6 partners would have the same access to OCTs in exactly the same way as the country with which the OCTs upheld 'special relations'.[75] Finally, Article 135 of the Treaty contained an implied declaration of intent to ensure the free movement of workers between the EEC and the OCTs in the future, to be agreed upon unanimously by the member states.[76]

The most fiercely debated issue, naturally, arose over the concrete installments by each EEC member into the **EDF**. On German request, the ultimate financial contributions to the fund were to be deposited progressively, with only 10 percent of the total amount due in the first year and the biggest installment of 38.5 percent in the fifth. All assistance from the EDF would come in the form of **non-repayable grants**. The bulk of the money was allocated to French territories ($511.25 million), with the second largest share ($35 million) going to Dutch territories outside Africa to appease The Hague.[77] This meant that the difference of $546.25 million would go to African territories.[78] From table 14 it becomes also obvious that France was the big winner of this outcome, while the FRG did probably least benefit from these figures. In effect, the

First EDF (in million US$)		
	Contributions	Allocation to OCTs
Belgium	70	30
France	200	511.25
FRG	200	-
Italy	40	5
Luxembourg	1.25	-
Netherlands	70	35

Table 14: First European Development Fund – Contributions and Planned Allocations.

[73] "*The specific details of the trading relationship differentiated between customs duties […] and quantitative restrictions […]. The rules regarding tariffs were set forth in […] the Rome Treaty itself, while those governing quantitative restrictions were contained in the Implementing Convention […].*" Cosgrove Twitchett, *Europe and Africa*, 19.

[74] See Ibid., 20.

[75] 'Special' was the expression used in the Rome Treaty and the annexed Implementing Convention not to say 'colonial'.

[76] Interestingly, Defferre in his letter to Guy Mollet (see footnote 44) pointed out his concern of migration streams from Europe towards Africa. Explicitly, he referred to hordes of unemployed Italians that could make their way into Africa and destabilize the region. This seems strangely ironic compared with today's migration flows.

[77] See Laurent, "The Diplomacy of the Rome Treaty," 216.

[78] US Dollar ($) as such is actually not entirely correct; at the time the terminology used was 'EPU units of account' or abbreviated 'u/a'. The European Payments Union (EPU) was founded in 1950 when the intra-European market came to a halt because of dollar shortages, the only then accepted reserve currency. The EPU facilitated the convertibility of European currencies by setting exchange rates that were deemed to reflect the reality of each country's economic situation. It was at the end of 1958 replaced by the 'EMA units of account'; abbreviating the European Monetary Agreement. As both these units had the same value in gold (0.88867088 grams of fine gold), which was also the value of one US Dollar at the time, replacing EPU and EMA units of account with US Dollars is a legitimate simplification.

$311.25 million French OCTs got in excess of France's contribution of $200 million might be viewed as a premium paid for France to participate in the EEC.[79]

Number of Votes applied in QMV		
	Art. 148 TEC	Art. 7 IC
France	**4**	33
FRG	**4**	33
Italy	**4**	**11**
Netherlands	2	**11**
Belgium	2	**11**
Luxembourg	1	1

Table 15: Number of Votes applied in Qualified Majority Votings pursuant to the Rome Treaty and the annexed Implementing Convention.

From table 14 it can also be seen that Italy's contribution was conspicuously low, which reflects her weak economic position at the time. This less in contribution is reflected in the decision making procedure agreed among the EEC6 to select projects funded by the EDF in the case of **Qualified Majority Votings** (QMV), illustrated in table 15: While in the Council of Ministers Italy was treated as a big country and received the same number of votes as Germany and France, when voting on EDF projects Italy only had the number of votes corresponding to the Netherlands and Belgium.

1.2.2.1. Interactions in the Institutional Triangle

The Directorate-General (DG) within the **European Commission** responsible for handling all issues in connection with the Association of OCTs was DG VIII, which was later to develop into the DG Development. DG VIII was in charge of selecting and analyzing projects proposed by the associated African states and so became the intermediary between the African states and the member states' representatives in the Council of the EEC, which had the exclusive power to take final decisions regarding project selection. The usual procedure was as follows: The Directorate of DG VIII was in charge of evaluating projects proposed by African states and would submit a 'financial proposal' to the **EDF Committee**, which was composed of member states' representatives and chaired by a representative of the Commission. If within one month no member state requested that the Council examined the proposal, it was deemed approved.[80]

The Commission's position towards the representatives of the Council in the EDF Committee was generally a very powerful one. This power resulted from the fact that criteria for the selection of projects were very broad or even secret until the 70s. This gave the Commission a great margin for maneuver in selecting projects. Its ability to forge coalitions and connections with African leaders made it a powerful actor within the EDF Committee, which usually consented to the endorsed projects with little discussion. This *modus operandi*, which was widely accepted within the DG VIII at the time, resulted in a very anti-bureaucratic and pragmatic handling of project applications which favored quick implementation in an else protracted decision making process.[81]

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[79] See Rivkin, *Africa and the European Common Market*, 15.

[80] See Dimier, "Administrative reform as political control," 76-78.

[81] The powerful position of DG VIII towards the EDF Committee largely resulted from the person of Jacques Ferrandi, the first *chef de cabinet*, who staffed the DG VIII with friends and former colleagues in the French colonial administration at a time when there were virtually no regulations to be followed when hiring civil servants. When Lemaignen left his post in 1962, Ferrandi appointed his friend Jean Chapperon as his own

The DG VIII was one of the first units of the Commission to have devised and implemented a common European policy; even more: a foreign policy. Because grants from the EDF were to be supplemental to bilateral aid, especially from former metropolitan powers, the Commission from the beginning had to inquire into the development plans of EEC member states to coordinate its actions.[82] This was not made easier by the fact that all EEC partners but France and to a lesser extent Belgium viewed Association as the unwanted child. This is reflected in the DG VIII's internal position within the Commission, where issues like the internal market and the CAP were viewed as being much more relevant to European Integration. Association was the stepchild to be carried along. The DG VIII was considered as merely dealing with African negro kings.[83]

One of the early tasks of the DG VIII therefore consisted in convincing member states, above all the Netherlands and the FRG, of the merits of Association. Several DG VIII officials, after coordinating themselves with the first Commissioner for Association of OCTs in the Hallstein Commission, Robert Lemaignen, toured discussions and seminars all over the EEC. Sometimes films were arranged to show the results of projects funded by the EDF. To help their reputation within the Commission, trips to the OCTs were organized to familiarize other Commission officials and civil servants with the work done in the DG VIII. The efforts seemed to be successful: In June 1961 Lemaignen came back from a trip to The Hague being very satisfied with the evolution of the Dutch government's position towards Association.[84]

Pursuant to Article 144 of the Rome Treaty, the **European Parliament**[85] (EP) could introduce a motion of censure against the Commission at any time.[86] This gave the EP enough lever to assure that the Commission would seek conciliatory behavior: Since the EP could introduce the motion at any time, the Commission from the beginning sought to involve the EP and consult with it even where it had no formal obligation to do so. In effect, the Commission strove to give the EP the same status in all areas as in Article 122, where in the field of developing the social situation the EP has been given the right to ask the Commission to draw up special reports upon their discretion. Furthermore, the Commission vowed to consult the EP as laid down in Article 149 and amend original proposals as long as the Council has not decided.[87] The EP so had indirect influence on the formulation of policies outside its actual array of competencies, such as the Association of OCTs.

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successor. Ferrandi himself remained as Director in the DG VIII. Future Commissioners for Development, first Henri Rochereau (1962-1967) then Jean-François Deniau (1967-1973), were so consumed by managing their own political career in France that they left the agenda largely at the hands of Chapperon as their *chef de cabinet* and Ferrandi developed into the most powerful individual within DG VIII; see Ibid., 75-78.

[82] See Rivkin, *Africa and the European Common Market*, 18.

[83] See Dimier, "Legitimizing the DG8," 4-5.

[84] See Ibid., 16-19.

[85] The actual word to refer to the European Parliament at the time of the Rome Treaty was 'Assembly'.

[86] An easily accessible electronic English-language version of the actual Treaty establishing the EEC is available at http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Treaty_establishing_the_European_Economic_Community_(EEC) (29 July 2009).

[87] See EEC Commission, *First General Report on the Activities of the Community (1 January 1958 - 17 September 1958)* (Luxembourg: Publications Department of the European Communities, 1958), 26-27.

1.3. The Yaoundé Convention – From Association Octroyée to Association Négociée

This section will review the negotiations leading to the signing of the Yaoundé Convention and its outcome regarding the Association of AASM.[88] These negotiations are presented as a complementary picture of the same phenomenon, i.e. how to reconcile Europe's colonial legacy with the European Common Market and the very diverse positions and interests present among the Six.

1.3.1. Negotiations

Negotiations of the Yaoundé Convention commenced in mid-1961. Much to the surprise of the EEC, African decolonization, instead of taking decades, gained momentum not long after the Rome Treaty was signed. "*The newly independent states, formerly associated to the EC ex officio […], were obviously no longer bound by the […] Treaty of Rome.*"[89] When the Association under the Rome Treaty could be described as an *association octroyée* without proper representation of the African territories in the course of negotiations, the new form of cooperation would have to be an *association négociée*. Interest in a continued relationship with Europe on the African part, however, was pronounced. Political independence is one thing, but it "*[…] is not as a rule accompanied by the complete rupture of the economic ties which had been formed in the course of the historical phase of colonial dependency between the metropolis and its external territories […].*"[90] In fact, only Guinea turned away from the EEC and stopped implementing the trade liberalization measures laid down by the Rome Treaty.[91] All other African states showed great interest in maintaining ties with the EEC, which guaranteed continuation of aid flows from the EDF.

The importance of the African continent to the European market might have waned in the few years since the Rome Treaty, since the EEC's "*[…] economic interests were less focused on the former African colonies, as the integration of the [EEC] and the increasing liberalization and internationalization of the world economy increased other economic links.*"[92] But the African dependency on Europe did not wane. Table 16 presents the share of exports originating from the

[88] Actually, 'Yaoundé Convention' can refer to both the Yaoundé I Convention and the subsequent Yaoundé II Convention signed in 1969. However, since the Yaoundé II negotiations were relatively uncomplicated and its outcome largely an extension of the Yaoundé I provisions, this chapter shall deal exclusively with the Yaoundé I Convention.

[89] Enzo Grilli, *The European Community and the developing countries* (Cambridge [et al.]: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 15.

[90] Gaston G. Leduc, "The Economic Balance Sheet of Colonialism," *Journal of Contemporary History* 4, no. 1 (1969): 37.

[91] See Cosgrove Twitchett, *Europe and Africa*, 37.

[92] William Brown, *The European Union and Africa: the restructuring of North-South relations*, The Library of international relations 20 (London [et al.]: I.B. Tauris, 2002), 42.

African18 delivered to the markets of the EEC6.[93] Export shares are ranked in descending order and split up by EEC member state. The African state of dependency and her interest to remain close to the EEC become clear: Senegal delivered almost 90 percent of all her exports to France in 1962, Cameroon over 80 percent to the EEC6. Another seven countries delivered over two-thirds of their total exports to the EEC6. Only Mali, Somalia, and Burkina Faso have a share considerably below 50 percent. The economic dependence on Europe could hardly be more pronounced and has given rise to claims of **neocolonialism**, i.e. the claim that African states have acquired political independence but Europe still controls the continent indirectly via economic relations.[94]

Share of Exports delivered to the EEC6 in 1962						
	EEC6	France	Belg-Lux	FRG	Netherlands	Italy
Senegal	88%	86%	0%	1%	1%	0%
Cameroon	81%	60%	1%	4%	13%	3%
Benin	77%	70%	0%	0%	6%	0%
Gabon	76%	59%	1%	12%	2%	1%
Congo, Rep.	73%	20%	25%	18%	9%	0%
Congo, Dem. Rep.	69%	5%	40%	11%	5%	8%
Ivory Coast	69%	49%	1%	6%	6%	7%
Togo	68%	52%	6%	0%	6%	4%
Central African Rep.	64%	57%	2%	2%	2%	1%
Chad	60%	50%	8%	2%	0%	0%
Madagascar	60%	54%	0%	3%	1%	1%
Niger	56%	56%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Mauritania	49%	48%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Mali	18%	17%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Somalia	13%	0%	0%	0%	0%	12%
Burkina Faso	6%	4%	2%	0%	0%	1%

Table 16: African18's share of Exports delivered to the EEC6 as a percentage of Total Exports in 1962. Data not available for: Burundi and Guinea. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.

The African states managed to organize themselves fairly well in the course of negotiations, especially when taking into account that it was their first major appearance on the international scene. Since continued Association was a top priority for most OCTs, the AASM managed to agree on a quite consistent common stand through a single official spokesman. Paradoxically, the AASM's main source of advice in their deliberations was the European Commission, who encouraged the African states to negotiate as a group.[95] The African countries negotiating *en bloc* may come as a surprise, since Pan-Africanism in general had a difficult stand: The two blocks in Africa in the early 60s were the **Casablanca Bloc** in favor of a Pan-African movement, and the **Monrovia Bloc** espousing a doctrine of multiple roads. The Addis Ababa Conference of 1963, which gave birth to the

[93] The African18 is identical with the AASM (contracting parties of the Yaoundé Convention) when subtracting Guinea and adding Rwanda.

[94] See Edmond J. Keller, "Decolonization, Independence, and the Failure of Politics," in *Africa*, ed. Phyllis M. Martin and Patrick O'Meara, 3. ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 156.

[95] See Cosgrove Twitchett, *Europe and Africa*, 79.

Organization of African Unity (OAU), the forerunner of the African Union, then signaled the dissolution of the Casablanca Bloc and underlined each African state's choice to head down whatever road it found suitable. Although some countries remained vocal rearguards of Pan-Africanism thereafter, the 'Spirit of Addis' came about as a strong defeat of Pan-African aspirations and emphasized the principle of multiple roads to political, economic and social development.[96] However, the AASM's weak stand against the EEC6 seems to have been incentive enough to forge a common approach.

The Six could agree on the great outlines of their position – to help the Associates in their economic and social development as stipulated in Article 131 of the Rome Treaty – and "*[…] none of the Member States sought to deny that association remained part of the EEC's colonial heritage.*"[97] But the actual split within the EEC over how to proceed with OCTs after they became independent in detail, corresponded closely to the positions taken during the Rome Treaty negotiations: France accorded a high priority to continued Association, while the Dutch and the German governments were particularly against such moves for fear of trade diversion and the taint of neocolonialism. "*Their reluctance to continue association, however, was overshadowed by their desire for harmonious advance towards integration within the Community.*"[98] Compared to the ongoing negotiations concerning the CAP and the first British application to join the EEC of 10 August 1961, the Yaoundé negotiations paled in insignificance.[99] Also, since not the whole framework of the EEC was contingent upon agreement on this issue – as was the case in the Rome Treaty negotiations – the debate was much less strained. In addition, both the Commission and the EP fervently favored continued Association, which might have decreased the propensity of Bonn and The Hague to push the matter.[100] The Commission then also took the initiative in July 1961 and was resolved to take the lead in the pending Association negotiations, but – although formally represented – its role would be very limited. Instead, the Council of Ministers asked the Committee of Permanent Representatives to prepare a draft for the negotiations. The member states clearly wanted to retain the conduct of negotiations firmly in their own hands.[101] The Commission's hands were tied.

Another dominant aspect on the mind of the Six when pondering continued Association of the African states were worries that former colonies could turn the other way in the Cold War, seeking Soviet assistance in their political and economic formation after gaining independence.[102] By continued Association of OCTs with the EEC their pro-western course should be supported. Although

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[96] See Rivkin, *Africa and the European Common Market*, 2.
[97] Cosgrove Twitchett, *Europe and Africa*, 91.
[98] Ibid., 38.
[99] See Vaughan, *Twentieth-century Europe*, 152.
[100] Interestingly, even French President de Gaulle, the principal proponent of *l'Europe des patries* as opposed to *l'Europe communautaire*, desired a quick decision so ardently that he supported the Commission wholeheartedly: "*An uncomfortable but expedient alliance between France and the EEC Commission underlay the Yaoundé Convention.*" Cosgrove Twitchett, *Europe and Africa*, 74.
[101] See Ibid., 78.
[102] See Olufemi Babarinde, "The European Union's Relations with the South: A Commitment to Development?," in *The European Union in the world community*, ed. Carolyn Rhodes (Boulder, Colo. [et al.]: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 141.

this argument was not reflected officially in any of the related documents, its validity becomes obvious in the ideological frame of early 60s, *inter alia* symbolized by the construction of the Berlin Wall and the Cuban missile crisis.[103] The African manifestation of the Cold War became visible in Guinea's decision in 1958 to turn down an invitation to join France's *Communauté Française* therefore also losing French bilateral aid. Similarly, when Tanzania decided to establish diplomatic ties with the GDR in 1965, the FRG broke off diplomatic relations and cut off economic assistance in line with its Hallstein-Doctrine.[104]

The actual Yaoundé negotiations then might have been conducted between parties that had formally acquired the same political status, but certainly not the same power. Although the AASM were avidly supported by the Commission and the EP, the Council of Ministers took a much more reserved approach towards African demands. In effect, the African Associates were in an extremely weak bargaining position. In fact, this weakness might have been their only strength. By constantly appealing to Europe's moral obligation they could yield more than by trying to bargain with nothing to bargain with. Key decisions were taken in the Council alone and the AASM had to take whatever the Council offered: "*The African Associates were disappointed with the Community's offers, but acknowledged that West Germany, and even more so, the Netherlands would not be moved by appeals from themselves or from France.*"[105]

Regarding the final agreement, the French side could ultimately claim success in the following areas: The association was **perpetuated** on a free trade approach, substantial financial and technical assistance for the Associates was granted, and compensation for the elimination of the *surprix* system prevailing in the former French colonies was established. On the other hand, Germany and the Netherlands would assert themselves on these issues: The CET was lowered, which lessened the potential gains from being associated under the Yaoundé Convention vis-à-vis third countries, the compensation for the abandoned *surprix* was of a temporary nature, and a **Declaration of Intent** made it clear that the enshrined Association regime would be potentially open to other developing countries as well. Finally, the EP, Commission and Associates managed to influence the shape of the newly created institutions rather decisively, in which donors and recipients would come together as partners to mutually shape future aid relations.[106] Also on the Associates explicit request, the first Yaoundé Convention was designed as a bilateral free trade agreement between every single associated country and the EEC. This means that while Association under the terms of the Rome Treaty implicitly included a free trade area among the African Associates themselves to further regional integration and horizontal trade, the Yaoundé Convention brought with it no further

[103] This ideological dimension can be assessed today by accounts of senior officials in office in the 50s and 60s. For example, Horst Dumke of the German *Auswärtiges Amt* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) gives an insightful account of the situation in the early 60s; see Horst Dumke, *Anfänge der deutschen staatlichen Entwicklungspolitik: eine Korrektur des politischen Bildes,* Auslandsinformationen 12 (Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 1997), 10-12.

[104] The EEC's development assistance was trying to take a more apolitical and pragmatic stance towards aid distribution, reflected in the Lomé Convention, which even included some socialist countries as beneficiaries; see Friedrich, Park, and Wiegelmann, *Entwicklungspolitik der EG*, 22-23.

[105] Cosgrove Twitchett, *Europe and Africa*, 85.

[106] See Ibid., 91-94.

incentives for African economies to build economies of scale by virtue of increased integration.[107] At the end of negotiations, when the Yaoundé Convention was signed on 20 July 1963, all African and European parties involved were eager to express their satisfaction over the results achieved.[108]

1.3.2. Outcome

The Yaoundé Convention created three new institutions: The **Association Council** would be composed of members of the Council and the Commission as well as one member of the government of each associated state. The presidency would be held alternately by a member of the EEC and a government-member of the Associates. It would be convened once a year, was to have the sole ultimate decision power in matters of Association, and was to be assisted by an Association Committee. Additionally, it was to lay down the general pattern for financial and technical cooperation under Article 27 of the Convention. The **Parliamentary Conference** would be composed equally of members of the EP and the Associates' Parliaments to meet annually. The Association Council was to submit an annual report on its activities to the Conference. The **Court of Arbitration of the Association** was to be approached in case of controversy about the interpretation of the convention and had the power to issue binding decisions. It was composed of five members to be appointed by the Association Council. The institutional build-up very much resembled the EEC itself; not least because the Association Council was clearly the dominant actor.[109]

Other principles enshrined in the Yaoundé Convention was trade expansion and opening of quotas as well as the Right of Establishment for all EEC members alike; all basically extensions from the provisions in the Rome Treaty. The second **EDF** made available a total of $730 million to the AASM, whereas $64 million would now come in the form of loans by the EIB, another $46 million as special loans directly from the EDF, and only the balancing $620 million in the form of non-repayable grants. Abolition of the *surprix* system was bolstered by EDF moneys in the range of $230 million made available to affected countries. So, while the bulk of the second EDF was – unlike the first EDF – open to all associated countries alike, these $230 million were earmarked for increasing efficiency and diversifying the agricultural base of selected countries listed in protocol five of the Convention. The remaining $500 million were to be spent in the field of economic and social investments and – this was new – general technical cooperation. In addition, some funds could be used to prop-up commodity prices important to the African states in a first attempt to use stabilization schemes to counteract fluctuating world market prices.[110]

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[107] See Grilli, *The European Community and the developing countries*, 147.

[108] See Cosgrove Twitchett, *Europe and Africa*, 80-82. A one-minute clip from the signing ceremony in Yaoundé, Cameroon, can be watched at http://www.ena.lu?lang=2&doc=5783 (29 July 2009).

[109] A fourth new institution, not spelled out as such in the Yaoundé Convention, can bee seen in the establishment of direct representation of each associated state in Brussels, in order to get immediate, direct access to the EEC organs, above all the Commission. The initiative of Togo, the former French UN Trust Territory, not to be represented anymore by an intermediary *interlocuteur valable* consequently set a precedent for all other African associates; see Rivkin, *Africa and the European Common Market*, 31.

[110] See Cosgrove Twitchett, *Europe and Africa*, 101-104.

Under Yaoundé the EDF was still administered by the European Commission, but the procedure for selecting projects was modified: Under the Rome Treaty provisions the EEC member states were at the same time administering authorities in the OCTs. Hence, they were practically responsible for submitting projects to themselves, which guaranteed them great influence over the selection of projects. The new situation necessitated changes which would warrant them similar weight in the selection process. The Commission was consequently obliged to administer the EDF in cooperation with a newly created **Fund Committee**, which was composed of representatives of the member states and headed by the Commission. Only when the Commission and the Fund Committee agreed, the decision was final. If they could come to no agreement, the matter would be directly referred to the Council of Ministers of the EEC. Ultimately, another new element was the so called Commission's delegate (*le contrôleur délégué*) who was responsible for overseeing the project implementation in Africa and so became a vital intermediary in the Commission's administration process; and a first attempt to bring decision makers and affected people closer together.[111]

Although the IC annexed to the Rome Treaty was due to expire after its five-year period at the beginning of 1963, by agreement of the parties the provisions were extended to June 1964, when the Yaoundé Convention finally entered into force. The reason for the delayed ratification of the Yaoundé Convention was that Germany and the Netherlands refused to sign the Convention because of France's behavior on a different, although related, matter that would foreshadow the future turn of events: In January 1963 France blocked the UK's entry bid into the EEC for the first time.[112]

[111] See Ibid., 104-109.

[112] See Tom Soper, "The EEC and Aid to Africa," *International Affairs* 41, no. 3 (1965): 469.

2. The Northern Enlargement and the Lomé Convention

On 22 January 1972 Britain, Denmark, Ireland, and Norway signed the Treaty of Accession to the EEC. While Norway finally failed to join due to a negative referendum, entry into the Community of the other new partners would affect the economic structures of old and new EEC partners – and their pattern of trade – alike. Also, the development of Eurafrican relations was impacted by the Northern Enlargement. While the Yaoundé Convention defined the means for closer relations between the EEC and the – mostly Francophone – AASM, the Lomé Convention opened the scope of potential beneficiaries of EDF funds considerably: Not only to countries in the Caribbean and Pacific, but also to several African countries under formerly British control.

Since one purpose of this chapter is to highlight the relevance of Eurafrican relations on the first British entry bid, a separation of African Lomé countries into the subsets 'Early Commonwealth Countries', i.e. African countries joining the Commonwealth up to 1963, which was about the time of the first veto, and the 'Late Commonwealth Countries', i.e. countries joining later than 1963, appears fruitful. In addition, some 'Other Countries' joined the EEC framework at Lomé: Two of them were former Spanish and Portuguese colonies. Also, Guinea, which turned its back on the EEC after gaining independence in 1958, and the Sudan, a former British colony never part of the Commonwealth, joined the Lomé Convention. Finally, Liberia, which was founded by freed American slaves in the mid-nineteenth century, and Ethiopia, who lost independence to fascist Italy only for a very short period in the 1930s, were contracting parties. The list of African countries entangled with the EEC under the Lomé Convention and included in the scope of this paper is summarized below:

- **Early Commonwealth Countries:** Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda
- **Late Commonwealth Countries:** Botswana, Gambia, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia
- **Other Countries:** Sudan (former British), Guinea (former French), Equatorial Guinea (former Spanish), Guinea-Bissau (former Portuguese), Ethiopia, Liberia



Figure 9: African countries cooperating with the EEC pursuant to the Lomé Convention. Source: Wikimedia Commons and own illustration.

After two French vetoes, the Northern Enlargement ultimately took place on 1 January 1973. The underlying motivation for de Gaulle to veto the British applications has often been explained with his geopolitical *Weltanschauung*, in which he wanted to attain France's (and Europe's) position as a separate third power in the bipolar world of the Cold War, but a closer look at the circumstances does cast some doubts on that interpretation. In fact, a completely different motivation could lie behind de Gaulle's decision, nonetheless extraneously motivated, as the "*[…] intransigence of both the Commonwealth nations and the French government over agricultural questions is arguably significant when one studies the causes of de Gaulle's seemingly sudden decision […].*"[113]

This chapter will again first sketch the economic background and analyze the development of trade between the EEC9 and selected countries. The second section will then review the situation surrounding de Gaulle's first and second veto in the light of **sub-hypothesis two**, which states that the reasons for de Gaulle's vetoes can be partly explained by British-French rivalry stemming from their colonial past. Finally, the situation around the Lomé Convention shall be presented.

2.1. The economic situation between the EEC9 and selected countries in the 60s

When the previous chapter set out to identify the different geographic centers of gravity to make inferences about the respective national positions in the course of the Rome Treaty negotiations, this seems not the right approach to fully elucidate the questions associated with the Northern Enlargement in general, and the *Causa Britannica* in particular. As this chapter will show, some of the relevant economic ties to highlight concerns with regard to Britain's entry are those with pre-1945 Commonwealth countries mostly outside Africa (with the exception of South Africa). To be sure, these ties are based on colonial legacies nonetheless, but their relevance to the unfolding EEC – which was just about to formulate its guiding principles for the CAP in the 60s – is more dominant in the actual debate than most countries on the African continent. The scope of this paper initially chosen proves therefore too restricted to capture the dynamics: While the four tropical commodities employed in the previous chapter still represent sizeable import flows from Africa throughout the 60s, they do not grow in the moderate climate of Europe and therefore cause little friction among European countries in relation to the CAP. The situation was distinctly different in the case of other Commonwealth countries like Canada, for example, wherefrom the UK received a large portion of her wheat – in the 60s also one of the most important agricultural export commodities for France.

Again, data presented in this section on the economic situation between Europe and selected countries is starting in 1962. However, rather than a static picture this chapter sets out to present the dynamics in trade between 1962 and 1970. To that end, the numbers for the years 1962, 1965, and 1970 shall be presented. For the latter two observations it would have certainly been better to aggregate flows for the 1963 to 1966 and 1967 to 1970 periods to build four-year averages in order

[113] Mark Gilbert, *Surpassing realism: the politics of European integration since 1945* (Lanham, Md. [et al.]: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 99.

to smoothen out peaks and troughs. However, since I am not a subscribed user of the COMTRADE database, I cannot simply download data but have to copy it from the screen. It goes without saying that this is an arduous enough task for single years.

When shifting to a dynamic view, inevitably the question of inflation comes to the fore. To what extent, for example, can a tripling in import figures measured in current US$ terms be attributed to an associated increase in goods and not merely to an increase in prices? The chosen period, 1962 to 1970, seems little controversial in this respect. Although inflation figures could reach higher single digit numbers in individual countries in the Bretton Woods era as well, compared to the period after 1971, which is when the system collapsed, inflation figures were very moderate. "*This does not mean that the gold standard prevented inflation. But the gold standard did impose some constraints on the inflationary process.*"[114] Concerning imports from African countries this could still be a misleading conclusion since imported goods are mostly primary resources that one could reason have been subject to serious price fluctuations already in the 60s. However, the evidence is again that price volatility was very moderate in the 60s, at least compared to the post-1973 (first oil shock) era.[115] In any case, since these prices where determined on world markets and affected all countries in the same way, the reported numbers should at the very least be fine when drawing conclusions relative to one another within single years.

Each EEC9 country will be dealt with in two ways:

- First, the situation regarding the EEC9 on the one side, and the African Lomé countries and selected Commonwealth countries on the other is portrayed for the 1962 to 1970 period. To that end, African Lomé countries are split up into AASM[116], Early Commonwealth Countries[117] (ECC), Late Commonwealth Countries[118] (LCC), and Other Countries, all defined as described earlier and illustrated in figure 9.[119] Additionally, a group called **Historical Commonwealth Countries** (HCC) shall be identified separately in the data. These HCC compose of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, all of which joined the Commonwealth before 1945 and are sometimes ascribed to as **white settler colonies**, i.e. colonies where European

[114] Robert O. Keohane, "The International Politics of Inflation," in *The politics of inflation and economic stagnation: theoretical approaches and international case studies*, ed. Leon N. Lindberg and Charles S. Maier (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985), 81.

[115] See Eduardo Borensztein et al., *The Behavior of Non-Oil Commodity Prices*, Occasional paper 112 (Washington, DC: Internat. Monetary Fund, 1994), 6-9.

[116] No data is available for Rwanda in 1962 in the COMTRADE database.

[117] No data is available for Tanzania in 1962 in the COMTRADE database.

[118] Data for Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland is not available in the COMTRADE database on the individual level; compare footnote 120. For the year 1962 data for Malawi and Zambia is available only under the heading **Former Rhodesia & Nyasaland**. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, also called Central African Federation (CAF), was a semi-autonomous British dependency founded in 1953 and comprises of the present-day states of Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Since Zimbabwe did not join until the second Lomé Convention of 1979, it serves as an upward bias for LCC in 1962. The CAF was dissolved in 1963; see Kevin Shillington, ed., *Encyclopedia of African History: A-G*, vol. 1 (New York [et al.]: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2005), 1700-1701.

[119] To be sure, these four groups – AASM, ECC, LCC, and Other Countries – combined form all *African* contracting parties of the Lomé Convention.

settlers pushed back native inhabitants to the point where they themselves would constitute the new majority (or ruling minority, as in the case of South Africa) and came to fight for more independence from the former metropolis.[120]

- Second, the intra-EEC import figures are presented for the same time span, which will show a push towards **Europeanization**, i.e. a strong increase in imports within the EEC6 on the expense of 'outsiders'. The data will be presented both individually for every country and in the EEC6 and EEC9 aggregates. Also, the difference simply defined as

$$\Delta EEC = EEC9 - EEC6$$

shall serve as an indicator for two separate cases: First, regarding the EEC6 the ΔECC measure can be used as an indicator of proclivity towards Northern Enlargement. The higher the measure, the more goods are being traded with the UK, Denmark, and Ireland.[121] Hence, the assumed interest in inviting these countries to join the club. Second, regarding the UK, Denmark, and Ireland the measure can serve as an indicator of how much interest the countries had to join the EEC as a group.[122]

After dealing with all EEC9 partners individually, a short section at the end shall systematically review their interests relative to one another and draw conclusions.

2.1.1. France

France imported almost 8 percent from African Lomé countries in 1962, the bulk of this being delivered from the AASM, naturally. In 1962 France also imported 4.53 percent from HCC, which is the third highest share of all EEC9 countries after the UK and Italy. In the course of the 60s, however, no country of the Six did shift its economic outset quite to the same extent as France: From 1962 to 1970, the AASM lost more than 3 percent in share of total French imports, while the HCC lost another 2 percent. If the goal of the Yaoundé Convention was to increase trade with the AASM, it clearly failed to achieve this goal in the case of France.

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[120] Data for South Africa in the surveyed time period is available only under the heading **Southern African Customs Union** (SACU) in the COMTRADE database. SACU comprises of South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (Namibia was a *de facto* member and formally joined SACU in 1990 after gaining independence from South Africa) and, founded in 1910, is the oldest customs union in the world; see Thomas M. Leonard, ed., *Encyclopedia of the Developing World: Index O-Z*, vol. 3 (New York [et al.]: Routledge, 2006), 1468-1470.

[121] In effect, the ΔEEC measure simply adds up imports from the UK, Denmark, and Ireland.

[122] The attentive reader might be tempted to question why intra-EEC imports are used rather than intra-EEC exports. The easiest way to answer this might be by referring to the fact that intra-EEC imports for one EEC country are intra-EEC exports for another and win the argument by simple logic. However, since imports and exports do not *exactly* add up in the COMTRADE database due to various reasons this answer would be misleading. So, it would be valid to use intra-EEC exports and one could expect slightly different results. I would still argue that the difference stemming from these two alternative approaches is negligible, since – at least in the 60s – imports and exports of European countries balanced out fairly well.

Evolvement of French Imports from selected Countries 1962 to 1970						
	1962		1965		1970	
	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World
AASM	512 580 997	6.82%	547 002 639	5.29%	703 702 390	3.72%
ECC	23 738 598	0.32%	64 718 811	0.63%	133 172 168	0.70%
LCC	28 832 998	0.38%	47 321 676	0.46%	96 374 120	0.51%
Other Countries	24 164 271	0.32%	27 531 126	0.27%	37 210 380	0.20%
Lomé Countries	589 316 864	7.84%	686 574 252	6.64%	970 459 058	5.13%
HCC	340 266 668	4.53%	393 365 572	3.81%	507 275 196	2.68%
World	7 516 678 144	Σ12.37%	10 335 869 952	Σ10.45%	18 922 430 464	Σ7.81%

Table 17: Evolvement of French Imports received from selected Countries over 1962, 1965, and 1970. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.

The intra-EEC imports in 1962 are listed in descending order in table 18 and have already largely been presented in the previous chapter. New to this table are import flows originating from the UK, Denmark and Ireland. Of these, only British imports represent a sizeable share. When looking at the data for the 1965 to 1970 period, one can clearly see the astounding impact the EEC had on the French economy: Albeit starting from a low figure in 1962, the French economy's share of intra-EEC6 imports gained over 15 percent until 1970. Especially, imports from Germany and Belgium-Luxembourg were booming. The UK could feel this process of Europeanization quite directly; she was the only country within the EEC9 to lose in share of total French imports. Also, the ΔECC measure – used to quantify interest in letting the UK, Denmark and Ireland join the EEC6 – was the lowest for France among the Six. A way to interpret this measure more tangibly is by formulating that would the Northern Enlargement have taken place in 1962, France would have profited from an immediate increase in intra-EEC imports of only 5.63 percent (and hence lower prices due to lower tariffs).[123]

Evolvement of French intra-EEC9 Imports over 1962, 1965 and 1970						
	1962		1965		1970	
	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World
FRG	1 323 643 392	17.61%	1 911 114 624	18.49%	4 217 817 600	22.29%
Belg-Lux	496 909 056	6.61%	858 285 824	8.30%	2 145 763 072	11.34%
Italy	414 478 240	5.51%	726 073 792	7.02%	1 765 479 808	9.33%
UK	387 088 704	5.15%	521 969 120	5.05%	864 193 984	4.57%
Netherlands	288 210 432	3.83%	519 702 400	5.03%	1 126 877 952	5.96%
Denmark	31 721 704	0.42%	59 689 176	0.58%	80 170 504	0.42%
Ireland	4 122 263	0.05%	18 753 412	0.18%	39 555 944	0.21%
EEC6	2 523 241 120	33.57%	4 015 176 640	38.85%	9 255 938 432	48.92%
EEC9	2 946 173 791	39.20%	4 615 588 348	44.66%	10 239 858 864	54.11%
ΔEEC	422 932 671	5.63%	600 411 708	5.81%	983 920 432	5.20%

Table 18: Evolvement of French intra-EEC9 Imports over 1962, 1965, and 1970. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.

[123] To be sure, this is not to say that France would have been able to import all these additional goods right after accession duty-free. Naturally, intra-EEC customs would have to be reduced gradually after enlargement (similar to the way foreseen in the Rome Treaty for the Six) to give the entering economies time to adjust.

2.1.2. Belgium-Luxembourg

Belgium-Luxembourg imported a total of $4.5 billion in 1962. In contrast to France, her share of imports from the AASM, although starting from a high base, increased slightly to 1970. Belgium-Luxembourg so even had the highest share of total imports received from the AASM within the EEC9 in 1970. This could be 'hindsight evidence' that she was the single most interested country in ongoing economic relations with OCTs, after all. Her overall share of goods imported from the African Lomé countries only declined slightly in the 1962 to 1970 period, but imports originating in the HCC fared relatively bad, losing about 1.5 percent of the total share until 1970.

Evolvement of BEL-LUX Imports from selected Countries 1962 to 1970						
	1962		1965		1970	
	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World
AASM	200 218 337	4.40%	233 907 421	3.67%	513 093 199	4.52%
ECC	18 361 436	0.40%	45 198 957	0.71%	39 456 481	0.35%
LCC	10 315 627	0.23%	1 235 672	0.02%	2 183 230	0.02%
Other Countries	13 087 458	0.29%	23 107 023	0.36%	27 776 354	0.24%
Lomé Countries	241 982 858	5.31%	303 449 073	4.76%	582 509 264	5.13%
HCC	193 328 096	4.24%	240 881 491	3.78%	315 281 300	2.77%
World	4 555 408 896	Σ9.56%	6 373 554 947	Σ8.54%	11 362 287 616	Σ7.90%

Table 19: Evolvement of Belgian-Luxembourgian Imports received from selected Countries over 1962, 1965, and 1970. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.

The same phenomenon as in the French case, however, can be witnessed from the Belgian-Luxembourgian intra-EEC import statistics. The growth in intra-EEC6 imports was enormous, which affected countries outside the EEC directly. When the UK had a share of over 8 percent of total Belgian-Luxembourgian imports in 1962, that share waned to 5.81 percent in 1970. The bigger winners of these process were Germany and France, the latter overtaking the Netherlands in 1965. In fact, the Netherlands herself were the only country among the EEC6 not to increase her share in the Belgian-Luxembourgian economy. The ΔECC measure did fall over 2 percent until 1970. As in the case of France, the possible impact of the Enlargement on her economy was diminishing over time.

Evolvement of BEL-LUX intra-EEC9 Imports over 1962, 1965 and 1970						
	1962		1965		1970	
	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World
FRG	851 293 760	18.69%	1 263 077 339	19.82%	2 651 444 992	23.34%
Netherlands	673 289 792	14.78%	964 033 893	15.13%	1 660 628 224	14.62%
France	664 899 584	14.60%	994 240 978	15.60%	1 947 213 184	17.14%
UK	367 042 208	8.06%	485 683 562	7.62%	660 034 496	5.81%
Italy	134 354 304	2.95%	251 972 739	3.95%	425 626 560	3.75%
Denmark	18 244 698	0.40%	29 073 815	0.46%	41 379 580	0.36%
Ireland	2 430 599	0.05%	7 846 836	0.12%	27 835 818	0.24%
EEC6	2 323 837 440	51.01%	3 473 324 949	54.50%	6 684 912 960	58.83%
EEC9	2 711 554 945	59.52%	3 995 929 162	62.70%	7 414 162 854	65.25%
ΔEEC	387 717 505	8.51%	522 604 213	8.20%	729 249 894	6.42%

Table 20: Evolvement of Belgian-Luxembourgian intra-EEC9 Imports over 1962, 1965, and 1970. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.

2.1.3. Federal Republic of Germany

Although Germany tripled her imports from the AASM between 1962 and 1970 in absolute terms, the share of AASM in overall German imports increased only slightly to 0.83 percent. This already hints at the immense expansion in overall imports in the same period – between 1962 and 1970 German imports increased by over 160 percent. The share of trade with the African Lomé countries declined nonetheless, if little from about 3 percent in 1962 to just under 2.8 percent in 1970. The share of imports received from the HCC did decline a little more than that, but in the general friendly environment of a booming German economy also the HCC did not have to give much way to its 1962 share.

Evolvement of German Imports from selected Countries 1962 to 1970						
	1962		1965		1970	
	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World
AASM	92 981 000	0.71%	163 151 008	0.82%	281 900 000	0.83%
ECC	170 252 000	1.30%	244 293 020	1.23%	376 737 992	1.11%
LCC	75 332 000	0.58%	68 746 000	0.35%	131 480 000	0.39%
Other Countries	50 380 000	0.38%	119 567 003	0.60%	159 415 000	0.47%
Lomé Countries	388 945 000	2.97%	595 757 031	3.00%	949 532 992	2.79%
HCC	469 986 000	3.59%	567 220 008	2.86%	1 031 660 992	3.03%
World	13 096 053 760	Σ6.56%	19 828 754 432	Σ5.87%	34 080 014 336	Σ5.81%

Table 21: Evolvement of German Imports received from selected Countries over 1962, 1965, and 1970. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.

Unsurprisingly, Germany also profited from the process of Europeanization in the 60s. Albeit not increasing her share in intra-EEC6 imports quite to the same extent as her French partner and keeping her economic interests fairly even spread across the world, she did increase the intra-EEC6 share by almost 12 percent in the eight years to 1970. The UK and Denmark are the only EEC9 countries that had a diminishing share in total German imports over the eight-year period, which is reflected in the ΔECC measure, to decline to 5.17 percent until 1970.

Evolvement of German intra-EEC9 Imports over 1962, 1965 and 1970						
	1962		1965		1970	
	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World
France	1 306 761 984	9.98%	2 105 990 016	10.62%	4 115 412 992	12.08%
Netherlands	1 072 633 984	8.19%	1 820 018 048	9.18%	4 065 157 120	11.93%
Italy	924 644 992	7.06%	1 604 002 944	8.09%	3 157 287 936	9.26%
Belg-Lux	685 654 976	5.24%	1 330 637 952	6.71%	3 042 259 968	8.93%
UK	574 796 032	4.39%	854 385 984	4.31%	1 263 346 048	3.71%
Denmark	304 526 016	2.33%	383 922 016	1.94%	454 838 016	1.33%
Ireland	15 291 000	0.12%	39 432 004	0.20%	45 069 000	0.13%
EEC6	3 989 695 936	30.46%	6 860 648 960	34.60%	14 380 118 016	42.20%
EEC9	4 884 308 984	37.30%	8 138 388 964	41.04%	16 143 371 080	47.37%
ΔEEC	894 613 048	6.83%	1 277 740 004	6.44%	1 763 253 064	5.17%

Table 22: Evolvement of German intra-EEC9 Imports over 1962, 1965, and 1970. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.

2.1.4. Netherlands

The Netherlands showed the most impressive increase in imports in the three years to 1965; her imports almost tripled! However, she was not able to continue this trend and by 1970 she had to give back a little in her total import figure. Still, compared to 1962 the total 1970 figure is impressive. Influenced by the strong underlying trend of increasing imports, practically all surveyed country groups managed to increase their share, with the AASM and the HCC being the most affected.

Evolvement of Dutch Imports from selected Countries 1962 to 1970						
	1962		1965		1970	
	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World
AASM	37 705 425	0.71%	102 278 344	0.70%	132 536 114	0.99%
ECC	71 401 627	1.34%	151 341 115	1.03%	198 495 385	1.48%
LCC	4 956 929	0.09%	13 024 062	0.09%	10 863 318	0.08%
Other Countries	13 206 427	0.25%	36 760 590	0.25%	25 953 049	0.25%
Lomé Countries	127 270 408	2.38%	303 404 111	2.07%	367 847 866	2.75%
HCC	79 315 693	1.48%	215 467 246	1.47%	263 445 634	1.97%
World	5 347 534 830	Σ3.86%	14 688 410 624	Σ3.53%	13 392 971 776	Σ4.71%

Table 23: Evolvement of Dutch Imports received from selected Countries over 1962, 1965, and 1970. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.

When looking at the EEC import figures, the strong Dutch performance up to 1965 and the ensuing slight decline up to 1970 can be witnessed again. Interestingly, increases with Germany, France, and Italy were so pronounced that Belgium-Luxembourg even experienced a significant decline in relative importance to the Dutch economy. In spite of the strong overall increase in total imports, the decline in relative importance of the British economy can also be witnessed in the Dutch case. When the British share of overall Dutch imports was 7.26 percent in 1962, this share decreased to 5.48 in 1970, making it the fourth biggest importer behind France. Accordingly, had the Dutch economy profited from the Northern Enlargement in 1962 by an immediate increase of over 8 percent in intra-EEC imports, did this number fall to 6.25 percent in 1970.

Evolvement of Dutch intra-EEC9 Imports over 1962, 1965 and 1970						
	1962		1965		1970	
	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World
FRG	1 234 548 507	23.09%	3 403 628 032	23.17%	3 573 655 552	26.68%
Belg-Lux	1 050 846 044	19.65%	2 856 968 192	19.45%	2 200 906 752	16.43%
UK	388 076 028	7.26%	924 871 872	6.30%	734 002 368	5.48%
France	250 855 155	4.69%	849 839 040	5.79%	970 025 792	7.24%
Italy	146 803 103	2.75%	582 740 736	3.97%	574 707 968	4.29%
Denmark	39 466 414	0.74%	101 786 688	0.69%	86 274 440	0.64%
Ireland	3 255 906	0.06%	31 667 696	0.22%	16 169 793	0.12%
EEC6	2 683 052 809	50.17%	7 693 176 000	52.38%	7 319 296 064	54.65%
EEC9	3 113 851 157	58.23%	8 751 502 256	59.58%	8 155 742 665	60.90%
ΔEEC	430 798 348	8.06%	1 058 326 256	7.21%	836 446 601	6.25%

Table 24: Evolvement of Dutch intra-EEC9 Imports over 1962, 1965, and 1970. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.

2.1.5. Italy

Italy imported just over $6 billion in 1962, thereof 1.43 percent from the AASM. The figure in total imports more than doubled until 1970. Imports from the AASM increased rapidly in 1965 to reach a share of over 2 percent, but then declined to 1.6 percent in 1970. The share in total imports received from other African Lomé, on the other hand, decreased constantly, with the exception of the LCC. Similarly, the HCC experienced a steady decline in their total import share.

Evolvement of Italian Imports from selected Countries 1962 to 1970						
	1962		1965		1970	
	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World
AASM	86 595 462	1.43%	150 362 442	2.05%	239 111 933	1.60%
ECC	44 573 362	0.74%	53 239 086	0.72%	76 641 761	0.51%
LCC	42 656 809	0.70%	31 487 956	0.43%	114 479 941	0.77%
Other Countries	38 506 501	0.64%	47 488 103	0.65%	81 897 955	0.55%
Lomé Countries	212 332 134	3.51%	282 577 587	3.85%	512 131 590	3.43%
HCC	299 543 868	4.95%	292 604 056	3.98%	450 807 630	3.02%
World	6 056 367 616	Σ8.45%	7 347 242 496	Σ7.83%	14 939 196 416	Σ6.45%

Table 25: Evolvement of Italian Imports received from selected Countries over 1962, 1965, and 1970. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.

A look at the intra-EEC figure reveals where the strong expansion in imports between 1962 and 1970 really came from. Imports from the EEC6 totaled below $2 billion in 1962 and increased to over $6 billion in 1970. The corresponding share of total imports received from the EEC6 increased to over 41 percent in 1970. Again, the UK was the big loser of the process of Europeanization. Until 1970 it lost two ranks to the Netherlands and Belgium-Luxembourg to become Italy's fifth biggest importer right behind the five EEC member states. In the Italian case, the ΔECC measure declined also markedly from 7.31 percent in 1962 to 4.6 percent in 1970.

Evolvement of Italian intra-EEC9 Imports over 1962, 1965 and 1970						
	1962		1965		1970	
	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World
FRG	1 023 807 744	16.90%	1 081 347 328	14.72%	2 964 232 448	19.84%
France	534 771 776	8.83%	718 000 768	9.77%	1 972 459 264	13.20%
UK	383 273 376	6.33%	340 181 728	4.63%	565 681 344	3.79%
Belg-Lux	166 027 248	2.74%	207 355 808	2.82%	567 342 592	3.80%
Netherlands	162 759 424	2.69%	284 590 208	3.87%	642 068 672	4.30%
Denmark	55 999 312	0.92%	86 804 136	1.18%	106 957 048	0.72%
Ireland	3 732 795	0.06%	5 656 620	0.08%	15 076 104	0.10%
EEC6	1 887 366 192	31.16%	2 291 294 112	31.19%	6 146 102 976	41.14%
EEC9	2 330 371 675	38.48%	2 723 936 596	37.07%	6 833 817 472	45.74%
ΔEEC	443 005 483	7.31%	432 642 484	5.89%	687 714 496	4.60%

Table 26: Evolvement of Italian intra-EEC9 Imports over 1962, 1965, and 1970. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.

2.1.6. United Kingdom

Throughout the nineteenth-century, also known as 'Britain's Imperial Century', the UK focused on expanding economic relations with her overseas territories, rather than achieving formal political control. With the mechanization of the British textile and hardware industry, the supply of goods could no longer be absorbed by the Britons alone and international trade became increasingly important to find outlet markets. The shift away from a mercantile system of modeling imports and exports towards a system of truly free trade then began in the 1830s and led to a major shift in Britain's economic set up.[124] By 1860 the volume of British trade had tripled and imports of cheap foodstuff fundamentally altered the British agricultural sector.[125] The ramifications in Britain's economic set-up were felt well into the twentieth-century.

In 1962 Britain had imports totaling over $12.5 billion. That number made it the second largest importer in Europe after Germany. As can be seen from table 27 below, within Africa she was clearly skewed towards her own former colonies. She received about 5 percent of her African imports from British-Africa, while only a minor proportion of 0.34 percent originated from the francophone AASM. The share of African Lomé countries together yielded a share of 5.63 percent of total imports, a number that only France topped in 1962. The major British interest, however, lay with the HCC. Nearly a fifth of her imports originated from these countries. Similar to what has been shown in the previous chapter for France and Belgium-Luxembourg, in certain single lines of commodities the dependency on her former dependencies could be much stronger.

Evolvement of British Imports from selected Countries 1962 to 1970						
	1962		1965		1970	
	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World
AASM	42 195 024	0.34%	103 984 487	0.64%	76 348 121	0.35%
ECC	340 473 246	2.71%	563 318 208	3.49%	530 603 559	2.44%
LCC	271 493 965	2.16%	236 629 128	1.47%	279 560 913	1.29%
Other Countries	53 555 729	0.43%	52 616 244	0.33%	35 626 319	0.16%
Lomé Countries	707 717 964	5.63%	956 548 067	5.93%	922 138 912	4.24%
HCC	2 303 059 040	18.31%	3 067 985 728	19.01%	3 144 425 664	14.47%
World	12 576 497 664	Σ23.94%	16 137 772 032	Σ24.94%	21 723 672 576	Σ18.72%

Table 27: Evolvement of British Imports received from selected Countries over 1962, 1965, and 1970. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.

The strong economic ties between the UK and the HCC stemmed prominently from the circumstances around the Great Depression that led to the **Ottawa Agreement of 1932**, which marked the end of a 100 years of British commitment to Free Trade in order to create a preferential

[124] This development was influenced by Adam Smith, who was indignant when it came to how colonies were exploited under the banner of mercantilism in the past and made a strong argument for completely free trade and political independence of subjugated overseas territories; see Emma Rothschild and Amaryta Sen, "Adam Smith's Economics," in *The Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith*, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge [et al.]: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006), 341-343.

[125] See Timothy H. Parsons, *The British imperial century, 1815-1914: A world history perspective*, Critical Issues in History (Lanham, Md. [et al.]: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 10-11.

environment for goods from the Commonwealth Dominions plus India. The Agreement constituted a system of imperial preferences to create a British trading bloc in competition with other trading blocs, like the Franc Zone dominated by France.[126] To illustrate, in 1962 almost 90 percent of sheep and goat meet, about 50 percent of butter, and about two-thirds of wool imports originated from Australia and New Zealand. Concerning wheat imports two-thirds were shipped to the UK from Canada and Australia. With regard to primary resources, practically all nickel and zinc, and over half of British Aluminium imports, were imported from Canada and Australia.

While the share of HCC in total imports rose slightly in 1965, it slumped in 1970. Similarly, trade with Lomé Countries on the African continent declined more than 1 percent to 4.24 percent of total imports until 1970. This is clear indication the British interest in the Commonwealth – quantified by these imports statistics – has waned considerably over the 60s. In less then a decade the share of imports received from the African Lomé countries and the HCC combined shrank by over 5 percent. As table 28 reveals, this 5 percent loss corresponds closely to the gains in intra-EEC imports in the same period, which should clearly underline the UK's building interest in joining the process of European Integration throughout the 60s.

Evolvement of British intra-EEC9 Imports over 1962, 1965 and 1970						
	1962		1965		1970	
	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World
Netherlands	552 989 376	4.40%	759 054 720	4.70%	1 085 344 256	5.00%
FRG	542 099 328	4.31%	742 910 336	4.60%	1 299 220 992	5.98%
Denmark	425 984 000	3.39%	545 811 008	3.38%	659 837 056	3.04%
Ireland	388 747 968	3.09%	476 905 440	2.96%	770 763 840	3.55%
France	367 627 168	2.92%	534 065 440	3.31%	864 991 296	3.98%
Italy	316 168 288	2.51%	405 468 192	2.51%	594 379 328	2.74%
Belg-Lux	204 462 880	1.63%	345 984 160	2.14%	420 082 976	1.93%
EEC6	1 983 347 040	15.77%	2 787 482 848	17.27%	4 264 018 848	19.63%
EEC9	2 798 079 008	22.25%	3 810 199 296	23.61%	5 694 619 744	26.21%
ΔEEC	814 731 968	6.48%	1 022 716 448	6.34%	1 430 600 896	6.59%

Table 28: Evolvement of British intra-EEC9 Imports over 1962, 1965, and 1970. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.

If the UK would have joined the EEC in 1957, her share of intra-EEC imports with the Six would have been decisively smaller than that of any other member state.[127] This is in stark contrast to Denmark, as we shall see later. Interestingly, the UK would have also been the only member state not to have Germany as the single biggest import partner, since the Netherlands imported slightly more. France was the biggest winner in the surveyed period making good two places – leaving behind Ireland in 1965 and Denmark in 1970 – to become the UK's third biggest importer inside the EEC9 behind Germany and the Netherlands.

[126] See David Meredith and Barrie Dyster, *Australia in the global economy: continuity and change* (Cambridge [et al.]: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 138.

[127] Again making the same assumption as in the previous chapter that the 1962 figures are a good indicator of the situation in 1957.

2.1.7. Denmark

Denmark is the only country included in this survey neither to be member of the EEC6 nor the British Commonwealth. In fact, Denmark developed a particular strong form of national identity due to her long-standing history as a sovereign kingdom and her strategy of neutrality to balance the two great powers in her vicinity – Germany and Great Britain.[128] This orientation around herself is also reflected in the trade statistics. Denmark had by far the smallest share of trade with the selected countries.

Evolvement of Danish Imports from selected Countries 1962 to 1970						
	1962		1965		1970	
	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World
AASM	5 112 356	0.24%	9 015 942	0.32%	8 232 180	0.19%
ECC	12 983 055	0.61%	18 048 180	0.64%	28 012 465	0.64%
LCC	1 529 846	0.07%	139 593	0.00%	951 330	0.02%
Other Countries	1 201 303	0.06%	1 236 776	0.04%	2 133 696	0.05%
Lomé Countries	20 826 560	0.98%	28 440 491	1.01%	39 329 671	0.90%
HCC	16 612 290	0.78%	22 286 405	0.79%	39 049 111	0.89%
World	2 123 761 408	Σ1.76%	2 811 248 128	Σ1.80%	4 384 559 616	Σ1.79%

Table 29: Evolvement of Danish Imports received from selected Countries over 1962, 1965, and 1970. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.

On the other hand, this orientation towards Europe reflects positively in her intra-EEC import figures. Would Denmark have joined the process of European Integration at Rome, her share of intra-EEC imports would have been among the highest, ranking below the BENELUX but above France, Germany, and Italy. Over the eight years to 1970, when the EEC6 indulged in their process of Euro-

Evolvement of Danish intra-EEC9 Imports over 1962, 1965 and 1970						
	1962		1965		1970	
	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World
FRG	455 711 872	21.46%	596 908 480	21.23%	826 910 272	18.86%
UK	296 364 640	13.95%	374 011 584	13.30%	608 936 576	13.89%
Netherlands	128 232 680	6.04%	132 483 536	4.71%	175 497 584	4.00%
France	85 241 760	4.01%	104 863 872	3.73%	190 965 312	4.36%
Belg-Lux	70 944 800	3.34%	82 894 480	2.95%	126 925 824	2.89%
Italy	62 343 896	2.94%	82 816 672	2.95%	136 360 800	3.11%
Ireland	352 786	0.02%	1 094 092	0.04%	2 236 791	0.05%
EEC6	802 475 008	37.79%	999 967 040	35.57%	1 456 659 792	33.22%
EEC9	1 099 192 434	51.76%	1 375 072 716	48.91%	2 067 833 159	47.16%
ΔEEC	296 717 426	13.97%	375 105 676	13.34%	611 173 367	13.94%

Table 30: Evolvement of Danish intra-EEC9 Imports over 1962, 1965, and 1970. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.

[128] Denmark saw her place in Europe rather in a new form of pan-Scandinavianism, which partly explains the great reluctance she initially showed towards pan-European integration; see Johnny Laursen, "A kingdom divided: Denmark," in *European Union Enlargement: A comparative history*, ed. Wolfram Kaiser and Jürgen Elvert, Routledge advances in European politics 18 (London [et al.]: Routledge, 2004), 31-34.

peanization, Denmark fell back and her share of total imports with the EEC6 decreased constantly. Only France, Italy, and Ireland could, to a very marginal extent, increase their share in total imports, while the UK managed to keep up her high share with her EFTA partner Denmark. A circumstance that also shows in the largely unchanging ΔECC measure.

Denmark in 1962 also had the second highest export figure within Europe when it came to exporting food and live animals ($836 million). This meant that Danish agricultural exports (captured by this commodity line) were the most numerous in Europe after the Netherlands with $2.1 billion and before France with $774 million. For Denmark and the Netherlands this also meant that about half their total exports in 1962 was made up of these agricultural products. Denmark, at first reluctant to join the EEC also for economic fears of not having a competitive industrial basis, was sitting on the fence between the Six and the Seven.[129] By the early 60s her industrial basis has considerably strengthened. When the UK then made her entry bid into the EEC, Denmark was resolved not to be confronted with a *fait accompli* with regard to her agricultural exports to the British market. Similarly, with this strong agricultural base underlying the Danish economy and stagnating agricultural exports to the EEC6, she certainly felt intrigued by joining the CAP. So it should come as little surprise that Britain's application to the EEC was quickly followed by the Danish one in 1961.[130]

Top Exporters Food & Live Animals (in US$)			
	1962	1970	% change
Netherlands	2 141 098 048	2 597 068 288	21%
Denmark	836 675 200	1 111 440 640	33%
France	774 128 960	2 194 167 808	183%
Italy	635 047 360	925 614 528	46%
UK	363 083 104	598 400 576	65%
Canada	1 035 532 800	1 565 556 480	51%

Table 31: Top 5 European Exporters of Food and Live Animals in 1962 and 1970 plus Canada. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.

2.1.8. Ireland

There is no data available for Ireland in 1962. While in the intra-EEC import figures the data for 1963 is presented instead, the data for 1963 with regard to the selected countries is not. The Irish data for 1965 and 1970 show nonetheless that – albeit in very low absolute number terms, which illustrates the weak condition of the Irish economy at the time – imports from the ECC and HCC represented a substantial share of total imports.

[129] 'The Seven' is used to refer to the seven EFTA countries Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK.

[130] See Laursen, "A kingdom divided," 37-38.

Evolvement of Irish Imports from selected Countries 1962 to 1970						
	1962		1965		1970	
	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World
AASM	n/a	n/a	2 598 714	0.25%	2 261 197	0.14%
ECC	n/a	n/a	8 450 409	0.81%	14 917 489	0.95%
LCC	n/a	n/a	480 551	0.05%	1 741 110	0.11%
Other Countries	n/a	n/a	693 198	0.07%	179 465	0.01%
Lomé Countries	n/a	n/a	12 222 872	1.17%	19 099 261	1.22%
HCC	n/a	n/a	44 426 751	4.27%	45 676 120	2.91%
World	n/a	n/a	1 040 565 632	Σ5.44%	1 567 881 216	Σ4.13%

Table 32: Evolvement of Irish Imports received from selected Countries over 1962, 1965, and 1970. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.

The intra-EEC import figures then highlight the real Irish dilemma – her dependence on the British economy. Ireland was one of the founding members of the British Commonwealth in 1931. She left the Commonwealth with the passing of the Republic of Ireland Act in 1949, but remained closely tied to the British economy through an ongoing monetary union and maintained agreements covering both trade and migration. This reflects in the numbers: When she was already receiving over half her imports from the UK in 1963, this high number increased even further until 1970. Ireland waited for the UK to join the process of European Integration before becoming herself active in the hope to diversify her economy across more European countries.[131]

Evolvement of Irish intra-EEC9 Imports over 1963, 1965 and 1970						
	1963		1965		1970	
	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World	in US$	% of World
UK	437 084 288	50.95%	526 331 776	50.58%	838 038 208	53.45%
FRG	56 431 544	6.58%	66 828 660	6.42%	110 606 376	7.05%
Netherlands	28 164 906	3.28%	28 331 962	2.72%	41 956 760	2.68%
France	20 784 516	2.42%	29 837 416	2.87%	50 763 088	3.24%
Belg-Lux	16 486 406	1.92%	20 884 764	2.01%	23 369 634	1.49%
Italy	9 992 478	1.16%	12 824 384	1.23%	31 066 490	1.98%
Denmark	8 475 479	0.99%	10 582 270	1.02%	19 635 972	1.25%
EEC6	131 859 850	15.37%	158 707 186	15.25%	257 762 348	16.44%
EEC9	577 419 617	67.31%	695 621 232	66.85%	1 115 436 528	71.14%
ΔEEC	445 559 767	51.94%	536 914 046	51.60%	857 674 180	54.70%

Table 33: Evolvement of Irish intra-EEC9 Imports over 1962, 1965, and 1970. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.

[131] Ireland then even lodged its application ten days before the UK – on 31 July 1961 – but was not to start negotiations until October 1962, later than all other Northern aspirants. After de Gaulle's veto of the British entry, which in effect was vetoing the overall Northern Enlargement, this was seen as a blessing in disguise, since not so much effort had been wasted on what proved to be a futile task; see Edward Moxon-Browne, "From isolation to involvement: Ireland," in *European Union Enlargement: A comparative history*, ed. Wolfram Kaiser and Jürgen Elvert, Routledge advances in European politics 18 (London [et al.]: Routledge, 2004), 53-58.

2.1.9. Conclusion

The first question that needs to be addressed is if trade with the **AASM** increased in reaction to the Rome Treaty provisions and the first Yaoundé Convention. If that is the case, the share of total imports received from AASM should increase. This can be achieved through three channels: If AASM countries offer the same goods as developing countries in other parts of the world, they can replace trade due to advantages gained from the preferential treatment. This is referred to as **trade diversion**. The second way to increase the AASM share is when African companies can compete more effectively on the European home market as a result of lower tariffs or when European consumers build additional demand because of lower prices, resulting again from the tariff reduction. Both instances are usually referred to by **trade creation**.[132] Finally, European companies might relocate their production into African countries to exploit wage differences and then export the same goods into the European market. These businesses would effectively capitalize on the Right of Establishment and the free trade agreements to reap additional profits while serving the European market from overseas. This process might be referred to as **trade replacement**.

Judging from the figures presented in this chapter, two main findings can be presented: Firstly, every EEC6 country managed to increase its trade with AASM substantially in absolute terms. However, when looking at the share this absolute import numbers represent as a percentage of total imports, all EEC6 countries increased their share of AASM imports only marginally, with France even showing a declining share.[133] One might therefore conclude that the Yaoundé Convention failed to live up to its expectations of boosting economic ties with the AASM significantly.[134] On the other hand, while the AASM showed slightly increasing import shares with the EEC6 throughout the 60s, the other African Lomé countries (i.e. ECC, LCC, and 'Other Countries') mostly experienced slight declines. This is indication that the preferential treatment embodied in Part IV of the Rome Treaty and in the Yaoundé Convention did indeed have an impact; AASM countries could expand their import share to the detriment of other African states. Following this logic, gains would primarily have to be accrued to trade diversion.

The second main finding from the trade figures with selected countries is that the UK was heavily skewed towards her own Commonwealth partners in Africa. The splitting up of Commonwealth countries into ECC and LCC did give no additional insight. Interestingly still, from the EEC6 two countries consistently showed higher shares with the ECC subset than with AASM, in spite of trade preferences – Germany and the Netherlands. Again, this is strong indication that these two countries

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[132] See Grilli, *The European Community and the developing countries*, 153.

[133] The falling AASM share in the case of France might indicate that France faced increased competition from the other EEC countries which tried to boost their market prospects in Africa after Association; or it might show that France had a decreased interest in the AASM market when faced with the increased opportunities of fostering trade within Europe. Also, it might simply be indication of falling prices due to the elimination of *surprix*. No definite answer can be given judging only from these headline numbers.

[134] If this underperformance relative to the intra-EEC average has to be attributed more to false policies originating in Europe or has to be ascribed to factors primarily shaped and decided within African countries cannot be addressed in this work. It seems sensible, though, to assume that both sides bear partial responsibility for the outcome.

were hesitant to exclusively support French-Africa and preferred to include British-Africa as soon as possible to widen the European Association scheme.

Concerning the **HCC** it is clear that the UK is the country showing by far the biggest trade relationship. No other country came even close to the UK, who received about a fifth of her imports from HCC in the mid-60s. Measured in shares, Italy and France ranked next with under 5 percent of total imports in 1962. Then again, the HCC's share in British imports decreased substantially to under 15 percent until 1970. Also, it was clear that this trend would continue in the 70s. Finally, all EEC9 countries but the Dutch saw their combined share of trade with Lomé Countries and the HCC reduced in 1970 compared to 1962, with the Danish experiencing practically stagnating shares received from that parts of the world. This is very strong indication of Europe concentrating its efforts on generating trade from within.

At this point I would like to take a moment and address the **reliability of trade data**, since the correctness of the numbers in the COMTRADE database is the main underlying assumption throughout this paper. Grant and Agnew make a couple of interesting observations on this: Official trade statistics collected by African countries have been described as being so inaccurate as to be 'almost useless'. The 'primitive state' of African statistical agencies has then been identified as the main problem. Such claims were based on the differences of reported import and export flows in African states. Yet, "*[…] there is nothing mysterious or peculiar to Africa about the discrepancies unearthed by such comparisons. Many reporting errors can be readily explained by reference to country and commodity characteristics.*"[135] Amongst other factors, underreporting of export figures takes place to circumvent quotas stipulated in international agreements. In any case, since the data presented in this paper is practically entirely reported by European states,[136] the problem is strongly mitigated in this work. Trade figures reported by the European agencies themselves can usually be expected to be more reliable.[137]

The second question that needs to be addressed in this section is the extensity of the process of **Europeanization**. During the 60s the abolition of intra-EEC customs was proceeding even more swiftly than foreseen in the Rome Treaty and by 1968 all intra-EEC customs were fully abolished and the CET was instituted. From the tables dealing with intra-EEC imports in

Intra-EEC Imports 1962 and 1970			
	1962	1970	% change
France	2 523 241 120	9 255 938 432	267%
Germany	3 989 695 936	14 380 118 016	260%
Italy	1 887 366 192	6 146 102 976	226%
Belg-Lux	2 323 837 440	6 684 912 960	188%
Netherlands	2 683 052 809	7 319 296 064	173%
UK	1 983 347 040	4 264 018 848	115%
Ireland	131 859 850	257 762 348	95%
Denmark	802 475 008	1 456 659 792	82%

Table 34: Development of Intra-EEC6 Imports in absolute numbers. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.

[135] Richard Grant and John Agnew, "Representing Africa: The Geography of Africa in World Trade, 1960-1992," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 86, no. 4 (1996): 732.

[136] The only exception being tables 16 and 35 summarizing African export shares to the EEC, where African countries were selected as reporters in the COMTRADE database.

[137] This is not to say that discrepancies in trade statistics cannot occur in developed countries as well; see Grant and Agnew, "Representing Africa," 731-733.

this section it becomes very clear that trade among the EEC6 partners was increasing with breathtaking velocity. Expressed in absolute US$ terms (see table 34) the increase in intra-EEC6 imports between 1962 and 1970 was 267 percent for France and 260 percent for Germany – making France the biggest beneficiary of Europeanization! A clear line can be drawn between the Netherlands (the EEC6 country benefiting least from the process, applying this measure) and the UK, whose share in imports from the EEC6 increased 'only' 115 percent between 1962 and 1970.[138]

The **ΔEEC measure** was used as an indicator to quantify inclination towards the Northern Enlargement. The higher the ΔEEC figure in the case of the EEC6, the more imports are received from the UK, Denmark, and Ireland. If the Northern Enlargement were to take place in each respective of the surveyed years, each respective country could expect duty-free (and hence cheaper) imports of the magnitude of the measure in the mid-term. Figure 10 below summarizes the ΔEEC measure for the EEC6 in 1962, 1965, and 1970.



Figure 10: The EEC6 grouped according to propensity for Northern Enlargement based on the ΔEEC measure. Concrete values are given in subscripts. Source: Own illustration.

[138] Furthermore, Denmark was the only country that experienced a diminishing share of intra-EEC6 imports between 1962 and 1970 and probably suffered serious headache from the delay in joining the EEC because of the constant vetoes directed at the UK.

The ΔEEC measure clearly reveals, in **1962** France was by far the country least interested in the Northern Enlargement, while Belgium-Luxembourg was the most interested, based solely on that measure. If the UK, Denmark, and Ireland would have joined the EEC in 1962, France would have increased her (to-be-duty-free) intra-EEC imports by just 5.63 percent, while Belgium-Luxembourg would have seen her intra-EEC imports increased by 8.51 percent as a result of enlargement. The difference between the country with the highest and the lowest ΔEEC value was hence 2.88 percent in 1962. In **1965** all countries but France have seen lower ΔEEC values, with Belgium-Luxembourg still showing the highest and France still showing the lowest value, albeit the difference between the two has already shrunk to 2.39 percent. By **1970** the situation has changed completely. No longer France, but Germany and Italy are the countries least interested in Northern Enlargement based on the ΔEEC measure. Belgium-Luxembourg still carries the highest ΔEEC value, but all EEC6 countries alike have experienced major declines in ΔEEC values in the 1965 to 1970 period and became much more homogenous in their prospects for enlargement, which is reflected in the decreasing standard deviation (σ) given below the respective years. The accompanied decline in means (μ) can be interpreted as the Northern Enlargement having less potential impact on the Six and the economic consequences of such a step becoming better foreseeable. The difference between the country with the highest and the lowest ΔEEC value has shrunk to 1.82 percent by 1970. Furthermore, the difference between France and Belgium-Luxembourg was a mere 1.22 percent. From these figures it becomes obvious that between 1962 and 1970 France's interest in accepting the Northern Enlargement – relative to her five EEC partners – has increased considerably.

2.2. The Northern Enlargement – Britain's detour into Europe

France and the UK acting as adversaries can be traced back throughout their colonial history: By the early eighteenth-century Britain and France started to set thee pace in overseas expansion and developed a fierce rivalry, which culminated in the **Seven Years' War** between 1756 and 1763. While part of the war was fought in Europe between the major European powers, the overseas dimension of the conflict was mainly carried out between France and Britain. With the **Treaty of Paris of 1763** the UK gained enormous areas of land mainly at the expense of France.[139] The French would then support the Patriots against the British in the American Revolution, which would be ended after another seven years of bitter war with the **Treaty of Paris of 1783** and the formal recognition of American independence. However, the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the Congress of Vienna of 1815 then consolidated Britain's rule overseas and marked the beginning of the *Pax Britannica* and Britain's 'splendid isolation' from continental Europe.[140]

In the Scramble for Africa at the close of the nineteenth-century the **Fashoda Crisis** would then become the defining moment in France's and Britain's race for territorial expansion on the dark continent. While France planned an African empire that would stretch from west to east, from Dakar to Djibouti, the UK planned on spanning her African possessions from North to South, from Cairo to

[139] See Daniel Marston, *The Seven Years' War*, Essential Histories (Chicago, Ill. [et al.]: Dearborn, 2001), 76-79.
[140] See Frank W. Thackeray and John E. Findling, eds., *Events that changed Great Britain: Since 1689* (Westport, Conn. [et al.]: Greenwood Press, 2002), 57.

Cape Town. Inevitably, this led to the two grand nations intersecting on African soil, which eventually happened in Fashoda[141] on the upper Nile in the Sudan. The French and British would ultimately agree that military conflict was undesirable and French forces subsequently withdrew, leaving the field to the British.[142] Although this decision was based on mutual understanding, many Frenchmen viewed Fashoda as a humiliating defeat, which gave rise to the so called **Fashoda Syndrome** that is said to cause French foreign policy makers to intervene in Africa whenever there is a Francophone country in conflict with an Anglophone one.[143] Also Charles de Gaulle is reported to have been shaped by the Fashoda incident.[144]

The conflict between France and the UK then continued in the process of European Integration in the twentieth-century. When the UK tried to shape the economic set-up of Europe in the autumn of 1957 with the **Maudling Committee**, which foresaw a European-wide free trade area with the newly created EEC6 as one of its members, France was opposed from the start. Britain played with high stakes and tried to get the best of both worlds – keeping her preference agreements with Commonwealth countries for agricultural products while at the same time demanding a liberal rule of origin to export manufactured products to the European market. The negotiations continued until 1958, which was when de Gaulle consolidated the strong presidential system of the Fifth Republic and steered France's course. In November the same year he let his Minister of Information – outside the meeting room where the British representatives were still negotiating at the time – proclaim to the press that France regarded the proceedings at an end.[145]

2.2.1. First French Veto

The UK were invited to take part in European Integration early in the process: She was explicitly invited in the Messina resolution to take part in the Common Market negotiations. The UK applied to be associated with the ECSC late in 1954 and was one of the founding members of the Western European Union in mid-1955. Hence, it was quite natural to invite her to take part in the process of

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[141] Fashoda was soon after the incident renamed Kodok, which is also its present-day appellation.

[142] This diplomatic success laid the basis for the *Entente Cordiale* of 1904 between France and the UK that also ended the time of British splendid isolation; see Melvin E. Page and Penny M. Sonnenburg, eds., *Colonialism: An International, Social, Cultural, and Political Encyclopedia*, vol. 1 (Santa Barbara, Calif [et al.]: ABC-CLIO, 2003), 206-207.

[143] See Daniela Kroslak, "France's policy towards Africa: continuity or change?," in *Africa in international politics: external involvement on the continent*, ed. Ian Taylor and Paul Williams, Routledge advances in international relations and global politics 27 (London [et al.]: Routledge, 2004), 66.

[144] See Martin Meredith, *The Fate of Africa: From the Hopes of Freedom to the Heart of Despair: A History of Fifty Years of Independence* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 493; Richard Davis, "The 'Problem of de Gaulle', 1958-1967," in *Anglo-French relations 1898 - 1998: from Fashoda to Jospin*, ed. Philippe Chassaigne and Michael Dockrill, Studies in military and strategic history (Basingstoke [et al.]: Palgrave, 2002), 161-165.

[145] Consequently, the proposal was shelved. Ironically, this move by de Gaulle can be viewed as an important step towards a more federal Europe in the long run. One might argue that if the Maudling Committee had been successful, the fledgling EEC would have been watered down from the start and could have never developed into what it is today; see Ejvind Damsgaard Hansen, *European economic history: from mercantilism to Maastricht and beyond* (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press, 2001), 391-393.

European Integration.[146] However, when it became clear that the UK would not be interested in the exclusive formation of a supranational club and not be willing to adapt her relations with the Commonwealth, Britain withdrew (or was withdrawn) from the conferences in November 1955, which gave rise to the catchphrase that Britain was 'missing the boat at Messina'.[147]

Why then did the UK completely change her mind between 1955 and 1961? Firstly, Britain must have realized by then that her effort of undermining EEC ambitions with an OEEC wide free trade agreement were futile. Also, the organization established in opposition to the EEC, the NAFTA, was not having the aspired success. Secondly, under the conservative government of Harold Macmillan Britain might have feared about her special relations with the USA, who could feel forced to increase her direct links with the EEC and sideline the UK.[148] Thirdly, the British economic set-up was undergoing a process of rapid readjustment, as has been shown in the last section. Britain's economy was increasingly geared towards the European markets. A tendency that started much earlier than 1961, but developed with increasing velocity.[149] The declining importance of her former colonies also reflected in the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962, which for the first time put restrictions on the influx of migrants from Commonwealth countries.[150]

Edward Heath, the Head of the British Delegation at that time, pointed out another British desire in applying to the EEC: In his speech on 10 October 1961 in the run-up to the entry negotiations, he stressed that Britain also simply wanted a full part in the development of the European institutions and get a stake in the increasingly successful EEC. This reflects the basic fear of the UK to become a world power left behind and have to deal with waning influence, most painfully in Western Europe but more generally in the whole world. A different, not less interesting interpretation of the turn of events has been brought forward by Gilbert, who notes that the UK did not so much apply for membership in 1961 to actually join, but to test the waters and see if the Six were prepared to modify the Rome Treaty to an extent that made it possible for her to join without pains. This is not to say that the UK was not willing to make concessions, but its willingness to concede was clearly limited.[151] Britain indeed made it very transparent from the beginning that she would be prepared to join the EEC only if the Six were prepared to address **three major problems**: Questions relating to UK **agriculture**, problems stemming from **Commonwealth** trade, and special provisions for her fellow **EFTA** countries. The dominant position of these three issues is reflected in the official note of application of 9 August 1961, where these three issues are explicitly listed.[152] "*The third of these*

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[146] See Vaughan, *Twentieth-century Europe*, 135-137.

[147] See Martin Schaad, "Plan G-A 'Counterblast'? British Policy towards the Messina Countries, 1956," *Contemporary European History* 7, no. 1 (1998): 39.

[148] See Vaughan, *Twentieth-century Europe*, 152-153.

[149] See Kristian Steinnes, "The European Challenge: Britain's EEC Application in 1961," *Contemporary European History* 7, no. 1 (1998): 62-63.

[150] See David Childs, *Britain Since 1945: A Political History*, 5. ed. (London: Routledge, 2001), 93.

[151] See Gilbert, *Surpassing realism*, 97-98.

[152] The application was formally submitted by the UK and Northern Ireland and signed by Harold Macmillan; it was published in EEC Commission, *Bulletin of the European Economic Community, No 9-10, (September-October 1961)* (Luxembourg: Publications Department of the European Communities, 1961), 5. Available at and quoted from http://www.ena.lu?lang=2&doc=6991 (29 July 2009).

problems was largely pro forma. The concerns of the other EFTA nations would never have dissuaded Britain from concluding an agreement with the EEC […]. The first two, however, were not."[153]

The EEC's first response to the note of application was an invitation for a meeting in Paris in October the same year, where Britain was asked to lay out in greater detail her concerns, in particular concerning the three issues raised in the initial note of application, and to put forward possible solutions. Only then would the Council be willing to start the negotiations proper.[154] Britain's entry into the EEC was so made clearly contingent on resolving the questions of agriculture. The UK initially tried to push through as much of her agricultural system as possible and maybe even get the EEC to devise the CAP in line with her needs. Apart from agriculture, Britain's interest lay with accommodating the Commonwealth countries. She frequently stressed how deeply she cared about her Commonwealth partners and that it would be a tragedy if these partners were forced to change their pattern of trade – maybe even felt forced to change their 'political orientation' in the Cold War – for reason of the UK joining the EEC. The UK's negotiation strategy was clear: She compared the situation of the Commonwealth to the Association of OCTs under the Rome Treaty, where no external tariffs were imposed, and wanted a similar treatment for the less developed nations in the Commonwealth – Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, India, Pakistan etc. – as well as those African territories that have not yet gained full independence from the UK.[155]

The Commonwealth nations themselves took a largely negative stance towards British efforts to join the EEC. At the eleventh Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers on 10 September 1962, dedicated in particular to British plans for accession, the most ardent adversaries were Canada, India, and Pakistan, while New Zealand and Australia took more moderate positions. Still, all countries demanded of Britain to ask more concessions from Brussels and get a better deal for Commonwealth countries' exports to the EEC market and strengthen free world trade. British ministers promised to take full account of the views and to try and reconcile the EEC with the Commonwealth.[156] Especially the Conservative Party, whose main stakeholders were farmers, would not accept a damaging policy to the Commonwealth, especially to the white settler colonies of the HCC. Yet, the two basic British demands were bound to infuriate de Gaulle: Instituting the CAP and upholding special trade preferences with the former French empire – manifest in the enthusiasm shown by French officials at the parallel negotiations for the Yaoundé Convention – were two key concerns of the French government in 1961 running diametrically against British claims.[157]

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[153] Gilbert, *Surpassing realism*, 98.

[154] The response was signed by Ludwig Erhard and published in EEC Commission, *Bulletin of the European Economic Community, No 9-10*, 7-8. Available at and quoted from http://www.ena.lu?lang=2&doc=6992 (29 July 2009).

[155] See CVCE, "Statement by Edward Heath (Paris, 10 October 1961)," *European Navigator*, 2006, paragraphs 27-35, http://www.ena.lu?lang=2&doc=23550 (29 July 2009).

[156] See Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Commission de Publication des Documents Diplomatiques Français, ed., "Lettre de Arnaud Wapler à Maurice Couve de Murville (Londres, 12 septembre 1962)," in *Documents diplomatiques français 1962 (1er juillet - 31 décembre),* vol. 2 (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1999), 195-197. Available at and quoted from http://www.ena.lu?lang=2&doc=7600 (29 July 2009).

[157] See Gilbert, *Surpassing realism*, 98-99.

On 14 January 1963 British aspirations of joining the EEC ended in Paris with a press conference by de Gaulle. The negotiations were proceeding 'smoothly' to this point – the question of Commonwealth relations was resolved by the UK accepting the CET with a few minor exceptions and the UK conceded to apply the CAP as envisaged by the Six – and optimistic negotiators even considered a final agreement only weeks away in January of 1963. So, "*[n]othing gave them the slightest hint of the bombshell that was about to explode […]*"[158] when de Gaulle entered the press conference and declared his final opposition to the British application. In the same speech he stated the following reasons for his decision: Firstly, the UK did not belong to the continental-European bloc that the EEC encompasses. Secondly, when the UK refused to join the process of European integration at the beginning – even more, tried to sabotage it – she cannot expect to enter the EEC, even more so on her own conditions, now. Thirdly, de Gaulle doubted that the UK was prepared to cut her ties with the Commonwealth and start covering her demand for temperate foodstuff from within the European Common Market:

> "*One might sometimes have believed that our English friends, in posing their candidature to the Common Market, were agreeing to transform themselves to the point of applying all the conditions which are accepted and practised by the Six. But the question, to know whether Great Britain can […] renounce all Commonwealth preferences, to cease any pretence that her agriculture be privileged, and, more than that, to treat her engagements with other countries of the free trade area as null and void — that question is the whole question.*"[159]

From this part of the speech one would have to suspect that de Gaulle's main concern was indeed extraneous, but not concerning the 'soft issue' related to the special relations the UK upheld with the USA in a bipolar world and his vows to reestablish the *grandeur* of France. His main concern regarding his veto was directed at hard economic facts in relation to French farmers. Accordingly, France's stance in the entry negotiations was that the question of the CAP will have to be dealt with *before* any further steps concerning the British application ought to be taken. The breakdown of negotiations was then officially announced on 29 January 1963 on a ministerial conference.[160]

What were the reactions of France's five partners? Already in 1958 de Gaulle unilaterally ended discussions concerning the future of the EEC. There were no fierce or long-lasting reactions to de Gaulle's action then.[161] Similarly in 1963 all six partners had a mutual interest in upholding European cohesion and proceeding with the process of European Integration as outlined in the Rome Treaty, notwithstanding differences on the UK. So, no long-lasting reactions from 'the Five' were to be expected, even as they did disagree strongly with de Gaulle. Tellingly, for example, just a few days

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[158] Paul-Henri Spaak, "Hold Fast," *Foreign Affairs* 41, no. 4 (1963): 613.

[159] CVCE, "Press conference held by General de Gaulle (14 January 1963)," *European Navigator*, 2008, http://www.ena.lu?lang=2&doc=29970 (29 July 2009).

[160] See Western European Union / General Affairs Committee, ed., "Concluding Statement by Henri Fayat (29 January 1963)," *A retrospective view of the political year in Europe: 1963* (1964): 41. Available at and quoted from http://www.ena.lu?lang=2&doc=8566 (29 July 2009).

[161] See Oliver Bange, *The EEC Crisis of 1963: Kennedy, Macmillan, De Gaulle and Adenauer in Conflict*, Contemporary history in context series (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 20.

after de Gaulle's first veto, Adenauer and de Gaulle signed the Elysée Treaty in an effort to strengthen Franco-German coordination, albeit outside the structures of the EEC.[162] "*While Adenauer professed a continuing desire to bring Britain into full membership in the European communities, [...] his policies betrayed a higher priority on rapprochement with France [...].*"[163] As regards Britain, London was naturally consternated over de Gaulle's veto and Macmillan is reported to have been bitter and despondent. Diplomatic relations between London and Paris were on a low in the aftermath, with the tone of the debate only confined by the prospect that before too long British negotiators shall be again debating entry conditions into the EEC with French officials. British hopes were that de Gaulle would suffer electoral defeat and vanish as an obstacle as soon as possible. The problem in British eyes was hence viewed as being only of a temporary nature.[164] Then again, time is everything that de Gaulle desired with his move.

France's veto of the British application is often explained with the **Trojan Horse theory**, which states that de Gaulle feared that the UK would always do the American's bidding and weaken an independent Europe. The argument was often brought forward in close connection with the Nassau agreement between the USA and the UK of December 1962, which foresaw the provision of the UK with a supply of nuclear-capable Polaris missiles. Not being consulted over this is reported to have infuriated de Gaulle. This logic is also backed by Spaak's own accounts, who saw the Nassau agreement as the underlying cause of de Gaulle's decision to sabotage the entry negotiations.[165] However, Moravcsik has found that any causal link between Nassau and the veto is practically impossible, because de Gaulle has made it clear after the French parliamentary elections of November 1962 at a cabinet meeting some days *before* Nassau that he was going to veto the British entry bid.[166] Although this does not automatically falsify the Trojan Horse theory *per se*, it serves as a powerful reminder that geopolitical considerations as the root cause of General de Gaulle's veto might have been accepted somewhat readily.

If then agriculture was at the heart of de Gaulle's concerns, then it might not have been so much over questions of agricultural trade – Danish farmers were a much greater force in agricultural exports to be reckoned with than the UK and de Gaulle is reported to have been informing Denmark on the occasion of the British veto that she could enter on her own accounts, with farmers, food surplus and all.[167] The major difference was that Denmark was keen on joining the CAP as proposed and has shown no intentions to influence it otherwise, while Britain wanted to change the CAP –

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[162] See Rudolf von Thadden, "The French-German Partnership," *Internationale Politik Global Edition* 4, no. 2 (2003): 77.

[163] Robert W. Heywood, "London, Bonn, the Königswinter Conferences and the Problem of European Integration," *Journal of Contemporary History* 10, no. 1 (1975): 133.

[164] See Richard Davis, "The 'Problem of de Gaulle': British Reactions to General de Gaulle's Veto of the UK Application to Join the Common Market," *Journal of Contemporary History* 32, no. 4 (1997): 453-457.

[165] See Spaak, "Hold Fast," 615.

[166] See Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* (London: UCL Press, 1998), 192-193. Similarly, Vaïsse finds that Nassau was only confirming de Gaulle in his decision, not causing it; see Maurice Vaïsse, "De Gaulle and the British 'application' to join the Common Market," in *Britain's failure to enter the European Community, 1961 - 63: the enlargement negotiations and crises in European, Atlantic and Commonwealth relations*, ed. George Wilkes (London [et al.]: Cass, 1997), 65.

[167] See Laursen, "A kingdom divided," 39.

inter alia in a direction to make it easier for third countries, above all the HCC, to import temperate foodstuff into the EEC. In effect, de Gaulle then might have simply wanted to delay Britain's entry until after the CAP was fully institutionalized (and the burden of French farm subsidies put on European shoulders), which made it impossible for the UK to influence its outcome.[168] Also, the longer the UK was staying out, the more France could benefit from the process of Europeanization by creating trade links with her five EEC partners, without facing competition from British enterprises.

If this was one of de Gaulle's main causes for the veto, then the development of French-African territories might have been a consideration on the side, tipping the scales in favor of that decision. "*The relationship of the United Kingdom to the [EEC's] role in African trade arose on each occasion when the UK applied for membership.*"[169] The underlying question is, when Association was this big issue for France in the course of the Rome Treaty negotiations, how reasonable is it to assume that French-Africa has lost all its explanatory power for French actions in the 60s? Certainly, with most of the French colonies independent by then, its relevance for France has decreased somewhat – even when the economic ties were still substantial and the *surprix* system largely in place.[170] But to presume that one can explain France's veto without any reference to Africa, seems implausible.

When de Gaulle forestall UK's entry into the EEC, he himself claimed one key reason for this to be the UK's failure to decolonize fully and interpreted this is a lack of commitment towards building Europe. "*Embarrassed, the British, […] pushed most of their remaining colonies towards independence.*"[171] It is obvious that the UK joining the EEC must have had some ramifications for Eurafrican relations. A widening of Association to British-African territories – already as part of the Yaoundé Convention if the UK were to join in the 60s – would almost necessarily have diluted funds away from the AASM, at a time when the *surprix* was to be dismantled and affected countries were to get special funds under the Yaoundé Convention to be compensated. By delaying Britain's entry, which might have even been convenient in other ways, he could increase the likelihood that the French-speaking parts of Africa would get exclusive access to the European market and receive the unconfined attention of the EEC, and with it most of the money from the EDF, for another couple of years, on the expense of English-speaking countries – there the French Fashoda Syndrome might have been showing.

2.2.2. Second French Veto

In May 1967 the UK applied to enter the EEC for the second time. This time she stated no necessary objectives to be resolved in her note of application, as she did the first time around. She was prepared to meet the whole *acquis* and demanded only a few financial adjustments and transitional

[168] See Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, 180.
[169] Alan S. Milward, *Politics and economics in the history of the European Union*, The Graz Schumpeter Lectures 7 (London [et al.]: Routledge, 2005), 87.
[170] See African Department Study Group, "Financial Arrangements of Countries Using the CFA Franc," *Staff Papers - International Monetary Fund* 16, no. 2 (1969): 291-292.
[171] Shepard, *The invention of decolonization*, 7.

arrangements for some of her trade.[172] This unconditional commitment made British application fall on sympathetic ears in all EEC6 capitals – but Paris. On a press conference on 16 May 1967 de Gaulle made it clear that he does not want to talk about the UK entering the EEC at this point. The others had no interest in confronting de Gaulle in a united five-member bloc out of fear that this would make him – as was the case in the Empty Chair Crisis – even more uncompromising in other maters of importance to continuing integration. On 27 November 1967, in another press conference, de Gaulle effectively vetoed the British application for the second time.[173] The deep cleavage between France and her partners culminated at the Council of Ministers on 19 December 1967, where the Germans took the lead and demanded the opening of negotiations with the UK. France stood firm and was uncompromising. Unlike the first time, though, efforts to find some solution – maybe in form of a gradual approach like a mere association at first and full membership based thereon later – intensified after the veto and negotiations with the UK would not come to an abrupt end but merely be suspended.[174]

The proposal for a summit to deal with the Northern Enlargement then came from the new French President Georges Pompidou in July 1969, mere two month after de Gaulle resigned, and its purpose was described with the three catchwords *l'achèvement, l'approfondissement, l'élargissement*. The most important outcomes of the ensuing **The Hague Summit** in December 1969 were: (i) concerning **completion** a final agreement on the financing of the CAP should be reached by the end of 1969; (ii) concerning **deepening** a plan should be devised to define progress in political unification as well as how to achieve an economic and monetary union; and (iii) concerning **enlargement** the decision to resume negotiations between the EEC and the Northern applicant states.[175] Negotiations with the applicant states officially resumed on 30 June 1970 and proceeded more or less smoothly – *inter alia* with special provisions agreed upon for West Indian sugar and New Zealand butter as well as the offer to the remaining EFTA countries to join the EEC by way of free trade agreements – until 22 January 1972, when Britain, Denmark, Ireland, and Norway finally signed the Treaty of Accession.

Were de Gaulle's reasons for his second veto the same as for his first? Indeed, the situation seems to have changed little. In his press conference of 27 November 1967, he again refers to the UK's early attempts to sabotage the fledgling EEC and the very distinct nature – economic and otherwise – of the UK compared to continental Europe, which made it impossible for her to join the EEC without

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[172] See EEC Commission, *Bulletin of the European Economic Community, No. 6, (June 1967)* (Luxembourg: Publications Department of the European Communities, 1967), 8. Available at and quoted from http://www.ena.lu?lang=2&doc=7036 (29 July 2009).

[173] See CVCE, "Press conference held by General de Gaulle at the Elysée (27 November 1967)," *European Navigator*, 2006, http://www.ena.lu?lang=2&doc=5860 (29 July 2009). The press conference can also be watched at http://www.ena.lu?lang=2&doc=20322 (29 July 2009).

[174] See Carine Germond, "France, Germany and Britain's Second Application to the European Community (1966-1969) ," *European Navigator*, 2008, http://www.ena.lu?lang=2&doc=28531 (29 July 2009).

[175] See Anjo G. Harryvan and Jan van der Harst, eds., *Documents on European Union* (Basingstoke [et al.]: Macmillan, 1997), 168-169.

changing the nature of the EEC itself.[176] In his speech he also refers to an episode between him and the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in 1958, where Macmillan threatened him with a war that will be 'doubtless economic at first' but runs the risk of spreading into other fields, according to de Gaulle's own accounts.[177] In addition, time was still playing in de Gaulle's favor. The longer he waited, the longer France would benefit from the ongoing Europeanization and new economic ties with her five EEC partners without competition from the British industry. Similarly, France could still dominate the EEC's policy towards associates within the European Commission and French-Africa could still profit from unconfined attention and preferential access into the EEC6 to become better equipped to face the competition that is likely to arise from British-Africa once the UK joined the Common Market.

2.3. The Lomé Convention – From Association to Partnership

Britain's entry into the EEC brought with it a major shift in the *rapport de force* between member states. Germany and the Netherlands, who both supported the extension of the association scheme to other countries and were hence called 'globalists', found a powerful ally in the UK.[178] France and Belgium, less openly Italy, on the other hand, are reported to have been in favor of a more limited approach towards development cooperation, focusing on their former colonies, and were accordingly termed 'regionalists'.[179] This section will illustrate this dividing line by portraying the negotiations surrounding the Lomé Convention.

2.3.1 The EEC and British-Africa before Lomé

The UK was from the very beginning extremely skeptical of EEC Association as foreseen in the Rome Treaty. As soon as March 1957 she launched her counter-campaign, complaining that she had not been consulted and pointing to the possible negative side effects this arrangement could have on her own overseas territories. Several memoranda were later devised to expose all the damages the Association could cause to the Commonwealth. The British overseas territories in Africa would surely have to suffer under the CET when marketing their products within the EEC, which constituted grave disadvantages compared to the associated OCTs. "*As the British memorandum stressed, this could damage their fragile economy. It could also lead to a kind of political division of Africa […], between associated and non associated states, which may benefit the Communist grasp on the continent.*"[180] This should develop into a diplomatic dispute between the UK and France of formidable proportions.

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[176] See Western European Union / General Affairs Committee, ed., "Press conference given by General de Gaulle at the Elysée (27 November 1967)," *A retrospective view of the political year in Europe: 1967* (1968): 152-154. Available at and quoted from http://www.ena.lu?lang=2&doc=5860 (29 July 2009).

[177] See Gilbert, *Surpassing realism*, 97.

[178] See Dimier, "Administrative reform as political control," 79.

[179] See Maurizio Carbone, *The European Union and International Development: the politics of foreign aid*, Routledge / UACES contemporary European studies series 4 (London [et al.]: Routledge, 2007), 31.

[180] Dimier, "Legitimizing the DG8," 8.

An agreement in principle at the time of the UK's first application in 1961 made it clear, however, that British colonies and dominions in Sub-Sahara Africa (with the important exception of South Africa, which was deemed a developed economy and thus excluded) were allowed to join the Association provisions on similar terms as French-Africa once they gained independence.[181] On insistence of the Netherlands, this agreement later developed into a **Declaration of Intent** adopted by the EEC Council in April 1963 – in between de Gaulle's first veto and the signing of Yaoundé Convention – which was effectively directed at British-Africa (countries having an 'economic structure and production' comparable to the AASM) and defined three options for non-associated states in Africa: (i) Fully-fledged association under the Yaoundé Convention pursuant to Article 58 of that convention; (ii) some special association arrangement pursuant to Article 238 of the Rome Treaty; or (iii) a simple commercial agreement to facilitate trade. Hence, it was made clear that the fate of Commonwealth Africa was in no way connected to the fate of Britain's entry bid and that African states could start negotiations even if entry negotiations were to fail.[182]

In British-Africa only Nigeria and the three East African countries Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania took advantage of the EEC's offer of association. The latter signed the **Arusha Agreement** on 24 September 1969, which ran parallel with the second Yaoundé Convention and on similar lines but with less extensive concessions: Concerning East African exports to the European market, unroasted coffee, cloves, and tinned pineapples would enter duty-free within certain quantitative boundaries. Preferences were granted on certain EEC exports to East Africa, affected being about 15 per cent of the total export figure. The African signatories are not to discriminate between nationals or companies of the Six who seek the Right of Establishment, and they must not – subject to exceptions – grant more favorable treatment to third countries. There are no provisions regarding the free movement of capital or financial assistance. Similarly, **Nigeria** completed an association agreement in 1966 to run parallel with the Yaoundé Convention, but it was never ratified because of the Nigerian Civil War and resulting tensions with France, who openly supported the secessionist Biafra region. Under the agreement most Nigerian exports would have been given duty-free access.[183]

Why did not more British-African countries take up the offer to become, in one way or another, associated with the EEC? One possible explanation might be British behavior towards Africa in connection with her first EEC entry bid in the early 60s. Britain made little distinction between already independent countries, like Ghana, and still dependent territories, like Kenya. In Europe she demanded full association of all her overseas territories under Part IV of the Rome Treaty, while overseas she refused to consult these very countries' ruling elites. This might have had a lasting impact on these countries' impression of the nature of European Association. In addition, the reverse preferences build into association agreements were seen as clear evidence of European interests overruling African ones.[184] The still ongoing Algerian War in the early 60s and France's decision to conduct atomic test explosions in the Sahara also alienated several African countries, Nigeria even

[181] See Milward, *Politics and economics in the history of the European Union*, 87.

[182] See Oye Cukwurah, "The position of overseas associated States in the E.E.C.," in *The law of the common market*, ed. Ben Atkinson Wortley (Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 1974), 215-216.

[183] With the exception of cocoa, palm and ground-nut oils, and plywood, all subject to quantitative restrictions; see Economic Department Standard Bank Ltd., "Commonwealth Africa and the Enlarged European Community: Notes on the Possible Effects of Britain's Entry," *African Affairs* 71, no. 285 (1972): 428.

[184] See Cosgrove Twitchett, *Europe and Africa*, 143-145.

broke off diplomatic ties with Paris.[185] Also, it might have been a simple misunderstanding stemming from language differences. While *association* had a long tradition in French colonial history, it did mean little in English.[186] Notwithstanding the root causes, in any case Association with the EEC was *de facto* viewed by most British-African leaders as deplorable throughout the 60s.

2.3.2. Negotiations

In 1972, when it became clear that the UK was finally about to enter the EEC and the concrete provisions became known, the impact on Commonwealth Africa was foreseen to be substantial. The UK would have to gradually abolish intra-EEC customs and fully apply the CET over a five-year transitional period.[187] Hence, by 1 July 1977 the tariff advantage African Commonwealth countries enjoyed in the British market over Yaoundé countries pursuant to Commonwealth preferences would be lost. More to it, if Commonwealth countries failed to negotiate some form of agreement with the EEC9, their advantage over *all* third countries would be lost and they would be subject to the CET just like everybody else.[188] Hence Protocol 22 of the Accession Treaty reiterated the three options – already formulated in the Declaration of Intent of 1963 – available to developing Commonwealth countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, listed in Annex VI of the Accession Treaty:[189] Full-fledged association under the Yaoundé Convention (or what was to follow it); some special association arrangement pursuant to Article 238 of the Rome Treaty, such as that provided for in the Arusha Agreement between East Africa and the EEC (involving reciprocal rights and obligations); or a simple trade agreement. Negotiations between the EEC and Commonwealth countries were to start by August 1973. Naturally, the protocol also stressed that the possible extension of Association in

[185] See Mailafia, *Europe and economic reform in Africa*, 50.

[186] See Dimier, "Administrative reform as political control," 79.

[187] See Stephen C. Schmidt, "United Kingdom Entry into the European Economic Community: Issues and Implications," *Illinois Agricultural Economics* 12, no. 2 (1972): 1-2.

[188] To be sure, the CET did not affect all goods alike. Generally speaking, minerals and unprocessed goods had a tariff of nil according to the CET, anyway, and thus the AASM had no advantages over third countries in these product categories once the CET was fully implemented. For Commonwealth countries this meant that in the 70s, exports like Zambia's copper or Malawi's raw cotton – being duty-free under both the Commonwealth preferences and the EEC's CET – were to be unaffected no matter the form of association; see Economic Department Standard Bank Ltd., "Commonwealth Africa and the Enlarged European Community," 429-434.

[189] The countries concerned were: Barbados, Botswana, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Guyana, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Tonga, Uganda, Western Samoa, and Zambia. All **British dependent territories**, except Gibraltar and Hong Kong, were offered association under Part IV of the Rome Treaty. The territories concerned here were: Bahamas, Bermuda, British Antarctic Territory, British Honduras, British Indian Ocean Territory, British Solomon Island Protectorate, British Virgin Islands, Brunei, Cayman Islands, Central and Southern Line Islands, Falkland Islands and Dependencies, Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony, Montserrat, New Hebrides (with France), Pitcairn, St. Helena and Dependencies, Seychelles, Turks and Caicos Islands, West Indian Associated States. In addition, solutions would be sought to trade problems of the **Asian Commonwealth countries** of Ceylon, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Singapore. For the interim these countries would derive benefits from inclusion within the scope of the Community's Generalized Preference Scheme; see Schmidt, "United Kingdom Entry into the European Economic Community," 7.

Africa should in no way impinge upon relations with the AASM.[190] The first former British colony to actually choose the first option and become a full-fledged associated country was **Mauritius** – having a colonial history as much British as French and heavily dependent on sugar exports into the UK – joining the second Yaoundé Convention in 1972.[191]

It was only in November 1972 that the UK started to view full-fledged Association with the EEC as the preferred option for her former colonies. However, unlike France at the time of the Rome Treaty, Britain had to deal with independent countries and could not expect to influence their way easily. She indeed counted on German, Dutch, and Italian diplomats to find out which of the three options the British-African countries were contemplating. The main bone of contention was that Association with the EEC was accompanied by **reverse preferences**; EEC enterprises were free to market their merchandise in African countries as well, when the Commonwealth preferences embodied no such reverse preferences.[192] The most likely outcome was therefore that Commonwealth Africa would renounce the paradigm of reciprocity in the Lomé Convention negotiations and demand free access to the European market without granting Europe special access to Africa in return. This claim was backed with the UNCTAD doctrine prevalent at the time that reciprocity in commercial relations between industrialized and developing countries was inappropriate.[193]

Britain henceforth lukewarmly supported the Commonwealth countries in their claims, while France was fully committed to save the existing reciprocity provisions from the Yaoundé Convention. The other EEC9 countries were divided over the issue: Belgium, Luxembourg and Ireland supported France, while Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Denmark sided with the UK. Italy changed sides since she felt that she did not get her fair share of contracts under the Yaoundé system. A fact probably not totally unrelated to her relatively little contribution to the EDF. This led her to claim that the Yaoundé Convention was little more than a way for France to preserve her influence in Africa at Community expense.[194] Owing to the split on the question of reciprocity, the EEC's framework for negotiations with the ACP was not clear until April 1973, when the European Commission came up with a draft Association Agreement. In this draft the principle of reciprocity was dropped, which meant that the Commission was positioning itself on the side of ACP countries. It was also in this draft Agreement that the Commission for the first time proposed to transfer the EDF to the regular Community budget to give the EP a measure of increased control and assure continuity.[195]

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[190] Although this three-headed approach was already pinned down in the Declaration of Intent of 1963, the imminent enlargement further necessitated the specification of details, such as Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland eligible to full association, in spite of forming a customs union with South Africa.

[191] Mauritius was one of the contracting parties of the **Commonwealth Sugar Agreement** (CSA), under which Britain was committed to buy fixed quantities of sugar until December 1974. The other contracting parties of the CSA were: Australia, Antigua, Barbados, Fiji, Guayana, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, and British Honduras. It has been agreed in the course of the entry negotiations that Britain should fulfill this contractual obligation. After 1974, the EEC9 were to offer the countries concerned, excepting Australia and India, a form of association or trading agreement; see Ibid., 8.

[192] See Milward, *Politics and economics in the history of the European Union*, 95-98.

[193] See Cosgrove Twitchett, *Europe and Africa*, 150.

[194] See Milward, *Politics and economics in the history of the European Union*, 95-98.

[195] See Cukwurah, "The position of overseas associated States in the E.E.C.," 231-233.

It needs to be stressed that Britain's effort to take part actively in the Lomé negotiations was limited.[196] Britain's interest in accommodating British-Africa within the EEC has waned significantly since her first entry bid in the early 60s. In the 70s she was herself caught up in domestic issues around EEC accession, above all the ensuing debate over if she should herself remain a member of the EEC. This half-hearted British approach towards the Lomé negotiations also reflected in her contribution to the EDF, which was considerably lower than that of Germany and France. Also, this behavior pushed ACP countries themselves onto the front seat to negotiate favorable terms.[197]

In any case, the African Commonwealth countries were expected to have a major impact on the course of negotiations. While the AASM were most reliant on France in economic terms, the Commonwealth African countries had open economies for some time and were less reliant on the UK than the ex-French territories were on France relying on *surprix* prices; and as such Commonwealth Africa was more flexible when negotiating a new agreement.[198] An assertion not necessarily corroborated by the trade data extracted from the COMTRADE database (see table 35). The picture concerning the **AASM** is mixed: Togo developed into the country being most dependent on the EEC9 market, exporting 88 percent of her total exports to the Common Market. Still, even this high number can be interpreted as some form of improvement, since this dependency was split fairly equally among France, the Netherlands and the FRG. To compare, in 1962 Senegal was the AASM country most dependent on Europe (see table 16) but this dependency was practically completely owed to France, with 86 percent of Senegalese exports going to France alone. In 1970 Senegal still imported 70 percent of all her exports to the European market, but France's share has diminished to 57 percent. This finding can be generalized: Although the dependency of AASM on the European market did not decrease overall, at least the export market did experience some degree of diversification among different EEC member states. Results for the **African Commonwealth countries** are sparse: Most African Commonwealth countries are not represented in the COMTRADE database in the 70s. This makes a final conclusion on their state of dependency on the European market difficult. However, judging from the African Commonwealth countries that are represented in table 35 (Ghana, Gambia, Malawi, Nigeria, Zambia) the dependency on the European market seems not considerably less pronounced than in the case of the AASM. The only thing one might state is that the African Commonwealth countries were – even without association, EDF, Right of Establishment and all – already pretty well diversified across the European market with the bulk of trade, albeit consistently less than 50 percent, exchanged with the UK. This is indeed strong indication that compared to the AASM in 1962 – with the Franc Zone, *surprix* and all – the African Commonwealth

[196] In fact, Britain's interest in getting actively engaged in development cooperation in Brussels, i.e. at the European Commission, was lukewarm. The Commission was seen as competition by administrative bodies in the UK concerned with handling overseas development. Indeed, the Overseas Development Administration chose to ignore DG VIII. No officials from their ranks were sent to Brussels, and so British impact might have been less than it could have been. This may also explain why the evolution towards programming and evaluation – demanded by the UK after accession – was proceeding much more slowly than was indeed expected. At the same time, the increasing rationalization of project selection led to one major downturn – an increase in bureaucratization; see Dimier, "Administrative reform as political control," 81-82

[197] See Cosgrove Twitchett, *Europe and Africa*, 169.

[198] See Economic Department Standard Bank Ltd., "Commonwealth Africa and the Enlarged European Community," 433.

countries were much less dependent on the former metropolis area. I am just not sure if this assertion holds true for the AASM of the 70s.

Share of Exports delivered to the EEC9 in 1970							
	EEC9	France	Belg-Lux	FRG	Netherlands	Italy	UK
Togo	88%	28%	7%	20%	26%	4%	2%
Mauritania	79%	20%	14%	13%	1%	15%	17%
Congo, Dem. Rep.	73%	7%	42%	3%	2%	11%	7%
Cameroon	72%	30%	2%	12%	24%	2%	2%
CAR	71%	50%	12%	4%	1%	3%	2%
Chad	71%	70%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Senegal	70%	57%	1%	2%	6%	2%	2%
Ivory Coast	66%	33%	2%	10%	9%	9%	3%
Benin	65%	39%	1%	9%	8%	4%	4%
Niger	65%	47%	0%	1%	2%	15%	0%
Congo, Rep.	60%	13%	9%	14%	14%	5%	5%
Gabon	59%	42%	2%	7%	5%	1%	2%
Madagascar	43%	34%	0%	4%	1%	1%	2%
Burkina Faso	31%	12%	1%	1%	0%	9%	3%
Somalia	28%	1%	1%	0%	0%	26%	0%
Mali	24%	17%	0%	1%	0%	3%	3%
Gambia	83%	9%	0%	9%	13%	4%	47%
Nigeria	67%	9%	1%	7%	17%	4%	28%
Liberia	63%	7%	7%	18%	15%	10%	7%
Malawi	58%	1%	1%	3%	4%	0%	46%
Zambia	55%	8%	0%	12%	1%	11%	22%
Ghana	46%	1%	1%	10%	10%	3%	19%
Sudan	33%	2%	2%	10%	3%	10%	6%

Table 35: ACP's share of Exports delivered to the EEC9 as a percentage of Total Exports in 1970, grouped in AASM and other Countries. Data not available for: Burundi and Rwanda (AASM) as well as Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Uganda. Exact values for Denmark and Ireland are omitted but included in the EEC9 share. Source: COMTRADE and own computations.

However, assuming that the missing ACP countries were indeed less dependent on the EEC in economic and political terms than the AASM on a general level, this positive prospect might have been counterweighed to some extent by the fact that African states were now more heterogeneous. French- and British-Africa were thoroughly kept apart in colonial times and their different paths post-independence – French-Africa associated under the Rome Treaty, British-Africa part of the Commonwealth – did certainly not help rapprochement. To be more, French-Africa and British-Africa had similar goods to offer to the world market and could hence even be viewed as adversaries to some extent. Still, united by the common interest of getting the best out of the new situation vis-à-vis the EEC, the trade ministers of the nineteen associates (18 AASM + Mauritius) and twenty-two Anglophone ACP *associables* came together in May 1973 in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, to voice their interest in forging a single bloc to face the upcoming negotiations.[199]

[199] See Cukwurah, "The position of overseas associated States in the E.E.C.," 229-230.

Nigeria, by far the most populous country in Sub-Sahara Africa, was skeptical towards Association with the EEC as foreseen in the Rome Treaty or Yaoundé Convention. After the failing of her own association agreement in 1966 due to French sympathies towards the Biafra region, Nigeria viewed the EEC "*[…] with strong suspicion that sometimes bordered on hostility.*"[200] In addition, her interest in negotiating an economic agreement with the EEC was limited. In the early 70s her main exporting commodity increasingly became petroleum, which was not subject to tariffs under the CET. However, when the Nigerian head of state Yakubu Gowon was elected chairman of the OAU in mid-1973 one of his main responsibilities was the renegotiation of the new agreement with the EEC. At an OAU summit in Addis Ababa in 1973 – shortly after the meeting in Abidjan – African leaders agreed on six principles for their negotiations with Brussels; the first of them being the abolition of reciprocity.[201]

When the Brussels negotiations started in October 1973, the ACP countries, encouraged by the European Commission and under the joint leadership of Nigeria and Senegal, should form a remarkably cohesive group vis-à-vis the EEC9.[202] Especially Nigeria, by then in the prime echelons of importance for the Western World as an exporter of crude oil in the wake of the first Oil Crisis, had strong independent diplomatic ties and was not afraid to assert herself against the former colonial rulers.[203] Two of the most ferociously debated issues were over agricultural produce and non-tariff obstacles: Concerning **agricultural produce** the ACP countries demanded unrestricted access to the European market but the EEC refused tariff concessions for early fruit and vegetables. Although in the end the EEC conceded a good deal to relax its agricultural protection, further concessions were rebutted with the argument that this affected the CAP – an integral Community policy that was not negotiable. As regards **non-tariff obstacles** the ACP countries claimed that regulations such as health rules and standardization proved a serious impediment to their tropical produce and needed to be eliminated as well. As Brussels pointed out, the obstacles in question arose due to national regulations and were hence outside the EEC's competence. This caused irritation among several African delegates, as in the first case their requests were rejected because of a Community policy; and in the second case they were rejected because they did not form part of a Community policy.[204]

On the initiative of the ACP countries, negotiations were continued in July 1974 in Kingston, Jamaica. This gave a new impetus to the negotiations. It was in Kingston that the EEC finally dropped its insistence on reciprocity and made a definite commitment on the system of export earnings stabilization. The final touches were then added in two marathon conferences in January 1975 in Brussels, before the Lomé Convention would ultimately be signed in the Togolese capital amid immense fanfare and pageantry. The outcome after 18 months of negotiations – in the end ferocious over the size of the EDF – was then viewed as a major step away from Association as under the preceding Yaoundé Convention and came to be seen as a turning point in North-South relations.[205]

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[200] Olayiwola Abegunrin, *Nigerian foreign policy under military rule, 1966-1999* (Westport, Conn. [et al.]: Praeger, 2003), 40.
[201] See Ibid., 40-41.
[202] See Cosgrove Twitchett, *Europe and Africa*, 148
[203] See Jean Herskovits, "Nigeria: Africa's New Power," *Foreign Affairs* 53, no. 2 (1975): 322.
[204] See Charles Schiffmann, "A Negotiation and a Convention," *The Courier* 31, Special Issue (March 1975): 5.
[205] See Mailafia, *Europe and economic reform in Africa*, 65.

2.3.3. Outcome

The Lomé Agreement can be analyzed along the following lines: Trade cooperation, Stabex, industrial cooperation, financial and technical assistance, and the establishment of joint institutions.

Trade cooperation largely followed the Yaoundé Convention but ACP countries could improve the rules of origin provisions in that ACP states were treated like a customs area. This meant that goods processed in several ACP countries could benefit from a duty-free access into the EEC although the value added in the final exporting state was less than 50 percent. Moreover, Lomé granted free-access for ACP exports of all manufactured goods and tropical agriculture produce into the EEC without reciprocal preferences for EEC goods. These provisions covered over 96 percent of ACP's total exports to the EEC.[206] This seemingly high number, however, has to be put into perspective: With the tariff reductions negotiated in the Kennedy Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the 60s and the introduction of the **Generalized System of Preferences** (GSP) in the 70s, benefits stemming from preferential access to the EEC market began to erode.[207] On 1 July 1971 the EEC's GSP granted non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory tariff cuts for selected agricultural products and most (semi-)finished industrial products to 91 independent developing countries in order to help them boost export earnings and accelerate industrialization.[208] Moreover, as has been presented in the previous section on the economic background throughout the 60s, the preferential treatment of the AASM did not seem to have any exceptional influence on the ability of African countries to increase their trade with Europe faster than other developing countries, let alone faster than EEC trade with other industrialized countries.

With the benefits from preferential access further eroding due to GSP tariff cuts throughout the 70s, the ACP countries were especially rigid in their claims for an export revenue stabilization scheme, called **Stabex**. Under this scheme ACP countries could redeem export losses resulting from fluctuations in prices or production quantities of unprocessed goods that exceeded a certain threshold value. While better-off countries had to repay funds, most countries would get this support in the form of a non-repayable grant. However, the fund later showed serious shortcomings: Stabex funds did not have to be used to help the ailing industry that it was actually received for. Stabex funds were so robbed of their *raison d'être* and ended up being used for many things but not for compensating exporters for losses incurred due to fluctuations.[209] Favoring price stabilization of

[206] See Cosgrove Twitchett, *Europe and Africa*, 149-151.

[207] The trade enhancing effect of preferential tariffs for ACP countries are the bigger, the higher the tariff difference relative to the CET. Since ACP countries are charged lower import duties than third countries, ACP exporters are afforded a price advantage vis-à-vis those of the rest of the world. Hence, when the CET is lowered also benefits derived from preferential access to the European market are diminished; see Grilli, *The European Community and the developing countries*, 152.

[208] This was possible only after Raúl Prebisch as Secretary-General of UNCTAD was successful in his claims for a redefinition of the **Most Favored Nation** principle within GATT to enable developed countries to favor developing countries without granting the same tariff rates to other industrialized countries; see Axel Borrmann, Christine Borrmann, and Manfred Stegger, *The EC's generalized system of preferences* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1981), 26-31.

[209] See John Ravenhill, "What is to Be Done for Third World Commodity Exporters? An Evaluation of the STABEX Scheme," *International Organization* 38, no. 3 (1984): 541-544.

certain, mostly unprocessed, goods does also perpetuate a certain export structure and hinders diversification across a number of different exports by rendering the choice to allocate scarce resources to the production of goods that are not covered by Stabex less attractive.[210]

The Lomé Convention also contained a separate chapter on **industrial cooperation** which closely resembled a memorandum presented by the ACP countries at the ministerial conference in Jamaica in July 1974. The temporary political victory of ACP states to include this memorandum in the final Convention should not obscure the fact that this area, more so than others, depended on "*[…] a serious political will to translate intentions into concrete actions.*"[211] Concerning **financial and technical assistance** 3,000 million European Units of Account (EUA) should be made available from the EDF, thereof 2,100 million EUA in the form of grants, 430 million EUA in the form of special loans, 95 million EUA in the form of risk capital, and up to 375 million EUA for Stabex. Another 390 million EUA were to be made available from the EIB in the form of loans.[212] When taking into account the rapid inflation of the 70s, the ACP countries had considerably less funds at their disposal than the AASM under the second Yaoundé Convention, albeit this reduction may also be explained with the difficult economic situation in Europe in the 70s.[213]

Finally, regarding **institutions** two main changes compared to Yaoundé shall be pointed out: Firstly, the Parliamentary Conference was replaced with the **Consultative Assembly**, composed of MEPs and members designated by the ACP states, not necessarily from African parliaments. Many Commonwealth countries had weak parliaments and wanted the free choice of sending any representatives they saw fit. Secondly, the Lomé Convention did not provide for judicial institutions. The Yaoundé Court of Arbitration was in fact never convened and the ACP states preferred a more flexible formula for settling disputes. Hence, Lomé provides for *ad hoc* arbitration able to issue binding decisions only if the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers fails to reach a political agreement.[214]

The first Lomé Convention was seen as a major step away from Association towards a more comprehensive partnership of equals. However, by the late 70s the situation should have already changed completely and the second Lomé Convention was signed in a much less enthusiastic spirit – the myth of equal partnership in Eurafrican relations was demystified in less than a decade.[215]

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[210] See Friedrich, Park, and Wiegelmann, *Entwicklungspolitik der EG*, 7.

[211] Isebill V. Gruhn, "The Lomé Convention: Inching Towards Interdependence," *International Organization* 30, no. 2 (1976): 257.

[212] The European Units of Account (EUA) were a denomination of accounting currency constructed by the European Commission. EUA were based on the relative value of the currencies of the EEC's nine member states in fixed quantities and, unlike the u/a, calculated on a daily basis to assess its current value. It was replaced in December 1978 with the creation of the European Monetary System by the European Currency Unit (ECU); see Horst Ungerer, *A concise history of European monetary integration: from EPU to EMU* (Westport, Conn. [et al.]: Quorum Books, 1997), 137.

[213] See Cosgrove Twitchett, *Europe and Africa*, 156.

[214] See Ibid., 159-160.

[215] See Mir A. Ferdowsi, "Das Abkommen von Lomé - Modell oder Mythos?," in *Die Verträge von Lomé zwischen Modell und Mythos: Zur Entwicklungspolitik der EG in der Dritten Welt,* ed. Mir A. Ferdowsi, Politik - Recht - Gesellschaft 5 (München: Minerva-Publikation, 1983), 26.

Conclusion

> "*Ah, how fine and how good it would be should Europe be able to become a fraternal and organised entity in which each people would find its prosperity and its security. This also holds true for the world. How marvellous it would be to see disappear all the differences of race, language, ideology and wealth, all the rivalries, all the frontiers that have always divided the world.*"[216]
>
> Charles de Gaulle, 27 November 1967

In this work I suggest that the history of early European Integration – defined as the time between the Rome Treaty and the successful conclusion of the Northern Enlargement – was influenced a great deal by France's and Britain's colonial legacies. The negotiations of the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions were portrayed because they provide a complementary picture of the same phenomenon. In the course of my research I have found that especially France attributed a high priority to the fate of her overseas territories: The *Union française* was created together with the Fourth Republic in 1946 and for the first time named overseas territories, not colonies, but Overseas Departments and Territories and Associated States and Territories. The French Union was short-lived an replaced in 1958 by the *Communauté française* of the Fifth Republic, which was an overt attempt to avert independence of *France Afrique* and tie it to the French metropolis enduringly. The African territories had to consent to the French Community by way of a referendum and were faced with a 'take it or leave it' attitude. De Gaulle – the French President had an omnipotent role within the French Community – made it clear that should any African territory vote no, this meant losing the 'goodwill' and support of France. In the event, only Guinea voted no and soon found all of her bank credits stopped, technicians and supply ships prevented from arriving, administrative personnel, light bulbs and telephone wires withdrawn, aid offered to the enemies of the regime, and recognition as a new state refused. But also the French Community was short-lived and withered away by the summer of 1960 – Guinea managed to receive international recognition and to replace French aid with foreign aid from other sources – as the African territories realized that independence was indeed an option, even without the support of the former colonial power.[217] The Algerian War – still ongoing at the time of Britain's first accession bid – serves as another example of France's willingness to take major pains in order to retain tight control over her African territories. In the context of European Integration this translated first into adding to the EEC the policy of Association, and second into blocking the UK, and with it Anglophone Africa, from joining the EEC framework.

The first chapter highlighted the situation surrounding the Rome Treaty negotiations. The introductory section on the economic background has undoubtedly shown that France had a very

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[216] CVCE, "Press conference held by General de Gaulle at the Elysée (27 November 1967)."

[217] France eventually realized that dependency was no longer to be attained and the French Community was altered to allow for independence of constituent territories. It was then that France increasingly went along with her former colonies towards their *voie de l'indépendance*; see Marjorie Lister, *The European Community and the developing world: the role of the Lome Convention*, Reprinted. (Aldershot [et al.]: Avebury, 1990), 3-10.

different position towards European Integration and African Association than any other country. Only Belgium could to some extent be projected to develop sympathy for the French position. Still, it took some time for her to be convinced. France clearly counted on what could be termed 'confrontative politics' in the course of the negotiations in this particular field, much to the dismay of Germany and the Netherlands, who ultimately acquiesced grudgingly to French demands. As has been shown also, France too had a major interest in not letting the negotiations fail over the question of Association in order to lock in all the benefits already successfully negotiated in the course of the EEC and Euratom talks. In the ensuing Yaoundé negotiations the group of countries favoring Association and those rejecting it remained unchanged, but France and the European Commission formed a common bloc.

Chapter two dealt with the Northern Enlargement in general and the British accession bid in particular. The section on the economic background throughout the 60s addressed the question of the development of trade with the African countries as well as the process of Europeanization, then in full swing. Concerning the first French veto, I have argued that – apart from French desires to formulate the CAP uninfluenced by the British – the Faschoda Syndrom might be a worthwhile complementary line of argumentation: In the beginning 60s many of the British colonies were still dependent territories and Britain has made it very clear that she wished to associate all her overseas territories under the Yaoundé Convention, regardless of their own peculiarities. If then France could benefit immensely within Europe from the process of Europeanization to the detriment of the outsider UK much in the same way as French-Africa could benefit in Africa at the expense of the outsiders in British-Africa, why should de Gaulle not act in line with France's vested interests and veto Britain's application? – just as all other EEC member states devised their national positions in line with their vested interests.[218] This line of argumentation is corroborated by the high priority France has allotted to the question of French-Africa in the course of the Rome Treaty negotiations. If the well-being of French-Africa was this big issue for France then, how reasonable is it to assume that is has lost all of its illuminating power for the French position in the 60s? – at a time when, not least due to the Algerian War for independence, the question of French overseas territories in Africa was still highly visible. If this is correct, then the influence of Europe's colonial legacies on the process of early European Integration could indeed be the missing link to fully understand it.

As for relations within the **institutional triangle** the dominant actors clearly were the Council of Ministers and the European Commission, with the EP exerting influence indirectly at best.[219] The Commission has been given an extensive and wide-ranging role under the Rome Treaty provisions, probably as a compromise struck by France and Germany to mitigate potential conflicts in this field in the future. In fact, it was an unwritten rule between 1958 and 1984 that the Commissioner concerned with Association was a Frenchman, while the Director-General was to be a German. The objective of this provision was first and foremost that the German official should support his French Commissioner rather than become active himself; and thus keep French-German relations unclouded.[220] While the Commission held notable powers in the selection and implementation of

[218] The same arguments can be largely applied to de Gaulle's second veto.

[219] While the EP did not manage to influence policies directed at Sub-Sahara Africa profoundly, its influence concerning development aid towards other parts of the world was decisive. For example, in the mid-1970s a small programme for Asia and Latin America was set up on the EP's initiative; see Carbone, *The European Union and international development*, 32.

[220] See Ibid., 39.

projects under both the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions, its limited ability to influence the overall process of policy formulation has been striking and demonstrated at various points. Most notably during the Yaoundé negotiations, with all Six member states very eager to retain tight control over the course of negotiations, the Commission essentially restricted itself to support France. During the Lomé Convention the Commission was in a better position but again the decisive decisions were taken by the Council of Ministers alone. Tellingly also, the Commission started an initiative to address the lack of harmonization among member states concerning bilateral aid in 1972 but failed to make any progress. "*The reaction […] must have been so negative that no further action in the field of aid harmonization and coordination was proposed in any of the subsequent documents of the Commission on development policies […].*"[221] Only in the Treaty of Maastricht would some tentative formulation on the coordination of aid be reached.[222]

DEVELOPMENT AFTER LOMÉ I

The Lomé negotiations in the first half of the 70s were indeed special in their circumstances. The entry of the former colonial power Britain has tipped the scales within the EEC in favor of the globalists who wanted better relations with non-French speaking parts of the world for a long time. In addition, the vulnerability of western economies to the ruptured supply of certain commodities, above all oil, has demonstrated the interdependency of North-South relations and given the ACP countries a special bargaining position to bring about changes in North-South relations. The developing countries certainly hoped the trend would continue in their favor, but it did not. By the beginning 80s, prices for oil and non-oil commodities have slumped – throwing developing countries into a serious debt crisis – while prices for goods and services from industrialized countries have rocketed, not least due to inflation. The ACP countries found it difficult to bring something to the bargaining table that was of real value to the EEC. Additionally, by then ACP countries have lost their image as 'victims' of the outside world and were no longer seen to be 'entitled' to development aid. As a consequence their domestic policies came under increased scrutiny and were identified as the prime reason for their sub-standard economic performance. Aid was hence made increasingly conditional on good governance and the implementation of 'good' policies that was closely scrutinized by international organizations. The situation between 1975 and 1980 has indeed changed so much that some contemporary observers noted that a simple extension of the first Lomé Convention would have to be considered a respectable deal for the ACP states. In fact, the only significant innovation in the second Lomé Convention then was **Sysmin**, a system to promote mine output in ACP countries – primarily to ensure mineral supplies to European consumers.[223]

By the time the third Lomé Convention entered into force in 1986, the EEC has changed substantially due to the **Southern Enlargement** of Greece, Spain, and Portugal. The main underlying theme of their entry negotiations was how to improve the meagre shape of their own economies and how to

[221] Grilli, *The European Community and the developing countries*, 82

[222] See Simon Hartmann, "Between Ambitions and Realities: The Pathway of European Development Cooperation since Maastricht," *ÖFSE Working Paper* 24 (2009): 7-8. Available at http://www.oefse.at/Downloads/publikationen/WP_European_Development.pdf (29 July 2009).

[223] See Grilli, *The European Community and the developing countries*, 36-37.

protect the EEC9 from the expected impact of these impoverished countries joining the EEC. Although their colonial ties were a distant remnant of a glorious past and – unlike in the case of the UK – not among the most contentious issues in the course of entry negotiations, the Southern Enlargement did have some serious ramifications for Europe's relations with developing countries: The warmer climate of southern Europe did have some impact on the agricultural nature of the EEC in that certain tropical fruits could henceforth be grown within Europe under the CAP directly. Also, the new member states brought with them their own emphasis on countries with which they had historic and economic ties – above all Latin America and the Mediterranean. In any case, colonial ties with Africa were clearly limited in scope and importance and hence did not feature more prominently in this work. The collapse of the Soviet Union then completely changed the political realities of the outgoing twentieth-century and the interest in the ACP area deteriorated even further; The EU clearly refocused its development efforts towards Central and Eastern Europe.[224]

On 23 June 2000 the Lomé Conventions were replaced by the **Cotonou Agreement**. Conditionality was the paradigm of development cooperation at the time and hence references to democracy, human rights, rule of law etc. are explicitly mentioned in the text as a prerequisite to receive development aid - something that was completely unthinkable in the years of Lomé I. Another salient feature of Cotonou is the explicit inclusion of the civil society and NGOs. Furthermore, with the establishment of six different regions of ACP countries as potential signatories of the Agreement rather than with all ACP countries conjunctively, regional integration should be supported. Least Developed Countries were supported with the **Everything but Arms** initiative of 2001, which gave them the right to freely export everything but arms and ammunition to the European market.[225] It may be but years before success or failure of these recent policies may be soundly determined.

As for the **effectiveness of past policies** – starting from the Rome Treaty over the Yaoundé Conventions through all four Lomé Conventions – a myriad of studies and papers have analyzed the impact on beneficiary countries. Naturally, these works have usually looked at EC Aid and bilateral aid from member states in conjunction, since the latter makes up the bulk of development aid from Europe. Without going into the details of the different conclusions that have been drawn, I think it suffices to restate the latest statistical figures from the introduction: Sub-Sahara Africa today is the main battleground for UN peacekeeping missions, the least developed region applying the HDI as a measure, and the region facing the most serious problem concerning undernourishment. In the light of these numbers it is stating the obvious when saying that the policies of the past have largely failed to achieve any lasting results. If this outcome is to blame on the policies themselves or on how they were implemented in Africa is certainly a much more controversial question to address. In any case, it is my impression that the great majority of politicians and officials engaged in shaping Eurafrican relations throughout the period surveyed in this paper had the best of intentions when formulating policies to help Sub-Sahara Africa on its way towards social and economic development. Unfortunately, also good intentions can be the basis for bad policies.

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[224] See Carbone, *The European Union and international development*, 32-33.

[225] Similar as with the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions, the potential trade enhancing effect of such preferential treatment has to be judged in relation to the tariff rates levied on imports from countries not receiving the same preferential treatment.

THE NATURE OF EUROPE

I would like to end my master thesis in European Union Studies with my own account on what I perceive to be the nature of Europe. Certainly, after three years of dealing quite extensively with questions related to the process of European Integration and after one semester of dealing exclusively with the very early stages of the EEC researching for this work, I have developed a certain desire to record my own stance on the matter. Also, I think it is interesting for some readers to see that the teaching work done at the 'Jean Monnet Centres of Excellence' does resonate with the students. The question that I will try to approach is: What is the European Dream? I am quite surprised, after all, that my answer comes close to what de Gaulle seemed to have in mind, at least judging from the quote at the beginning of this conclusion.

The United States of America are often used as a point of departure when considering the nature of the European Union, political or otherwise. I would like to pick up this conduct and start my deliberations on the European Dream with the American Dream. The **American Dream** defines a relatively homogeneous set of values that everybody is invited to accept and on the basis of which everybody can integrate into the American society to eventually become a hyphenated American. While this is marvelous and a splendid approach very much in tune with that country's history, it can hardly be the way forward for Europe, simply because Europe is blessed with so many different traditions and languages that renders each attempt to define a coherent set of 'universal' values obsolete. The European Dream has to be markedly different from the American Dream.

The **European Dream**, as I understand it, is the wish of our forefathers that the very different peoples of Europe, which so often immersed the European soil with their blood in the past in what Stefan Zweig described as *Bruderkrieg*, should come together in a peaceful union to form something new in the future, something unwitnessed in the history of modern mankind: People of different creed, language and mentality living together without trying to convert each other or turning against each other in any form, but focusing on the connecting underlying quality of being human to arrive at deep mutual respect and understanding. To propel this dream spillovers into the civil society have to be promoted – if not pushed – and European exchanges will have to be increased exponentially on all levels, giving people of all ranks more and higher incentives to leave the 'protected habitat' of their national home countries. Also, I think it will be vital to agree on increased efforts in teaching English as a foreign language across Europe to facilitate the crossing of borders and the exchange of views.

If that is indeed the European Dream, its realization may not be contained to a single continent. If we Europeans prove that humans are in fact capable of leaving old stereotypes behind and form a new, common people of equals in spite of differing languages and cultural characteristics we have not only changed Europe, but we have indeed changed the face of the world.

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Salzburg, am…….

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